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Abstract
As a classical scholar and prominent founding father, James Wilson was at once
statesman, judge, and political thinker, who read Cicero as an example worthy of
emulation and as a philosopher whose theory could be applied to his own age. Classical
reception studies have focused on questions of liberty, civic virtue, and
constitutionalism in the American founding, and historians have also noted Wilson’s
importance in American history and thought. Wilson’s direct engagement with Cicero’s
works, however, and their significance in the formulation of his own philosophy has
been long overlooked.
My thesis argues that Wilson’s viewpoint was largely based on his readings of
Cicero and can only be properly understood within this context. In the first two
chapters of my thesis I demonstrate that Wilson not only possessed a wide-ranging
knowledge of the classics in general, but also that he borrowed from Cicero’s writings
and directly engaged with the texts themselves. Building upon this foundation, chapters
three and four examine Cicero’s perspective on popular sovereignty and civic virtue,
situate Wilson’s interpretations within contemporary discussions of Roman politics, and
analyse the main ways in which he adapts Cicero’s arguments to his own era. Wilson
retains a broader faith in the common people than seen in Cicero’s opinions, and he
abstracts from Cicero a doctrine of sovereignty as an indivisible principle that is absent
in the text; nevertheless, Cicero’s conception of a legitimate state and his insistence on
the role of the people provided the foundation for Wilson’s thought and ultimately for
his legitimization of the American Revolution. At the same time, like Cicero, Wilson
views the stability of the state as resting in the personal virtue of the individual. While
his enlightenment philosophy imparts optimism to his conception of the good citizen,
his definition of virtue closely follows that of Cicero. As the final chapter of my thesis
concludes, their individual interpretations of these theories of popular consent and
virtue were instrumental in forming Cicero’s and Wilson’s justifications of civil
disobedience.
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Abbreviations
Names of ancient authors and works are abbreviated following the usage of the Oxford
Classical Dictionary.
All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.
1Introduction
The central premise of constitutionalism is to promote a rule of law rather than anarchy
or despotism; thus, it seeks to maintain the balance between right and power that
provides stability in a world of shifting ideologies and political unrest.1 In this way, the
fundamental topics of constitutionalism, such as the effects of different forms of
government, the balance between strong laws and institutions and the liberty of the
people, and the relation between ideologies, custom, and written law, directly engage
with the complex problems we currently face. Present troubles, such as unstable
governments and the violation of law by rogue actors, pose one of the greatest dangers
to society and demonstrate the importance of political philosophies. As the United
States fails in the attempt to export democratic ideals and confronts the question of
whether it is in fact possible to rebuild or implement democracy in middle-eastern
nations, the necessity of considering the principles of constitutional government
becomes more evident.
In this context, the rapid decline in the study of the classics over the past century
appears insignificant and unconnected to current international affairs. Not long ago, the
belief that the classics served primarily in providing practical instruction in political and
domestic life aided their study and supplied an unchallenged argument for their
relevance.2 Nevertheless, while we no longer read the ancient texts as a simple answer
to modern day inquiries, they remain of primary importance in evaluating the
implications of past political theories and understanding how they continue to affect the
present.3
Therefore, in this thesis, I offer a focused examination of how two statesmen and
political theorists addressed the essential questions of popular sovereignty and civic
virtue at times when the fate of their own societies hung in the balance. The texts of
Cicero at the end of the Roman Republic and the legal lectures of James Wilson at the
founding of the United States provide a glimpse into two key moments in the history of
political thought.
1 McIlwain (1958)21-22, 136-137; cf. Pangle (1988) 7.
2 Winterer (2002) 16-20, 133, 138 on the ideological shift in the study of classicism.
3 Sirico (2009) 392-393.
2In the construction of his own legal doctrines, Wilson looked to the authority of
the classical texts and particularly to Cicero to justify his theories. In addressing the
direct connection between these two authors, I hope to demonstrate that in this narrow
topic, as in the larger field of political thought, it is only by understanding where we
have come from that we can make sense of where we currently stand.
1. Reception studies and the American founding
Despite disagreement over the precise nature of the classical influence in early
American thought and questions regarding the direct employment of texts, the obtaining
of quotations from intermediary sources, and the degree of classical knowledge this use
represents, previous scholarship has established the prominent place of classical
literature in the philosophy and discourse of the American Founding.4 As a result of an
education centred on the Greek and Roman texts and a culture that relied on the
authority of the ancients in the fashioning of governmental structures and political
ideals, the Founding Fathers shared a similar intellectual experience. This universal
language of the classics became an inseparable part of their writings and debates.
In understanding the founders’ use of the classical texts, two important facts
must be noted. First, it is significant to note that the reception of the classics in the
American colonies was not wholly unique. Despite the individual viewpoints and
circumstances governing the founders’ readings of the classics, they were drawing on a
long-standing tradition of political thought that utilised the classical texts.5 In
particular, the English and Scottish authors whose works were widely-read in the
colonies not only received a similar education in the classical texts and languages but
frequently cited the classics, examined and praised the institutions of the Roman
Republic as a model of government, and looked to classical heroes as examples of
political success and civic virtue.6
4 Richard (2008) and Malamud (2009) represent two of the more recent studies supporting this position.
5 See Millar (2002), especially chapters three and four, on the influence of the Roman Republic from the
political thought of the Middle Ages into Seventeenth-Century England.
6 Ayres (1997) 2-4, 12-13, 47, 51, 55-60; cf. Sher (2006) 503-504 on the influence of the Scottish
Enlightenment authors in early America.
3The second factor of importance is the reality of other interrelated threads
forming the fabric of American political thought. The classics were not the only
sources used by the founders. The period of the American Revolution was characterised
by a number of diverse and even competing philosophies that became integrated into
one overarching tradition.7
Within this broad sphere of scholarship, this thesis analyses the ways in which
one prominent leader in the American founding interacted with the writings of Cicero in
a way that shaped his identity and political philosophy. Originally trained as a student
in the classics and intended for the ministry, Wilson became one of the foremost
lawyers in the American colonies and an active statesman during the formation of the
new republic, signing the Declaration of Independence, assisting James Madison in
writing the Constitution, and playing a prominent role in the Federal Convention. Later,
he would become the first professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania and a
justice on the first Supreme Court. In light of Wilson’s career as a statesman and
politician, it is not surprising that Cicero stands as a central figure in Wilson’s life and
thought. Modern scholars draw attention to the union of philosophy and politics in
Cicero’s life,8 and for Wilson this association held personal relevance. Despite his
strong propensity for scholarship, he was not content to confine himself to academics
and sought a broader field in which to exercise his talents.9 Making a conscious
comparison between himself and Cicero, Wilson looked to this ancient Roman as an
example of one who devoted himself to the state, who successfully combined the duties
of both an active and contemplative life, and whose political theories provided a
practical source of guidance.
A problem often encountered in classical reception studies of the American
founding is that these studies often generalise terms and do not clearly differentiate
between the individual founders or between the precise classical texts they studied.
Despite his praise of Carl Richard’s The Founders and the Classics, James McLachlan
makes the justified criticism that Richard fails to adequately define the “founders” or fix
his argument within a specified historical context.10 This same tendency occurs not
7 For a helpful summary, see Rossiter (1963) 64-75 on the chapter “The Sources of Political Thought”.
Cf. Agresto, (1977) 481.
8 Powell, J. G. F. (1995) 2; cf. Lintott (2008) 423-424.
9 McCloskey (1967) 9.
10 McLachlan (1995) 201.
4only among scholars defending a direct correlation between the classics and early
American political theory, but also appears among those who argue that the classics
were primarily a specious show of classical knowledge. In his work The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution, for instance, Bernard Bailyn provides examples of
founders who drew diversely from the political and literary traditions preceding them;
nevertheless, he also makes some sweeping assumptions about the “founders” as a
whole. Some generalisations must be made in these types of studies, particularly since
many of the founders were united by a similar ideology and a comparative education in
the classics. Nonetheless, among the individual founders there was a significant
variation in their degree of classical knowledge, their approach to the texts, and their
opinions regarding the various classical authors and their works. Thomas Jefferson’s
declared affinity for the tenets of Epicureanism and John Adams’s typification of the
virtues of the Stoic sage are two such examples.11 In this thesis, therefore, I aim to
focus on Wilson’s unique relation to the Ciceronian texts.
At the same time, it is necessary to briefly contextualise Wilson’s place among
his contemporaries as well as to note the universal regard that marked the founders’
opinion of Cicero. During the American Revolution and the framing of the
Constitution, the founders’ conception of ancient Rome served as the supreme model of
a republic that ensured both liberty and security, and they extolled her citizens as
examples of patriotic devotion, virtue, and industry.12 Viewing themselves and their
place in history in light of these classical exemplars, the founders saw their struggle for
freedom and their construction of a new republic as an opportunity to match the deeds
of their ancient counterparts and even surpass them in forming a more lasting and
prosperous state.13
For a group of men who had a great respect for the classical authors, several
aspects of Cicero’s life held special appeal. The republicanism of the American
colonies adopted Cicero’s emphasis on virtue, higher law, and devotion to the state and
the common good, and employed these principles in the development of theories of
independence and resistance.14 Educated men such as Wilson made specific use of
11 MacKendrick (1977) 101-102.
12 Reinhold (1984) 101; cf. Richard (2008) 97; Malamud (2009) 12.
13 Richard (2008) 128; Malamud (2009) 3. Cf. Ayres (1997) 14 on a similar viewpoint in Great Britain,
which admired the deeds and institutions of Greece and Rome, but also aimed at surpassing them.
14 Skinner (1978) 1:54-55; Wood, G. S. (1969) 100-103; Nicgorski (1984) 564.
5Cicero’s texts and political philosophy; in particular the glorified image of Cicero as a
patriot who sacrificed himself in an attempt to preserve the liberty of the republic
against tyranny captured the American imagination. In a letter to Adams, for instance,
Jefferson describes Cicero’s letters as the “purest effusions of an exalted patriot”.15
Other classical heroes provided similar examples of patriotism, such as Cincinnatus,
who sought the good of his country rather than personal gain or private ambition.16 At
Valley Forge, Washington ordered a performance of Joseph Addison’s Cato, as a source
of inspiration for the weary troops, while Patrick Henry and Nathan Hale also quoted
from the play in their speeches.17 Nonetheless, Cicero occupied the first position in the
American consciousness.18
Cicero’s years as an advocate and his texts on oratory provided practical
examples for young attorneys, and his philosophical writings provided a theoretical
justification for the separation from Great Britain. In addition, his political career and
consulship marked him as a great statesman. In exalting Cicero as a model of sacrificial
patriotism, the colonials considered Caesar and Antony as archenemies of Cicero and
the Republic, which they viewed as representing the principles of personal and political
liberty.19 Although based on a biased perspective of the events of Cicero’s life, the
colonial mindset regarded Cicero’s suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, his
eventual condemnation of Caesar’s tyranny, and his final conflict with Antony as
emblematic of their own struggle against Great Britain. The example Antonius
introduces in de Oratore 2.31.134 of Opimius killing Gracchus in defiance of statute but
by the order of the Senate and to preserve the state, not only holds relevance for
Cicero’s own complaint against Clodius for engineering his exile, but also prompts the
same question the American colonists believed themselves to be considering: whether
one can be justified in protecting the state even if it entails acting against the laws. In a
similar manner, they couched their decision to separate from Great Britain in terms of
law and justice, arguing that they upheld the tradition of liberty against those who
threatened it.
15 Cappon (1959) 549.
16 Richard (2008) 125-126.
17 Malamud (2009) 9-10; Richard (2008) 151.
18 Winterer (2002) 25.
19 Richard (2008) 156. Cf. Malamud (2009) 17-18 on a helpful comparison between the American view
of Caesar and the more equivocal position he held in European history.
6Wilson’s use of this reasoning mirrors Cicero’s own attempt to employ history
and legal philosophy as a justification of his political courses of action. Like the other
founders, Wilson accepted Cicero as an authority and his writings as a source of
practical instruction, although at times he critiqued Cicero’s theory and position. While
Wilson’s approach to the classics is similar to the analysis offered by other founders,
however, two key points should be made regarding his unique relation to his
contemporaries.
First, even among the classically educated of the founders, Wilson’s high degree
of learning and scholarship set him apart. The significant part he played in the debates
at the Constitutional Convention attest to his knowledge, oratorical powers, and the
convincing force of his arguments.20 At that time, as well as in later years, many would
consider him the foremost of the founders in the intellectual powers he brought to bear
on the legal and theoretical aspects of the new constitution.21
The second main way Wilson stands out as unique among the founders is the
difficulty in wholly aligning him with any single political position. Despite his
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament, one of the earliest statements denying the legislative authority of
Parliament over the colonies, he was accused by many of opposing the American cause
because of his initial reluctance to sign the Declaration of Independence. In reality, this
hesitation was founded not only upon his unwillingness to exceed the powers entrusted
to him as a delegate of the Pennsylvania assembly, but also upon his fear that anarchy
would result if independence was declared before another stable form of government
was instituted to take its place.22
Wilson’s position during the adoption of the Constitution also provoked
criticism from those on both sides of the political line. His affinity with conservatives
in Pennsylvania led many to accuse him of being an aristocrat, while his firm stance in
favour of the Constitution caused him to differ from the Anti-Federalists.23 At the same
time, unlike many of the other founders and even more so than Jefferson, he retained an
20 Alexander (1906) 3.
21 Tansill (2005) 101 on William Pierce’s praise of Wilson. Cf. Obering (1938) 8; cf. Alexander (1906)
8, 10 on the high commendation Wilson received from James Bryce, author of the American
Commonwealth, and from John Marshall Harlan, former senior Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, who also affirmed the principal intellectual place Wilson held among the founders.
22 Seed (1978) 11-14; Smith (1956) 83, 89.
23 Bennett (1928) 49; Seed (1978) 127.
7unwavering faith in the people and viewed them as the practical foundation of every
form of government.24 In the debates at the Constitutional Convention, he consistently
endorsed a more popular control of government than that advocated by his
contemporaries. Throughout his career, Wilson thus joined a wholehearted belief in the
people with a desire for a strong consolidated government.
2. Method and texts
Delivered after the passing of the Constitution in 1787, Wilson’s Law Lectures,
although frequently forgotten in studies of the American founding, represent the
reflections on constitutional theory as imparted by one whose historical knowledge and
legal understanding was unparalleled among his contemporaries.25 Furthermore, similar
to Cicero’s purpose in de Officiis, they epitomize Wilson’s desire to record and preserve
the legacy he imparted to the United States. By passing on to later generations of
American leaders a systematic account of the legal philosophy upholding the
Constitution, he also aimed at inspiring them to uphold the principles on which he
believed the continuance, success, and prosperity of the new nation depended.
A brief summary of the lectures assists in establishing how Wilson’s use of
Cicero fits within the context of his work as a whole. The legal lectures were published
in 1804 by Bird Wilson, six years after his father’s death in 1798. Although Wilson had
intended them for publication, his attention was interrupted by the task of codifying the
laws of Pennsylvania, and he never finished editing the lectures. When acting as editor,
the younger Wilson separated them into sections and chapters but retained the original
unpolished lectures without removing any repetitions or altering the didactic form of
address.26 In part, the unrevised form of the lectures accounts for the minor errors that
occur in Wilson’s citations and may also be the reason why his works have not reached
24 Alexander (1906) 2-4; Bennett (1928) 47. Konkle (c.1900) 158-159 on the distinction between
Wilson’s and John Adam’s views of the people.
25 Smith (1956) 341. This view of Wilson’s jurisprudence and its continuing relevance was affirmed by
Simon Baldwin, former professor of law at Yale University and president of the American Bar
Association, who said that Wilson was “the real founder of what is distinctive in our American
jurisprudence” [Alexander (1906) 10].
26 Wilson, B. (1804) iii-iv, xiv. In my system of footnoting, I have used (Wilson, B.) when referring to
Bird Wilson, reserving (Wilson) for the works of James Wilson.
8a wider audience. The artificial chapters Bird Wilson imposed lend organisation and
continuity; however, the structure of the work would be apparent even without the titled
sections and it is clear that Wilson himself followed this plan of progression throughout
the lectures. This assumption is supported by Wilson’s statements in his preliminary
address giving the plan of his lectures, when he outlines the topics and direction of the
course.27
Wilson prepared three courses of lectures in 1790, after he was appointed the
first professor of law in the College of Philadelphia. During the winter of 1790-1791,
Wilson gave the first set of lessons. In the introductory lecture, Wilson explained the
purpose of the course, emphasised the essential role a legal education holds in a
democracy, and provided a brief overview of what he considered the fundamental
principles of law and government. Significantly, in a manner similar to Cicero in de
Legibus, Wilson purposely began not by examining specific legal codes or even the
United States Constitution, but rather by focusing on the theoretical basis of law. In his
opinion, although knowledge of the intricate details of law are highly useful for any
attorney, legislator, or citizen, the true and necessary study of law involves first and
foremost a comprehension of the philosophy of law itself.28
Wilson devoted the whole first set of lessons, therefore, to expounding these
principles. After the first introductory chapter, he examined the essence of law,
different types of law, and the doctrine of sovereignty. This chapter, entitled ‘Of the
General Principles of Law and Obligation,’ established the foundation of Wilson’s legal
theory and served as the starting point for the rest of the work. Chapters III-V then
addressed the categories of the law of nature, the law of nations, and municipal law,
while chapters VI-IX dealt with humans as individuals, as members of society, as
members of a confederation, and as members of a universal commonwealth. The final
four chapters study more disparate issues in a slightly less ordered fashion; here, Wilson
looked at the nature of government, the relation between the British constitution and
that of the United States, and the common law; finally, he concluded the course with
presenting an elaborate theory of evidence.
The second two sets of lectures were written for the following winter session
from 1791-1792; however, the course was interrupted in April of 1792 when the
27 Wilson (1804) 1:45-50.
28 Ibid. 1:14-15, 43-44.
9College of Philadelphia and the University of Pennsylvania were joined. Although
Wilson was at once given a professorship of law, the session was not completed, and
shortly afterward he turned instead to revising the laws of his state.29
The second set marks a clear division with Wilson’s earlier set of lectures.
Having completed his study on the nature of law, Wilson commenced the new term with
an evaluation of the specific statutes and governmental forms created by the
constitutions of Pennsylvania and the United States. Notably, Wilson did not hesitate to
critique the recent federal constitution, and in several important particulars he
commended the state of Pennsylvania as according more fully with the principles of
republican freedom.30 Chapters I-III dealt with the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments. In chapter IV, Wilson discussed the proper role of the courts, and then
went on in chapters V-IX to address different aspects of the courts and the individuals
associated with them: judges, juries, sheriffs and coroners, counsellors and attorneys,
and constables. He then ended with three respective chapters on corporations, citizens
and aliens, and the natural rights of the individual.
Compared to the other two sections, the third set of lectures is disproportionately
small and is concerned solely with crimes and punishments. Since it comes last and
Wilson was disrupted by being summoned to his other duties, it is likely that he never
delivered this set of lectures. Nonetheless, it adds an essential final element to the
lectures. In these lectures, Wilson addressed the nature of crimes, the purpose and
appropriateness of punishments, and ways law can be used to prevent and punish
crimes. As a whole, in studying the infringement of rights rather than their positive
aspect, the third section sheds light on many of the statements Wilson made in earlier
sections and enables readers to perceive what Wilson considered the practical
application of the common law.
Following the trend in Wilson’s lectures, my analysis in this thesis also focuses
primarily on de Officiis, together with an emphasis on de Republica and de Legibus.
The significance of these texts lies not only in Wilson’s frequent citation of them, but
also in their relation to Cicero’s own life. Composed within the period that
29 Wilson, B. (1804) iii-iv.
30 Wilson (1804) 2:144, 191-192 on the distinctions Wilson draws between the Pennsylvania Constitution
and the United States Constitution in their provisions for the election of senators and in the ability they
afford the president to appoint officers.
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encompassed Caesar’s assumption of power and eventual demise, his own exile and
return, and his final efforts to uphold the Republic against the machinations of Antony,
these works reflect Cicero’s consideration of the questions of civic virtue, resistance to
written law, and the best form of government at a time when his perspective was
profoundly shaped by the course of events.
In approaching the Ciceronian texts, I have chosen to use the texts as extant at
the time Wilson was reading them. In order to gain a greater understanding of Wilson’s
own interpretations and translations, therefore, even in my own examination of Cicero’s
theory and position, I have used the 1692 edition of Cicero’s works, edited by Gruter,
Wilhelm, and Gronovius, and the main copy available in the library at the University of
St. Andrews when Wilson was a student. When divergences occur with current
editions, however, I have noted them, a method which also aids in distinguishing
between the times when Wilson incorrectly cited the Ciceronian texts and when he was
merely following the old editions. The one exception to this rule is de Republica, for
which I have employed the Teubner edition of 1992 since the main portion of its extant
text comes from Angelo Mai’s discovery of the script in 1819 under a manuscript
containing Augustine’s commentary on the Psalms.31 Consequently, Appendix A
contains the text and fragments of de Republica extant at the time of Wilson’s lectures.
In Appendix B, I have listed the different works available in the eleven volume set of
Cicero’s texts. Since this thesis aims at providing a comprehensive picture of
Ciceronian reception in Wilson’s writings, the antiquated spelling and punctuation of
both Wilson’s own quotations and his translations of Cicero have been left intact.
In order to establish that Cicero’s works not only formed a significant portion of
the writings Wilson referenced in his lectures, but also that they helped to shape
Wilson’s political theory and interpretation of law, it is necessary to take a
comprehensive view of how Wilson slants the Ciceronian texts to fit within his own
political discourse. As Stanley Idzerda recognises in his review of Classical Traditions
in Early America,32 to seriously study the effect of the classics in the ideology of the
Founding Fathers, one cannot merely accumulate and compile data of the classical
references in their writings but must also be able to evaluate their perspectives in
31 For the history of the text, see Zetzel (1998) 33-34. Cf. Ziegler (1992) v.
32 This work, edited by John Eadie and published in 1976, contains chapters by noted authors like John
Eadie, Meyer Reinhold, and J.G.A. Pocock among others.
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comparison with a careful analysis of the classical traditions, viewpoints, and texts.33 In
the introduction to the book itself, John Eadie levels a basic criticism against scholars
like Richard Gummere whose method of measuring the affect of the classical tradition
is by “agglutinative procedure”.34 Nevertheless, as scholars acknowledge, this type of
documentation is still a vital part of identifying classical lines of thought in early
American writings. Thus far, research on Wilson’s works has failed to accomplish
adequately either the task of noting the classical quotations or of placing them within
the context of his legal theory. For instance, although in the most recent study on
Wilson, Mark David Hall provides a penetrating and detailed account of Wilson’s
political philosophy, he neglects to mention the fundamental role of the Ciceronian texts
in Wilson’s writings. In accounting for the influence of classical republicanism in
Wilson’s works, Hall makes generalisations about the classical tradition of thought, but
does not mention the classical texts and authors that played a role in the development of
Wilson’s legal theory.35
Therefore, this thesis has a two part objective: first, to establish the evidential
basis for Wilson’s knowledge of the Ciceronian texts and his direct engagement with
them, and second, to compare his approach with that of Cicero by examining several
fundamental ways in which Wilson employed the texts in order to support his own
philosophy. Undoubtedly, Wilson’s thought must be taken as a whole. The influence
of many previous thinkers is evident in his work and it is impossible neatly to
compartmentalise each contributing factor. Nonetheless, Wilson’s direct involvement
with Cicero is still evident throughout his writings, even as he reads the texts through
the filter of his predecessors and interprets them as relevant supports for his personal
views. Chapters one and two present the factual proof necessary for my first objective,
with chapter one demonstrating that the classical languages and texts were an essential
part of Wilson’s education and teaching, and chapter two analysing Wilson’s use and
translations of Cicero in his Law Lectures.
After laying this foundation, the second objective of placing Wilson’s use of the
texts within the broader context of Cicero’s work can be addressed. Scholars have
rightly pointed to popular sovereignty as the essential feature characterising Wilson’s
33 Idzerda (1978) 582.
34 Eadie (1976) x.
35 Hall (1997) 186-192.
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political thought,36 and civic virtue was the foundation on which it rested. In the
formulation of both these doctrines, Wilson attempted with greater and lesser success to
derive authority from Cicero’s works, claiming that they essentially aligned with his
own perspective. Consequently, chapters three and four respectively investigate the
relation of Cicero’s thought to popular sovereignty and his conception of the good
citizen, in conjunction with an examination of Wilson’s position on both these topics
and of his slant on the Ciceronian texts. Building upon this analysis, chapter five
explores the issue of resistance to written law, specifically looking at how their
individual interpretations of the concepts of civic virtue and popular sovereignty
allowed both Cicero and Wilson to construct a justification of civil disobedience that
supported their decisions of public policy. Ultimately, as these final chapters
demonstrate, despite his divergences from Cicero’s own viewpoint, Wilson’s readings
of Cicero formed an essential and determinative part of his political thought.
36 Konkle (c.1900) 421. Cf. Manin (1995) 154; Seed (1978) 7-9.
13
Chapter 1: Wilson and the classical tradition
His mind, while he spoke, was one blaze of light. Not a word ever fell from his lips out of
time, or out of place, nor could a word be taken from or added to his speeches without
injuring them.
Benjamin Rush’s description of James Wilson, Autobiography
There has been a vast array of scholarship already undertaken on the general reception
of the classics in the American founding. Since Richard Gummere’s groundbreaking
effort beginning in the early 20th century to trace the classical lines of influence in early
American thought, both classicists and historians have tried to pinpoint the diverse
components that contributed to the American tradition and have argued for conflicting
views. The many classical quotations and their apparent significance throughout the
founding era have been alternatively dismissed as mere “window dressing” or
highlighted as having exerted a “powerful and lasting effect on western culture”.1 The
debate has been particularly intense in regard to the impact of the classical texts and
whether they were mediated directly or indirectly through the English Whig political
writings. At the same time, scholars have sought to draw attention to the historical
awareness imparted by the classical texts and the ways in which early American writers
exploited their potent symbolism.2 What is not questioned, however, is the need to
explore further the classical backgrounds of prominent Americans and the various and
complicated functions of the classics in the founding of the United States.3
While later chapters study Wilson’s precise uses of the Ciceronian texts and
their role in his political thought and writings, it is first necessary to demonstrate that
Wilson possessed an ample knowledge of Cicero’s works and had direct access to the
texts he employs in his lectures, not citing them merely through an intermediary source.
Although it is generally accepted that the classics formed a vital part of the founders’
education,4 Wilson’s classical background and training have not been the subject of
scrutiny. Through the years, many scholars have asserted that the origins of Wilson’s
thought can be traced to such thinkers as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Reid, and
1 Bailyn (1967) 24; Wood, G. S. (2003) 88.
2 Pocock (1976) 256, 260.
3 Reinhold (1984) 19-20; Reinhold (1976) 35; Brooks (2009) xxxiii; cf. Reinhold (1976) 8-48 on a
general history of scholarship in this area. The nature of the classical tradition in America, although
always acknowledged, has been strongly contested, and while I cannot attempt to bring resolution to the
issue, I agree with Richard that many scholars, in emphasising the founders’ interaction with the Whig
tradition, have failed to sufficiently address the classical reading of the founders [Richard (1994) 5].
4 Richard (1994) 12-38; Winterer (2002) 10-15.
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other natural law philosophers.5 Singularly, however, none of these studies have
discussed Wilson’s connection with Cicero or his reliance on Cicero’s texts. This
chapter, therefore, establishes that the classics and particularly the Ciceronian texts were
fundamental in Wilson’s education, and it serves as an essential support to the claim of
the following chapter that the texts played a direct role in Wilson’s writing and political
thought.
1. Early education and teaching
While aspects of Wilson’s precise involvement with the classics are open to dispute, it
is undeniable that his knowledge of classical texts in general and of Cicero’s works in
particular goes far beyond a mere acquaintance with their topics and content. Wilson
was born in 1742 on a farm near St. Andrews, Scotland. Even during his years at a
classical grammar school near the small Scottish town of Cupar, Wilson is said to have
shown “proof of a fine genius a prompt capacity for learning and a steady application”.6
This description of his talents and study habits is confirmed by the fact that Wilson
received two bursaries during his time at the University of St. Andrews, one a general
Foundation bursar in 1757 and the second a Table bursar from St. Mary’s College in
1762.7
Although he originally entered the University of St. Andrews as a student of the
United College in 1757 and took the usual classes required during the four years of a
degree course, in 1761 Wilson enrolled as a student of Divinity in St. Mary’s College
5 None of the main studies on Wilson’s thought address his reliance on Cicero. Despite Wilson’s
dependence on Ciceronian texts throughout his development of natural law theory, O’Donnell (1937) fails
to mention their prominence in her study of Wilson’s philosophy of natural law. Delahanty (1969) seeks
to place Wilson squarely within the Aristotelian tradition of thought. Obering (1938) follows a similar
approach and contends that Wilson’s legal philosophy was heavily based on the thought of Thomas
Aquinas and also influenced by such natural law theorists as Richard Hooker. In direct contrast, Powell
maintains that the attempt to place Wilson in the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition is “overly
optimistic” and argues instead that the philosophical foundation for the thought of James Wilson should
ultimately be traced to Thomas Reid and other Scottish philosophers from the school of moral sense
[Powell, F. D. (1951) 364-365]. In his discussion of Wilson’s conception of natural law and rights,
Pascal argues that Wilson derived his theories from the inspiration of Francis Hutcheson’s A System of
Moral Philosophy (1755) [Pascal (1991) 61-91]. While Pascal is clearly correct in identifying the
similarities between these two writers, his analysis of Wilson’s thought also overlooks the importance of
the classical tradition.
6 Annan (1805).
7 Minutes (1736-1903); Minutes (1530-1962).
15
and seemed likely to fulfil his parents’ long-held intention for their eldest son to enter
the church.8 Upon his father’s death, however, Wilson left St. Andrews to serve as a
private tutor in a “gentleman’s house” and never returned to the study of divinity.9 In
contrast, his preoccupation with classical education and the classics themselves
continued.
The Library Receipt Book of Professors and Students recording the books
Wilson borrowed from the university library from the period 1757-1759 clearly attests
to his preference for the classics. Indeed, despite his status as a divinity student, he
checked out only one theological work.10 Other works Wilson checked out include
various essays, a biography, and fictional works.11 However, the majority of the books
Wilson borrowed from the library, even during his years at St. Mary’s College, were
either Greek and Latin texts or historical works on classical antiquity.12
Although the Library Receipt Book demonstrates that Wilson centred his reading
around classical texts during his university education, there is no evidence that he
actually checked out any of Cicero’s works. This does not prove, however, that he did
not read them. In fact, the library catalogues from the years Wilson attended the
university show that the Ciceronian texts formed an important subset of the classical
works available at that time. The holdings not only include biographies on Cicero, but
also every extant Ciceronian text of the time, available in a number of different
editions.13
The course of study Wilson would have followed also confirms his reading of
Cicero and his study of the classical languages. Even as late as 1845, those who
received bursaries from the United College or who sought a degree in the Arts were
required to pursue the traditional course of study that centred exclusively upon Latin
and Greek for the first session and then moved on to Latin, Greek, Logic and
8 Smart (2004) 953.
9 Annan (1805).
10 This was the Sermons by John Tillotson, an Archbishop of Canterbury and an influential writer who
stressed the practical side of Presbyterianism rather than its theological aspect.
11 Swift’s works, the Life of the Earl of Crawford, and a volume of plays were among these books.
12 Library Receipt Book (1752-1759) 143, 198. Strikingly, the list of books Wilson checked out is
disproportionately small compared to the lists of other students from these years. It is unlikely, however,
that these are the only works he read, especially since the bursaries he received bear witness to the careful
attention he paid his studies.
13 A Catalogue of Books (1744) 1, 7, 15, 18, 21, 28, 36; Reports (1738-1788) 10, 15, 38; A Catalogue of
the Books (1734-1763) 2, 46, 48, 52, 87, 109, 112, 114, 129, 146. The disparate page numbers occur
because the handwritten catalogues are not organised according to author or category.
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Mathematics.14 Cicero’s works formed a key component of the curriculum at the
University of St. Andrews, as the reports of professors in later years attest. Required
classes of Latin and Greek, the use of Cicero’s works, and exercises like the translation
of English passages into Latin, all helped form the central part of the students’ course of
study.15 For instance, in his report to the university commissioners, Dr. John Hunter
stated that texts from Horace, Virgil’s Georgics and Aeneid, Juvenal’s Satires, Livy’s
History, and Cicero’s orations formed the curriculum of his Latin classes, while Dr.
Thomas Gillespie said that his students “were in the habit of giving in Exercises in Latin
prose and Latin verse” and “translations of English passages into Latin prose”.16
The Ciceronian works in the University of St. Andrews Library also reveal that
Wilson had access to essentially the same corpus of Ciceronian texts as is currently in
print. One main edition of Cicero’s complete works available in the library at that time
was the eleven volume set published in 1692 under the complete title Marci Tullii
Ciceronis Opera Quae Extant Omnia ex MSS, Codicibus emendata, Studio atque
industria Jani Gulielmii et Jani Gruteri, additiis eorum notis integris: nunc denuo
recognita ab Jacobo Gronovio. As the library catalogues from 1738-1788 and 1826
attest, the precise edition currently in the special collections library was also present
during Wilson’s period of study and is not one of the rare editions of Cicero donated to
the library after Wilson’s departure.17 This edition contains essentially the same
Ciceronian corpus as currently in print, with de Republica as the one main
discrepancy.18 Aside from some minor changes, however, the fragments of book VI,
however, as well as the entire Somnium Scipionis, are the same as the text as it is extant
today, albeit with a different system of numbering than that used in current editions of
the text.19 Undoubtedly, the absence of de Republica as now extant represents a critical
14 Report of the St. Andrews University Commissioners (1845) viii-ix.
15 Evidence Oral and Documentary (1837) 38-42 on the report of Dr. J. Hunter, Professor of Humanity in
the United College; 50-56 on the report of Dr. T. Gillespie, Professor of Humanity in the United College;
56-57 on the report of Professor A. Alexander, Professor of Greek in the United College; 144-149 on the
report of Professor T. Duncan, Professor of Mathematics in the United College; 407 on the Provisional
Resolutions of the Commissions including mention of the Latin and Greek curriculum.
16 Ibid. 39, 52.
17 Reports (1738-1788) 38 and Catalogus (1826) 120. Catalogus lists the edition as printed in 1792;
however, this is a misprint, as evidenced by the pressmark L. 7. 18., which references the 1692 edition.
Reports correctly lists the date as 1692, as does the Author Catalogue (c.1980).
18 See Appendix A.
19 The Teubner edition not only has the modern system of numbering, but also includes the older system
which counts the Somnium Scipionis as an individual work.
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gap in Wilson’s ability to analyse Cicero’s political thought. Although Wilson had the
fragments from 1.25.39 on a commonwealth as a “thing of the people”, from 2.42.69
and 2.44.70 on the necessary role of justice in a state, and from 2.5.1.1-2 on the
importance of custom,20 the broader context of these quotations would have proved
useful in the construction of his arguments and his interpretation of Cicero’s work,
particularly those passages where Cicero examines the simple and mixed forms of
government (1.26.41-1.45.69) and the progression of the Roman state (2.1.1-2.39.66).
Significantly, Wilson still attempts to apply the fragments of de Republica to his
discussion on a mixed form of government, saying that Cicero “seems to have indulged
a fond speculative opinion, that a government formed of the three kinds, properly
blended and tempered, would, of all, be the best constituted”.21 From his careful effort
to modify the force of Cicero’s opinion, it is plain that Wilson recognises the lack of
context and the limitations he faces when quoting from this text.
Later, as a teacher of Latin at the College of Philadelphia, Wilson would still
have had access to similar editions, if not the same ones. Even after the Revolution, the
colonists’ editions of the classics were almost exclusively limited to British and
European imports.22 Additionally, the accessibility of Cicero’s texts also lends support
to the case that Wilson was more familiar with the Ciceronian texts than even his
specific quotations and references demonstrate. This is further confirmed by times
when Wilson quotes from different Ciceronian works than he used in the law lectures,
showing a greater knowledge of Cicero than he reveals in those works alone. For
instance, in his essay on the History of Property, Wilson provides two appropriate and
direct quotations from de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 3.20.67 and pro Sexto Roscio
Amerino 18.50-51: two sources he does not mention by name in the course of his
lectures.23
20 As the 1692 edition reveals, these fragments were obtained from August. De civ. D. 2.21 (see
Appendix A, pp. 197 and 199). The fragment from Cic. Rep. 1.25.39, however, is included in book III,
likely because De civ. D. 2.21 indicates that the quotation comes after Laelius’s defense of justice, when
Scipio renews his exposition on the definitions of a people and a commonwealth.
21 Wilson (1804) 1:416 (emphasis added).
22 Reinhold (1984) 29.
23 Wilson (1804) 3:183, 190. Wilson includes the translated quotation from Cic. Fin. in his discussion of
common possessions, that: “A publick theatre is common to all the citizens; but the seat which each
occupies may, during the entertainment, be denominated his own”. The Latin text, which Wilson does
not provide reads: Sed quem ad modum, theatrum cum commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius esse eum
locum quem quisque occuparit. Wilson’s use of the passage from Cic. Rosc. Am. includes both the Latin
and the English translation: Ab aratro arcessebantur, qui consules fierent…apud maiores nostros, summi
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During his work as a private tutor in Scotland, Wilson undoubtedly gained
practical experience in teaching the classics which aided him in the position of tutor in
the Latin department at the College of Pennsylvania soon after his emigration to the
American colonies in 1766. While there, he attained the highest marks yet achieved in
an examination on the classics, for which the trustees of the college awarded him an
honorary Master of Arts degree, “in consideration of his merit and his having had a
regular education in the universities of Scotland”.24 However, Wilson shortly resigned
from his position at the College in order to commence his legal studies under John
Dickinson.25
This affinity for Latin and for the studies of Rome rather than of Greece is a
consistent feature throughout Wilson’s education and teaching. For instance, despite his
frequent quotations from Latin authors, Wilson only twice references Thucydides
through the intermediary authors Samuel Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius.26 While this is
symptomatic of the founders’ general focus on Latin texts over Greek ones,27 it is worth
noting since Thucydides still formed an essential part of the reading matter of founders
like John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.28 Still, references and works from the Greek
period figure in Wilson’s lectures. In his introduction he praises the achievements and
excellence of the Greek theories of government.29 Later, in his discussion of juridical
practices, he especially praises what he considers to be the key features of Solon’s
system, such as being tried by a jury of one’s peers and submitting only to the laws
endorsed by the community as a whole.30 Consistently throughout his lectures, he
viri, clarissimique homines, qui omni tempore ad gubernacula reipublicae sedere debebant, tamen in
agris quoque colendis aliquantum operae temporisque consumserint (“Our consuls were called from the
plough. Those illustrious characters, who have been best qualified to manage the reins of government
with dignity and success, dedicated a part of their time and of their labour to the cultivation of their
landed estates”). In this quotation, the 1692 edition is consistent with the quotation as Wilson presents it;
one alteration appears in the Teubner edition, which is the use of consumpserint for consumserint.
24 Konkle (c.1900) 27.
25 Bauer (1952) 44.
26 Wilson (1804) 1:70, 366. In the first instance, Wilson cites the reference as coming from Thucyd.
5.105. The second quotation is taken from Thucyd. 1.85.2; for this reference in Grotius, which Wilson
only cites by footnoting the author and page numbers, see Grotius (2005) 1123-1124.
27 Winterer (2002) 19; cf. Ayres (1997) 4 on a similar focus in English political thought.
28 Cappon (1959) 291, 295.
29 Wilson (1804) 1:4.
30 Ibid. 2:317-318. On this point, Wilson references John Gillies’s The History of Ancient Greece, Its
Colonies and Conquests (London: 1786); however, while he cites this source in order to reference the
continuing influence of Solon’s laws in Europe, Wilson also would have been aware of other sources
containing information on Solon’s laws, such as Cic. Leg. 2.25.64-2.26.66, a work he cites elsewhere in
his lectures.
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affords Greece and especially Athens a significant place as the initiator of many of the
Roman traditions of law and liberty.31 Nonetheless, in his discussions on law he places
a still greater emphasis on Rome, particularly commending the period of the Republic
as a time when the liberties of the people were most secure.32 Even during his
university career at St. Andrews, this tendency to focus on Rome evinces itself. Out of
a total of twelve books checked out from 1758-1759, a full half are volumes from
Charles Rollin’s Roman History and Nathaniel Hooke’s Roman History, both published
only decades before Wilson’s time at St. Andrews. Other multi-volume works by Latin
writers like Justinian, Suetonius, and Horace also appear on the complete list.33
Significantly, the same sources he studied at university continued to shape his
perspectives of the ancient world, appearing in the legal lectures he gave three decades
later. Rollins is an obvious example, with Wilson employing his Ancient History and
Roman History as authorities in support of his interpretations of the classical period.34
During his legal study under John Dickinson, Wilson did not lay aside the
classical texts. Dickinson himself was a noted scholar, not only in law, having spent
four years of study in the Middle Temple of the English Inns of Court, but also in the
classical languages and texts.35 Wilson did not concur with all of Dickinson’s views.
For instance, Wilson later insisted in the law lectures that liberty continued even though
diminished under the Roman Empire, while Dickinson believed Roman liberty was
extinguished at the end of the Republic.36 Nevertheless, Wilson clearly identified with
Dickinson, whose later writings wove together both classical and legal ideas in a
31 Ibid. 2:10-14. In addition to Livy 3.31, 3.34, Wilson also references Nathaniel Bacon’s An Historical
and Political Discourse of the Laws and Government of England (1672) and John Pettingal’s An Inquiry
into the Use and Practice of Juries (1769), contrasting the different historical viewpoints of these two
authors.
32 Ibid. 1:100.
33 Library Receipt Book (1752-1759) 143, 198. This edition of Suetonius consisted of XII Caesares or
The Lives of the Twelve First Roman Emperors, containing the Latin and an English translation by John
Clarke (1732). The two-volume edition of Horace’s Works that Wilson checked out from the library
consisted of the Odes, Epodes, Satires, Epistles, Carmen Saeculare, and Ars Poetica in the Latin with an
English translation by David Watson (1760). I was unable to trace this precise edition of Justinian in the
library catalogues; however, the Institutiones do appear in the catalogues from the years when Wilson
was a student; Reports (1738-1788) 37; A Catalogue of Books (1744) 8.
34 Wilson (1804) 1:388, 2:477. Cf. Gribbin (1972) 611-622 on the popularity of Charles Rollin’s
historical works and their wide spread influence in the American colonies. Noticeably, however,
Wilson’s first contact with these works occurred before his emigration.
35 Gummere (1963) 108; cf. McLaughlin (1932) 126; Wolf (1976) 79.
36 Wilson (1804) 1:16; cf. 2:43. Cf. Richard (1994) 88 on Dickinson’s position.
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masterful justification of colonial liberties and earned him the title “Penman of the
Revolution”.37
Many of the founders, in keeping with the tradition of British scholars, kept
commonplace books that were essentially journals of their readings and which
functioned as a means of categorising notes, recording their thoughts, and retaining
important quotations.38 In Wilson’s commonplace book, which contains his
handwritten legal definitions and notes from the legal works of prominent English
scholars like William Bohun and Sir Edward Coke, Wilson departs from his usual small
script documenting legal minutiae to inscribe the translation of Cicero’s words from de
Oratore 1.15.64-65 in large letters across the top of the page, “Orator: The man who
deserves that awful name must be one who upon all occasions shall be able to deliver
what he has to say, accurately, perspicuously, gracefully and readily with a certain
dignity of action”.39 The Latin text of this translation, which Wilson does not include,
reads as follows: is orator erit, mea sententia, hoc tam gravi dignus nomine, qui,
quaecumque res inciderit, quae sit dictione explicanda, prudenter, et composite, et
ornate, et memoriter dicat, cum quadam etiam actionis dignitate. As is evident, Wilson
is clearly abbreviating the quotation according to what he deems the sense of Cicero’s
words rather than providing a strict word-for-word translation. He goes on to add a
selection of abbreviated quotations also cited as coming from de Oratore: “That part of
the philosophy which regards the life and morals of mankind must be completely
understood by an orator. No man unless he be a philosopher can be an orator”.40 The
way in which Wilson sets Cicero’s quotation apart from the rest of his notes reveals the
significance he places on it. Clearly, as he later emphasises in his law lectures, Wilson
accepted the definition of the orator given by Cicero and saw the study of law as
comprehending more than mere legal knowledge, but also eloquence, philosophy, and a
thorough understanding of basic principles and all that “appertains to justice”.41
37 Gummere (1956) 81-88 on Dickinson’s background and writings. Dickinson, however, unlike Wilson,
never took his arguments as far as declaring himself in favour of revolution. Cf. Sanderson (1828) 275 on
an early comparison between Wilson and Dickinson.
38 Dacome (2004) 603-604 on the British practice of using commonplace books and their significance; cf.
Richard (1994) 24-25.
39 Wilson (1766) 29.
40 Ibid. Wilson also adds several other quotations from de Oratore along the same lines that I have not
included here.
41 Ibid. (1804) 2:414; cf. 1:42-44.
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Thus, Cicero’s works were important for Wilson not only in the construction of
his legal and political theories but also in the realities of his speeches and practical
exertions in the courts. In his merging of classical and legal texts, Wilson was
following a long tradition. The Ciceronian texts had been studied for centuries by
English schoolboys who later as prominent jurists would appeal to them in justification
of their own common law theories.42 One instance is Sir Edward Coke, whose Institutes
of the Laws of England (1628-1644) and Reports of Divers Resolutions and Judgements
of Cases in Law (1658) Wilson repeatedly quotes in his law lectures.43 One cannot
survey English case law without coming across references from Cicero and other
classical authors,44 and even Wilson once quotes de Republica 3.22.33 through the
intermediary source of a case before the Court of King’s Bench: non erit alia lex
Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes et omni
tempore, una eademque lex obtinebit.45 Juridical practice, therefore, as well as the
general attitude of the time furthered this reading of classical texts as part of a legal
education. As a young and ambitious lawyer in the American colonies, Wilson was
well aware that he would need to be conversant not only with the cases and jurists of
English common law, but also with the classical authors.46
After his admission to the bar in 1767, Wilson rapidly achieved a prominent
place in the Pennsylvanian courts, combining eloquence with legal knowledge and
becoming one of the foremost and successful lawyers in Pennsylvania.47 At the same
time, Wilson continued to write on political topics and in 1769 finished his pamphlet
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament, which he withheld from publication until 1774. This effort of Wilson and
of other American writers to frame the arguments of independence into a legal and
42 Boyer (2003) 14-17.
43 Sheppard (2003) 557, 569, 576, 584, 873, 903, 1063 on several main examples of Coke’s citations of
Cicero.
44 Hargrave (1791-1792) 25, 85 on citations from Cicero, Varro, and Tacitus in English law.
45 Wilson (1804) 1:375. Wilson is citing here from a case from Sir James Burrow’s Reports of Cases
Adjudged in the Court of King’s Bench (1766-1780); however, the quotation is incorrectly cited. The text
in the 1692 edition reads: nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes
gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit. The Teubner edition coincides
with this, apart from the use of inmutabilis in place of immortalis.
46 Wood, G. S. (1993) 346.
47 Konkle (c.1900) 72.
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political doctrine48, separated from mere passion and couched in the same concepts
frequently used by their political opponents in Great Britain, received commendation
from no less a personage than the eminent jurist, William Murray, Earl of Mansfield.
While he did not concur with Wilson’s political doctrine of representation and instead
argued along the same lines as William Blackstone, Lord Mansfield acknowledged that
this legal doctrine as expressed by “one of the most able American writers” left no
possibility of balancing the authority of Parliament with that of the colonies.49 Thus,
both before and after the revolution, in his speeches and writings, and particularly in the
main role he played in the Constitutional Convention and the framing of the United
States Constitution, Wilson succeeded in justifying the theories of the revolution and the
later institution of American government in a series of carefully defined political
concepts.50
His Law Lectures of 1790-92 provide the most comprehensive account of
Wilson’s classical training joined with his endeavour to express in a systematic political
doctrine the ideology behind the newly formed government. His appointment as the
first professor of law at the College of Philadelphia in 1790 was heralded by the
Philadelphia Gazette, which commended both his “extensive law information” and
“profound political knowledge”, while his introductory lecture was attended by
luminaries like George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander
Hamilton.51 Since that time, scholars specialising in Wilson’s writings have
recommended his lectures as an indispensable source for understanding his
constitutional philosophy and the place of the United States in the history of popular
governments.52
Of greater importance for this thesis, however, are the ways in which Wilson
employs the classics in the formation of his political doctrines. His proficiency in the
classics is not only supported by the commendation he received at the College of
48 See Jensen (2003) 256-276 on Thomas Jefferson’s ‘A Summary View of the Rights of British
America’, written in 1774. Although at this point both Jefferson and Wilson had not made the final and
decisive step of arguing for separation from Great Britain, their arguments helped provide the theoretical
basis for the signing of the Declaration of Independence on 4 July 1776.
49 Konkle (c.1900) 106-7. Cf. Wright (1931) 84; Rossiter (1953) 340 on concurring views of Wilson’s
Considerations and its clear and proficient expression of legal principle.
50 See Bailyn (1967) 219 on the ideological shift in 1769 from dealing with specific issues like taxation
to the construction of an overarching political theory.
51 Konkle (c.1900) 627.
52 Andrews (1896) x; Seed (1978) 150; Konkle (c.1900) 642, 664.
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Philadelphia but also appears to be recognised by his contemporaries. For instance, in a
speech given in 1824 before the Bar of Philadelphia, Wilson Rawle specifically
mentioned Wilson’s training in the classics, while Dr. Benjamin Rush, another
signatory of the Declaration of Independence, spoke of him as a “profound and accurate
scholar”.53 William Pierce, in his Character Sketches of Delegates to the Federal
Convention considered him “among the foremost in legal and political knowledge” and
notes that “Government seems to have been his peculiar Study, all the political
institutions of the World he knows in detail, and can trace the cause and effects of every
revolution from the earliest stages of the Greecian commonwealth down to the present
time.”54 Even in the wide divergence of opinions among modern scholars regarding the
true depth of classical knowledge possessed by the founders, Wilson’s reading and
expertise in dealing with the classical texts and languages is almost invariably
acknowledged.55 In such a context, therefore, research on Wilson’s use of classical
quotations and their function in his writings is essential for gaining a full appreciation of
his legal and political thought. Thus, having established that Wilson’s background and
education equipped him to deal both directly and accurately with the classical texts, it is
now possible to specifically address the approach to the classics that Wilson takes in his
lectures.
2. Use of classical texts in the Law Lectures
Two main issues of methodology should be considered concerning the attempt in this
thesis to demonstrate that Wilson possessed first-hand knowledge of the Ciceronian
texts and directly borrowed from them in his works. The first, and the easiest to
address, regards his proficiency in Latin and Greek, since English translations of the
ancient texts were widely available to the founders.56 Even John Clarke’s editions of
the works of Justinian and Suetonius (1732) and David Watson’s edition of Horace
53 Alexander (1907) 105-106; Rush (1948) 150.
54 Farrand (1966) 3:91-92.
55 McCloskey (1967) 50-51; Reinhold (1984) 31, 102; Wolf (1976) 79; Richard (1994) 24, 65; Gummere
(1963) 174; McLaughlin (1932) 84.
56 Winterer (2002) 38-40. Cf. Richard (1994) 203, 206, 220 on Thomas Paine’s reading of translations of
Latin texts and on Benjamin Franklin’s use and publication of such translations.
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(1760) that Wilson checked out at the University of St. Andrews provided English
translations alongside the Latin text.57 Nonetheless, as we have seen, a high level of
proficiency in the classical languages was an everyday part of both the grammar school
and university education of Wilson’s time and expected of any student. Additionally, as
the following chapter demonstrates, Wilson’s own translations of Ciceronian passages
further highlight his skill in dealing with the Latin language. Wilson’s use of Greek is
much less frequent. Although he occasionally uses Greek phrases and explains them,58
his legal lectures do not contain extended passages in Greek, a striking contrast with his
employment and engagement with the Latin texts. This feature is consistent with the
tendency of his time to employ Latin quotations in writings more often than Greek
ones.59 Still, despite his obvious predilection for Latin and particularly for the
Ciceronian texts, Wilson’s knowledge of Greek texts and his appeals to Greek political
forms also surface in his writings.
Clearly, Wilson’s approach to such questions as sovereignty, citizenship, natural
law, and the rights of the individual cannot be analysed without recognising the
pervading influence of the classics. His background and education inevitably shaped
his later constructions of legal theory, as the constant appearance of classical citations in
his discussions on law illustrate. Some of the references are arguably the off-hand
quotations of a scholar long immersed in classical texts or are employed as literary
devices, directly affecting neither the flow nor substance of his arguments. Such, for
instance, are the frequent Latin tags that Wilson appears to be citing from memory and
does not attribute to any author.60 Also in this category are the quotations from the
Metamorphoses 1.92-93 and 2.13-14, which Wilson does not footnote and only
references as Ovid.61 In these cases, Wilson’s approach to the classical authors is no
different than his approach to later authors, whom he quotes in order to improve the
literary quality of his work. For instance, quotations from Milton’s Paradise Lost,
Pope’s Essay on Man and An Essay on Criticism, Shakespeare’s Richard II, and
57 Library Receipt Book (1752-1759) 143, 198. Cf. Winterer (2002) 38-39 on the use of John Clarke’s
texts in the American colonies.
58 Wilson (1804) 1:370; 2:7, 11, 17, 118.
59 Wolf (1976) 78.
60 Wilson (1804) 1:280, 302, 364; 2:74, 94, 96, 306, 351, 356, 400, 443, 451, 492; 3:46.
61 Ibid. 1:352; 2:299.
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Addison’s Cato, all appear in his works without the title or even the author being
mentioned.62
Wilson’s writing style reveals his awareness of the difference between what
functions as evidence and authoritative power for his claims and what provides mere
literary embellishment. In contrast to the previous examples, his usual practice when
quoting from classical works as a buttress for his own arguments is to provide an
accurate footnote and to expressly note the times when he is citing them indirectly
through a secondary source. Thus, Wilson points out that he is quoting Livy, Plutarch,
and Thucydides through the intermediate work of Samuel Pufendorf’s Of the Law of
Nature and Nations,63 that he is quoting Thucydides, Hesiod, and Aristotle through
Hugo Grotius’ Of the Law of War and Peace,64 that he is indirectly citing Plato through
Henry Dagge’s Considerations on Criminal Law,65 and that he is citing portions of the
Latin texts of Ulpian and Augustine through Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville’s
Bibliothèque philosophique du législateur, du politique, du jurisconsulte.66 As is
evident from these examples, Wilson’s system of footnoting provides a clear
differentiation between the times when he is referencing a work first-hand and when he
is using an intermediate source.
While his discourse on law concentrates on the common legal authorities of the
time, particularly revolving around Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the
Laws of England (1765-1769), as well as relying heavily on An Historical and Political
Discourse of the Laws and Government of England (1672) by Nathaniel Bacon, the
Institutio Legalis (1708-1709) by William Bohun, The Principles of Natural and
Political Law (1763) by Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, Of the Law of War and Peace (1625)
by Hugo Grotius, Of the Law of Nature and Nations (1672) by Samuel von Pufendorf,
and works by Thomas Reid, John Locke, and David Hume, Wilson invariably returns to
62 Ibid. 1:35, 342, 412; 2:468, 469.
63 Ibid. 1:70-71. Wilson references the classical quotations as coming from Thucyd. 5.105, Livy, and
Plut. in Pelop.
64 Ibid. 1:366, 391; 2:260. For the reference from Thucydides, see n. 26 above. The quotatioon from
Hesiod is from Theog. 83-103; for this reference in Grotius, which Wilson only cites by footnoting the
author and page numbers, see Grotius (2005) 273 n. 53. As in the previous two instances, when citing
Aristotle, Wilson only includes the reference to Grotius; in this case, Grotius does not include the
classical reference either, but merely states it as coming from Aristotle [see Grotius (2005) 876-877].
65 Wilson (1804) 3:12. In his work, Dagge does not provide a reference to the quotation from Plato, and
Wilson has merely translated the quotation from the Latin as included by Dagge [see Dagge (1774) 203].
66 Ibid. 3:158. In his footnote, Wilson does not reference the classical texts and only includes the
references to Warville’s work.
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Greek and Rome. As later chapters examine in greater detail, he centres his legal
philosophy on their traditions, reiterating throughout his lectures that the Saxon legal
system and the United States Constitution are based on fundamental principles of law
and government first established in these periods.67
Additionally, in his discussions on ancient history and government, he
constantly references a wide range of classical works and provides explanations of
classical terms and etymology. Wilson accepts some passages from Homer’s Iliad as a
true reflection of ancient political culture.68 Several other relevant details are drawn
from Caesar’s de Bello Gallico and Pliny the Younger’s Epistulae,69 but aside from the
number of ancient historians he consults, the three classical sources Wilson primarily
cites as authorities on ancient law are Livy, Tacitus, and Justinian.
From the four times he directly references Livy, it would appear that Wilson is
consulting the Latin text of ab Urbe Condita, since he also includes sections of the
Latin alongside his English explanations of the historical narrative. He includes Livy’s
description of the Roman laws from 3.34 as “immensus aliarum super alias
acervatarum legum cumulus” (an innumerable heap of law piled one above another),
and makes use of his appellation from 8.23 of the Roman attitude “debellare superbos”
(to subdue the arrogant).70
Even in comparison to the more modern authors cited by Wilson, Tacitus is one
of his most quoted sources. Wilson references the Agricola, Annales, and the
Germania, which prove to be essential sources in his attempt to trace a line of
continuity from the legal philosophies of Greek and Rome to the founding of the United
States. Based on Tacitus’ histories, he claims that two different strands came together
in the establishment of Roman legal theories and practices in Great Britain: first, that
which came from the direct implementation of Roman law in the British settlements
begun during the reign of Claudius, and secondly, that which came through Caesar’s
conquests in Germania and the institution of Roman law in the new provinces that in
67 See below, p. 89ff.
68 Wilson (1804) 2:118, 288. These are from Hom. Il. 2.547 (in regard to the role of the Athenian
people) and 18.497-502 (in regard to the designated place in the city for settling disputes).
69 Ibid. 2:7, 401. The references are to Caes. BGall. 6.13 (in regard to the laws of the Druids) and Plin.
Ep. 6.2 (in regard to the time limits set for the speeches of advocates). In both of these instances, Wilson
includes both the Latin quotation and his own translation. He makes a minor incorrection in citing the
first reference, however, which actually comes from Caes. BGall. 6.14.
70 Ibid. 2:177; 1:366. Cf. Wilson (1804) 2:13, 15 where Wilson references ab Urbe Condita 3.31 and
3.34 as explanations of the context but does not include the Latin.
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turn influenced the common law of the ancient Saxons.71 Wilson also employs Tacitus
in his discussions on Roman law and the legal practices of other ancient confederations,
and in total, directly references Tactitus’s texts fourteen times in his lectures.72 In a full
half of these instances, Wilson includes Latin passages or phrases without English
translations.73 This use of the Latin text not only reflects Wilson’s own understanding
of the Latin but also his expectation that his readers would be able to translate for
themselves. While they may not have been fluent, at least a basic mastery of Latin
would be required in order to read his works.
Comparisons to Roman law drawn from the Corpus Iuris Civilis also point to the
continuing effect of Roman legal theory both in the political theories of Wilson’s time
and particularly in his own thought. For Wilson, the benefits of Roman law and the
liberty it conferred did not end with the death of the Republic. Although he places the
origin of popular consent and its highest point of realization in the age of the Roman
Republic, he views the fundamental element of consent to law as continuing even under
the Empire. While Cicero is Wilson’s main classical source in explaining and justifying
this principle, for its later progression and its importance in the Empire he turns to
Justinian, who becomes a primary source of authority. Wilson appeals to the two
divisions of unwritten law and written law spoken of in Institutiones 1.2.3 and 1.2.10,
and sees this ancient division as upholding a type of customary law which derives its
legitimacy from the willing consent of the people.74 He includes the Latin passage from
Institutiones 1.2.9, “Sine scripto ius venit, quod usus approbavit; nam diuturni mores,
consensu utentium comprobati, legem imitantur” and translates it as “The unwritten law
supervenes upon the approbation of usage; for long customs, approved by the consent of
those who use them, acquire the qualities of a law”.75 This translation emphasises the
prime importance he places on law that slowly acquires authority and actually becomes
71 Ibid. 2:21, 32, 321 on the discussion of these topics with reference to Tac. Agr. 21, Germ. 12, Ann. 12.
Cf. Wilson (1804) 2:11, 17-22, 26-27 on a more general exposition of his thought on this issue.
72 Ibid. 1:330 on the quotation from Tac. Germ. 12; 1:331 on Germ. 38, 39; 1:390 on Germ. 11; 1:391 on
Germ. 12; 1:416 on Ann. 4.33; 2:21 on Agr. 21; 2:32 on Germ. 12; 2:21 on Ann. 12; 2:128 on Germ. 11;
2:177 on Ann. 3.25; 2:245 on Germ. 12; 2:478 on Germ. 18; 3:31 on Germ. 21; 3:143 on Germ. 21.
73 Ibid. 1:330, 390, 391; 2:128, 177; 3:31, 143.
74 Ibid. 2:16-17.
75 Ibid. 2:17. Wilson’s text of Institutiones 1.2.9 differs from that of modern versions; Birks (1987) 2 on
Paul Krueger’s text which reads: Ex non scripto ius venit, quod usus comprobavit. nam diuturni mores
consensu utentium comprobati legem imitantur. However, this is due to changes in the text rather than to
a misquotation on Wilson’s part; cf. Justinian (1730) 9 on a text of Wilson’s time which is consistent with
his own quotation of the text.
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law as the people consent to it. At two points in his lectures, Wilson also uses different
parts of the well-known passage from Digesta 1.3.3276 to reinforce his point that the
consent of the people both makes and unmakes law. As he translates it:
Confirmed custom is deservedly considered as a law. For since written laws bind us for
no other reason than because they are received by the judgement of the people; those
laws, which the people have approved, without writing, are also justly obligatory on all.
For where is the difference, whether the people declare their will by their suffrage, or by
their conduct? This kind of law is said to be established by manners ... On strong grounds
this rule is received, that laws may be abrogated, not only by the express declaration of
the legislature, but, through desuetude, by the tacit consent of all.77
While this brief look at Wilson’s use of other classical authors may at first appear to
have little bearing on his use of Cicero, in fact, it helps to establish not only his overall
familiarity and interaction with the classical languages and texts, but shows how he
used them in formulating his political ideology. As will be seen, Wilson’s general use
of classical texts provides a framework to consider his approach to Cicero, who appears
as a more pervasive and extensive source in Wilson’s lectures than any other ancient
authors.
The classics, therefore, formed an inseparable part of Wilson’s studies and
teachings on law. As an attorney, and later as a politician, framer of public policy, and
professor of legal theory, Wilson’s early education and background in the classics
proved to be one of the main influences shaping his legal and political viewpoints.
Regardless of the varied ways he interprets the ancient works to fit the discourse of his
day, a point that becomes the focus of later chapters, the fact remains that Wilson
persistently resorts to the classics and directly borrows from their contents. Their
authority supported his personal constructions of law and government and thus
ultimately affected the legal framework and future of the United States.
The second main issue of methodology that must be addressed in this study is
more central to my analysis. In endeavouring to establish that Wilson’s legal theory
reveals a more direct link with classical authors than has been generally recognised, the
76 Cf. Mommsen (1920) 34 on the Latin text, which Wilson does not include: Inveterata consuetudo pro
lege non immerito custoditur, et hoc est ius quod dicitur moribus constitutum. nam cum ipsae leges nulla
alia ex causa nos teneant, quam quod iudicio populi receptae sunt, merito et ea, quae sine ullo scipto
populus probavit, tenebunt omnes: nam quid interest suffragio populus voluntatem suam declaret an
rebus ipsis et factis? quare rectissime etiam illud receptum est, ut leges non solum suffragio legis latoris,
sed etiam tacito consensu omnium per desuetudinem abrogentur.
77 Wilson (1804) 1:64; 2:39. Jill Harries’s help was appreciated in identifying these two quotations,
which Wilson did not fully reference. Cf. Wilson (1804) 2:91; 1:315 on two other references to
Institutiones 1.2.12 and Digesta 49.15.
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question unavoidably arises of whether he was receiving and quoting classical opinions
from the classics themselves or largely through the works of intermediary sources. I
suggest that Wilson’s educational background and overall use of the classical texts
defend the former reading and that the specific Ciceronian quotations he employs add a
much greater credibility to this claim, as becomes evident by examining the quotations
themselves and the translations he provides.78
3. Approach to Cicero
Although Wilson continually bases his arguments upon comparisons drawn from
ancient history and cites a number of different classical authors, his use of Cicero stands
out as unparalleled. Not only does he provide long blocked quotations from Cicero’s
texts and cite them more directly and frequently than any other classical writings, but he
also reveals a comprehensive mastery of the Ciceronian corpus as a whole. Instead of
focusing on a specific work by a classical author, as he often does, Wilson borrows
from a wide range of Cicero’s works, treating them as authoritative sources and using
them to generate the amount of discussion he usually reserves for more modern authors
like Pufendorf or Reid. When citing Cicero, Wilson often discusses the surrounding
context, the textual understanding of the passage itself, and the degree to which he
follows the viewpoint being presented. Cicero, therefore, becomes foundational to
Wilson’s lectures, not merely as a rhetorical tool or as a superficial appeal to the
authority of the ancients, but as an essential part of the construction and justification of
Wilson’s legal thought. Chapter two explores in detail the specific Ciceronian
quotations Wilson provides in his writings, but a short examination of Wilson’s overall
perspective of Cicero himself and how it compares with that of his contemporaries helps
to place Wilson’s use of Cicero within the cultural and political viewpoints of the
period.
In regard to the American Founding, Cicero’s texts were of the first importance.
The writings of the founders reveal a strong self-consciousness of their place in history
and of their interaction with the classical texts, and they turned with particular fondness
78 See below, p. 35ff.
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and consistency to Cicero, affording him the highest place of honour among the
classical authors.79 While their readings were often selective and the information they
possessed about the ancient world was limited, their progressive view of history caused
them to constantly apply their knowledge of the classics in practical ways.80 While they
felt a need to identify themselves as part of the classical tradition and in many ways
accorded the ancient texts a much greater practical value than that placed on them by
modern scholars, the founders saw themselves as evolving beyond the limits reached by
their predecessors and as having attained to an advanced position in history and to
greater insights into the workings of political science. As Alexander Hamilton
proclaims in Federalist Paper Number 9, “The efficacy of various principles is now
well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the
ancients.”81
This general approach of many American founders to the classical texts holds
true for Wilson’s perspective of Cicero; although, as has been seen, the classical
knowledge he possessed was superior to that of most of his contemporaries. His
estimation of Cicero echoes the popular sentiments of his day in praising the
authoritative and literary worth of his texts. In particular, Wilson’s individual regard for
Cicero appears to be based on his ability to join together both practical law and
philosophy, a combination which Wilson himself strives to attain.82 He describes
Cicero as one who had been “consul of Rome” and had “kings for his clients”,83 as an
“exquisite judge of human nature and of law”,84 “that eloquent philosopher”,85 a man of
“most extensive abilities”86 and as one who “knew so well how to illustrate law by
philosophy”.87 More than once, Wilson describes general passages and metaphors in
79 Reinhold (1984) 98, 150; Mullett (1939) 100-101; cf. Richard (1994) 62, 224 on a brief look at Cicero
in the writings of other founders like John Adams and Noah Webster.
80 Reinhold (1984) 24, 39, 175. Even in asserting the founders possessed a limited knowledge of classical
texts and often read them only through a practical lens, Reinhold admits that Wilson’s understanding of
the classics was both thorough and exceptional [Reinhold (1984) 102].
81 Willis (1982) 38. Cf. Willis (1982) 42 on James Madison’s statement in Federalist Paper Number 10
that, “The valuable improvements made by the American Constitutions on the popular models, both
ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired.”
82 Wilson (1804) 2:411.
83 Ibid. 1:32.
84 Ibid. 2:157.
85 Ibid. 1:141.
86 Ibid. 1:30.
87 Ibid. 1:300.
31
Cicero’s works as “beautiful”,88 and he views Cicero’s analysis of natural law as “fine
and just”89 and his conception of the universal brotherhood of humankind as “beautiful
and energetick”.90 Finally, in speaking of individual texts, Wilson mentions Cicero’s
“excellent book de oratore”91 and expressly singles out de Officiis as a “work which
does honour to the human understanding and the human heart”.92 Nevertheless, Wilson
still cautions against a complete and careless acceptance of Cicero’s philosophy, saying
that “His philosophical performances are read, and ought to be read, with very
considerable grains of allowance; the beauties of his oratory have been the subjects of
universal and uninterrupted admiration.”93
Political science as an evolving process toward perfection is a repeated theme in
Wilson’s lectures.94 However, although he believes humankind has progressed in
knowledge since ancient times, Wilson accepts the authority of Cicero’s theories. At
times, he even separates Cicero from other classical authors on the basis of his political
insight and views him as a voice of reason urging advanced principles of political
theory. For instance, when speaking of ancient nations and their international policies,
Wilson condemns their oft-held views that they were under no obligations to other
nations unless bound by an agreement or treaty. He sees Cicero’s advocation of the
principles of a universal brotherhood as standing in contrast to these notions. 95
Another time, when discussing ancient perspectives on the mixed form of
government, Wilson mentions that history has proven the merit of Cicero’s theory of the
mixed form as described in de Republica, which Tacitus rejects as “visionary” in book
four of the Annales.96 At this point Wilson is paraphrasing from a passage in
Blackstone’s Commentaries,97 which he uncharacteristically does not actually footnote
or even mention. Neither Blackstone nor Wilson includes the precise citation, which
comes from Annales 4.33; however, Blackstone is correct in his recognition that
88 Ibid. 1:72, 304.
89 Ibid. 2:493.
90 Ibid. 1:173.
91 Ibid. 2:81.
92 Ibid. 2:476.
93 Ibid. 2:80.
94 See below, p. 90.
95 Wilson (1804) 1:173.
96 Ibid. 1:416. In book two of de Republica, Cicero provides an account of the development of the
Roman mixed form of government, consisting of a balance of authority between consuls, senate, and
people.
97 Blackstone (1979) 1:50.
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although Tacitus does not mention Cicero by name, he is referring to de Republica in
this passage:
Cunctas nationes et urbes populus aut primores aut singuli regunt: delecta ex iis et
conflata rei publicae forma laudari facilius quam evenire, vel, si evenit, haud diuturna
esse potest.
All nations and cities are ruled either by the people or the nobles or a single man: the
form of a state selected and composed from these parts is more easily praised than
brought into being, or if it is brought into being, it is by no means able to endure.98
Wilson’s analysis of this classical text not only follows Blackstone’s didactic view of
history, but also adopts a similar textual approach. In typical fashion, Wilson accepts
the statements as reflecting the viewpoint of the author without considering underlying
motivations, such as whether Tacitus’ political position and the state of affairs in the
Empire influenced both his dismissal of the mixed form as illusionary and his
perspective on the salvation of the state being necessarily dependent on the command of
one man.
From his use of Tacitus’ quotation and similar references, it is clear that Wilson
is cognisant of Blackstone’s frequent use of the Ciceronian texts. Wilson constantly
references Blackstone, the one author who receives his full attention throughout the
course of the lectures, as a source of comparison with his own legal and political
theories. Whether or not Wilson deserved the appellation of the “American Blackstone”
given him in early biographies99 is not a point to be addressed here. However, in the
lectures given to the law students at the University of Pennsylvania, Wilson was
undoubtedly attempting to construct a meticulous survey of the legal theory and practice
underlying the American system, in conscious hopes of his work becoming for the
newly formed United States what the Commentaries were to English law. Although
Blackstone’s own attempt at legal practice proved of little success, like Wilson, he is an
example of a practical lawyer and an academic; initially, he began the Commentaries as
a set of Oxford lectures in 1743.100
Both Blackstone and Wilson draw on the Ciceronian tradition. At one point, in
referencing one of Blackstone’s quotations, Wilson dryly remarks that “the high
98 Martin and Woodman (1989) 136 on the analysis of this passage and its textual connections with de
Republica.
99 Konkle (c.1900) 642; Bauer (1952) 54.
100 Katz (1979) iii-iv.
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authority of Cicero is also produced upon this occasion”.101 In a conscious imitation of
Blackstone’s introduction in the Commentaries, Wilson also begins his preface by
telling students that as a boy Cicero was instructed in the laws of the Twelve Tables “ut
necessarium carmen”.102 However, apart from this quotation and the one previously
mentioned, the Ciceronian quotations chosen by Wilson are different from those that
Blackstone selects.103 Some similarity is only to be expected from the popularity of the
texts themselves and from the same classical and legal tradition in which both men were
educated, but ultimately, the use of widely disparate quotations in itself supports that
Wilson was turning directly to the Ciceronian texts in constructing his legal analysis.
While Wilson’s high regard for Cicero is unquestionably sincere, his use of the
Ciceronian texts was also a means of gaining credibility in the eyes of his audience. As
is evident from Blackstone’s use of Cicero, Wilson’s dependence on the Ciceronian
corpus is not only consonant with his American contemporaries, but also characteristic
of a much wider sphere. The History of the Life of Marcus Tullius Cicero (1741), by
English scholar Conyers Middleton, was popular on both sides of the Atlantic, and
along with Cicero’s own works, was used by opposition writers in support of republican
opinions.104 The popularity of the Ciceronian texts in the university library of Wilson’s
time also attests to this trend, and several of the most worn volumes in the 1692 edition
are those Wilson cites from most frequently, such as de Officiis, de Legibus, de Natura
Deorum, de Amicitia and de Senectute.
The view of Cicero put forward in Wilson’s lectures corresponds with that of his
contemporaries. Colley Cibber’s The Character and Conduct of Cicero (1747), also
available in the library during Wilson’s years as a student, speaks of Cicero in such
laudatory terms as “the determined, that intrepid Hero” whose death was “a sacrifice to
liberty and virtue”, but also condemns his “vanity”, his “ductile love of fame”, and his
101 Wilson (1804) 3:39.
102 Ibid. 1:ix. Cf. Blackstone (1979) 1:6 on his inclusion of the phrase “as a carmen nessarium”. The
original quotation from Cic. Leg. 2.23.59, reads: ut carmen necessarium, indicating that Wilson may have
written the phrase from memory without checking the original quotation.
103 Many of the same texts are quoted by both authors, including Leg., Rep., De Or.,and Off., but they
also draw on separate Ciceronian texts. At twenty-three different points in his Commentaries, Blackstone
makes reference to Cicero and cites from de Leg., Brut., Dom., Rep., Att., ad Brut., Phil., Mur., Fin., Off.,
De Or., QRosc., Clu., and Mil.; see Blackstone (1979) 1:6, 13, 46, 50, 90, 118, 150, 346, 452; 2:4; 3:1,
49, 116, 117, 315, 366, 436; 4:16, 31, 138, 181, 203, 375.
104 Wood, G. S. (1993) 100-103.
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“frailty”.105 Wilson’s estimation of Cicero’s character reveals itself along similar lines
when, despite his frequent commendation of Cicero, Wilson still laments his flaw of
vanity.106
In conclusion, it is obvious that Wilson’s interest in the Ciceronian texts, his
tendency to quote them, and even his general approach to Cicero were influenced by the
mindset and popular conceptions of his time. Every author, however, will inevitably
read the classical texts through the interpretations of his predecessors and
contemporaries. Nevertheless, as the evidence supports, in referencing Cicero’s works,
Wilson turned to them directly. In his opinion, Cicero was not an infallible source but a
respected authority whose political insights enabled him to better interpret the events of
his time. It is against this background that we now turn to the specific Ciceronian
quotations and their role in the formation of Wilson’s political ideology.
105 Cibber (1747) 2, 20, 159, 255.
106 Wilson (1804) 1:30.
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Chapter 2: Wilson’s interaction with the Ciceronian texts
ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος, καὶ οὐ στηλῶν μόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ σημαίνει ἐπιγραφή,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ μὴ προσηκούσῃ ἄγραφος μνήμη παρ᾿ ἑκάστῳ τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου
ἐνδιαιτᾶται.
Thucydides, Pericles’ Funeral Oration
Building on the evidence given in the last chapter, which established Wilson’s classical
education and familiarity with the ancient authors and texts, this second chapter now
looks specifically at Wilson’s use of Cicero in his Law Lectures. In order to provide a
comprehensive view of Cicero’s place within the lectures, it addresses every mention of
Cicero that occurs in Wilson’s work. The first section of the chapter examines indirect
references and allusions. The second section focuses solely on the direct quotations,
analysing Wilson’s translations when they are provided and placing his translations
within the context of his own ideology, which reveals his unique slant on Cicero.
This chapter further establishes Wilson’s direct engagement with Cicero’s
works, by investigating the specific quotations and Wilson’s translations. Furthermore,
it also illustrates his proficiency in Latin and his thorough knowledge of the Ciceronian
corpus. In considering Wilson’s quotations of Cicero, I have employed the 1692 edition
of Cicero’s texts and then compared it with modern editions. Oftentimes, instances that
would initially appear as errors in Wilson’s quotations are merely places where modern
editions have made changes. The general approach of this chapter, therefore, attempts
to prove beyond question the centrality of the Ciceronian texts in Wilson’s writings and
political philosophy.
On this basis, later chapters expound on Wilson’s particular theories of popular
sovereignty, civic virtue, and civil disobedience, and examine the ways in which they
relate to Cicero’s own thought. Some slight overlap occurs, however, since a brief
explanation of Wilson’s thought accompanies the analysis of this chapter and provides a
context for his use and translations of Cicero.
1. Indirect uses of Cicero
While the footnoted quotations of Cicero’s work that appear in Wilson’s lectures
provide the surest and easiest method of identifying his use of Cicero, his frequent
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indirect references also aid in this effort. Although many of the references appear
insignificant alone, when taken together they help to form an overall understanding of
Wilson’s broad acquaintance with Cicero’s texts and of the direct Ciceronian influence
on his thought. This section, therefore, looks at the three main ways Wilson indirectly
acknowledges Cicero: his use of references and allusions, his phraseology, and his
second-hand quotations. All of these instances not only reveal the pervading effect of
Wilson’s training as a classical scholar, but also demonstrate that he was not merely
employing quotations and themes that already existed in the language and writing of the
educated class of his time.1
1.1. References and allusions
Wilson sprinkles classical allusions and Latin phrases copiously throughout his work,
often without attributing them to a specific writer. While many of these have some
bearing upon his arguments, Wilson sometimes employs them for stylistic purposes
without textual background. Four Ciceronian references appearing in his Law Lectures
appear to evince similar traits, since Wilson assigns the quotations to Cicero but does
not provide either a footnote or a reference to a particular work. Nonetheless, these
instances reveal Wilson’s close interaction with Cicero’s works.
The first allusion appears in Wilson’s discussion of what he considers the
spurious theory of natural superiority, which many political theorists use to justify the
right or power of rulers over their subjects. While he believes that superior talents and
virtue should be required in a leader, Wilson also maintains that they do not grant the
ruler a legitimate right to authority or mean that others must be subject to him.2
Although some theorists used Cicero in support of such an argument, Wilson disagrees
with their interpretation:
Because Cicero, by a beautiful metaphor, describes the government of the other powers of
the mind as assigned, by nature, to the understanding; does it follow that, in strict
propriety of reasoning, the right of legislation is annexed, without any assignment, to
superiour excellence?3
1 Cf. Bailyn (1967) 24-26; McLachlan (1976) 81-82; Kennedy (1976) 126-127 on the view that the
classical quotations used by the founders were frequently superficial and often gained through
intermediary sources rather than from a direct readings of the texts; cf. Mullett (1939) 93 on the founders’
use of secondary sources for gaining classical knowledge.
2 Wilson (1804) 1:71.
3 Ibid. 1:72.
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In the context of Wilson’s spoken lecture, it would undoubtedly have been clear to his
students that he was paraphrasing an argument described by Pufendorf in Of the Law of
Nature and Nations (1672), a work that frequently appears in this lecture. Due to the
unedited version of the written lecture, however, the allusion to Cicero is unclear since
Wilson cites neither the specific Ciceronian passage nor the reference to Pufendorf.4 By
referencing Cicero at this point, Wilson is warning students not to make wrong
inferences from Cicero’s text. This allusion, therefore, points to Wilson’s attempt to
further his personal reading of the text and to demonstrate that the Ciceronian passage
should not be applied to common misperceptions regarding political sovereignty. This
aim is made even more apparent in the very next paragraph, when Wilson addresses
how misleading interpretations of Aristotle have been advanced to support the same
theory.
The second allusion that appears as a quotation from the pro Cluentio 53.146
deserves special attention since it figures on the title page of the lectures and functions
as an introductory statement of Wilson’s underlying philosophy. To a great extent, the
lectures serve as a commentary structured upon the abridged form of this quotation that
Wilson presents as: Lex fundamentum est libertatis, qua fruimur. Legum omnes servi
sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.5 While the quotation undoubtedly shows his reliance on
Cicero, one could suppose that Wilson is merely employing it as a rhetorical flourish at
the beginning of his work as an eloquent and emotional appeal drawn from a law-court
speech. However, twice more in his lectures, Wilson revisits the quotation and
incorporates it into his own arguments.6
4 Cf. Pufendorf (2005) 66 on the quotation from Cicero, which comes from Tusc. 3.5.11: Itaque nihil
melius, quam quod est in consuetudine sermonis Latini, cum exisse ex potestate dicimus eos, qui effrenati
feruntur aut libidine aut iracundia … qui igitur exisse ex potestate dicuntur, idcirco dicuntur, quia non
sunt in potestate mentis, cui regnum totius animi a natura tributum est (Therefore nothing is better, than
that which is commonly expressed in Latin conversation, when we say that those who in an unbridled
state have been carried off by lust or anger have laid aside their power to control themselves … they,
therefore, who we say have lost control of themselves, they have been thus declared, because they are not
ruled by reason, to which the ruling power of the entire soul has been assigned by nature). Pufendorf also
disagrees with the idea that superiority grants the power to dictate obedience; however, he does not
specifically criticise the interpretation of the Ciceronian quotation that advances this theory. The Teubner
edition contains two variations: “ecfrenati” and “quia non sint”.
5 “The law is the foundation of liberty, which we enjoy. We are all servants of the law, so that we may
be free.” As at many other points in the lectures, Wilson does not provide a translation but assumes his
readers will translate the quotation for themselves.
6 Wilson (1804) 1:100; 3:71.
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In the first instance, he quotes an extended section of the Latin paragraph and
includes the citation.7 The second time, he mentions the passage in his reiteration of the
principles that liberty and law cannot be separated, that all forms of government exist
for the sake of the individuals who create them, and that any thoughtless or needless act
of the legislature usurps the individual’s right to liberty and is thus an act of tyranny.8
In this context, Wilson once again evokes Cicero’s words, placing them at the centre of
his legal theory: “‘Legum’—I repeat it—‘servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus’”.9
In this reference, as well as in the introductory quotation, Wilson only includes a
brief and highly abridged form of the original Latin quotation, which reads:
Hoc enim vinculum est huius dignitatis, qua fruimur in republica, hoc fundamentum
libertatis, hic fons aequitatis: mens, et animus, et consilium, et sententia civitatis, posita
est in legibus. Ut corpora nostra sine mente: sic civitas sine lege, suis partibus, ut nervis
ac sanguine, et membris, uti non potest. Legum ministri magistratus: legum interpretes,
iudices: legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.10
As is evident from the three times he employs this quotation, Wilson uses different
portions of it at various times in his lectures. However, his main purpose is best seen in
his condensed version of the quotation, which accentuates the fundamental argument he
makes in his introduction and recasts in different forms throughout his lectures: that law
and liberty are inseparable concepts and a proper understanding of liberty is essential to
the science of law. Although the shortened form of the quotation does not alter the
meaning of the passage itself, Wilson’s repeated emphasis on this one passage causes
Cicero to be read within the context of Wilson’s own legal theories.
In the end, it is clear that the passage from the pro Cluentio is not the mere
reference of a scholar and a gentleman but is foundational to Wilson’s argument and
reveals his direct involvement with the text. In contrast, the final two short quotations
from Wilson’s work that only allude to Cicero provide literary and authoritative support
for his points but are not crucial to them. Nevertheless, they also point to Wilson’s
proficiency in employing the classical texts.
7 See below, p. 52.
8 Wilson (1804) 3:70.
9 Ibid. 3:71, quoting Cic. Clu. 53.146.
10 The Teubner edition renders the phrase “ut nervis ac sanguine” as “ut nervis et sanguine.” The
translation which Wilson does not employ can be read as: “For this [law] is the bond of this distinction
which we enjoy in the republic, this is the foundation of our liberty, the source of justice. The mind and
the spirit and the deliberation and the judgement of the state are placed in the laws. As our bodies without
mind, so is the state without law, unable to make use of its parts as muscles and blood and limbs. The
magistrates as agents of the law; the judges as interpreters of the law; finally therefore we are all servants
of the law, so that we may be free.”
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The first is from de Legibus 1.5.17, where Cicero states, natura enim iuris
explicanda nobis est eaque ab hominis repetenda natura (for we must set forth the
nature of justice and this must be retraced in the nature of man). Wilson’s mention of
the passage occurs in his discussion of the indispensable role of metaphysics in the
study of law, when says that he concurs with Cicero’s opinion that natura juris a natura
hominis repetenda est.11
The second allusion is drawn from Orator 4.34, which comments, Quid tam
difficile quam in plurimorum controversiis diiudicandis ab omnibus diligi?
Consequeris tamen, ut eos ipsos quos contra statuas aequos placatosque dimittas.12 In
Wilson’s lecture, part of this quotation appears merely in a footnote. He highlights the
merits of just and legal judges, who in making the right verdict are also able to gain
public confidence and to remove any possible source of criticism even from those they
ruled against. Brutus figures as a positive example of this type of judge, for as Wilson
remarks, “Etiam quos contra statuit, aequos placatosque demisit; says Cicero of
Brutus.”13
Both of these quotations, while they could possibly be general quotations known
to all educated men of Wilson’s time, more likely point to Wilson’s own knowledge of
the classics. In these instances, Wilson has employed quotations having a specific and
limited application and has shortened and even altered the Latin in order to better
illustrate his points without making grammatical or linguistic errors; furthermore, the
fact that he does not cite the references may be the result of quoting from memory.
Overall, the context and format of the quotations point to an author well-acquainted
with Cicero’s work.
1.2. Similarities in phraseology
At various times, when constructing his philosophical arguments, Wilson’s phraseology
closely corresponds to Cicero’s style and concepts. Since he does not even mention
Cicero in these instances, it is possible that they are simply expressions prevalent at that
11 Wilson (1804) 1:227.
12 “What is so difficult as to please everyone in settling a great number of controversies? Nevertheless,
you achieve it, so that you send away precisely those who have been ruled against contented and kindly
disposed.”
13 Wilson (1804) 1:405. “Even those he rules against, he sends away contented and kindly disposed.”
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time or commonplace themes repeatedly occurring in the history of political thought.
Conversely, however, certain stylistic and philosophical similarities between the two
authors could indicate that Cicero exerts a more pervasive influence in Wilson’s thought
than he himself perhaps even fully realised. Such parallels undoubtedly would exist in
the writings of a scholar who had intently read the Ciceronian works.
While no decisive conclusion can be made, these examples merit consideration
along with the other evidence presented in this chapter. In a study of this nature, to pass
them over without note would hinder the effort to present a complete picture of the
Ciceronian influence in Wilson’s works. Therefore, I will at least point out three of the
more obvious instances where Wilson appears to be imitating Cicero.
In attempting to demonstrate the universality of what he terms moral
perceptions, Wilson states, “Robbery and theft are indulged by no society: from a
society even of robbers, they are strictly excluded.”14 In de Officiis 2.11.40, when
discussing the justice that is admired and exists among all men, Cicero employs the
same analogy, saying that even a robber must relinquish his place in a band of thieves if
he steals or robs from a comrade, for even robbers yield themselves to their own laws
(Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in
latrocinio quidem relinquit locum ... quin etiam leges latronum esse dicuntur, quibus
pareant, quas observent). It is significant that Wilson applies the same example to
illustrate an argument similar to the one Cicero is making; moreover, Wilson’s wording
is consistent with de Officiis, a work that he directly quotes from five other times in his
lectures.15
A second case of comparison with Cicero occurs in Wilson’s chapter on
evidence and its relation to the human mind. Wilson comments that: “Nature should
always be consulted. We are safe, when we imitate her in her various, as well as when
we imitate her in her uniform appearances. By following her as our guide, we can trace
evidence to the following fourteen distinct sources.”16 This terminology resembles
sentiments frequently expressed by Cicero, like naturam optimam bene viviendi ducem
(nature is the best guide for living well) from de Amicitia 5.19, a treatise from which
14 Ibid. 1:293.
15 Ibid. 1:173-174 on his quotations from Cic. Off. 3.5.25 and 3.6.28; 1:299 on Off. 1.7.22; 1:364 on Off.
1.11.34; 1:391 on Off. 2.12.41-42; 2:493 on Off. 1.17.54.
16 Ibid. 2:74-75.
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Wilson draws other references as well.17 Another similar example appears in de
Legibus 1.6.20 when Cicero says that repetam stirpem iuris a natura, qua duce nobis
omnis est disputatio explicanda (I will retrace the origin of justice from nature, through
whose leadership we must unfold the whole discussion) and Atticus replies with et
quidem ista duce errari nullo pacto potest (and indeed with that guide it is not possible
to err in any way).18 Once again, Wilson’s argument strongly approximates a
Ciceronian work that he quotes in his lectures and that he has certainly studied at
length.19
A final example presents a general philosophical position, which although not
exclusive to Cicero, is certainly an ever-present theme throughout his works. Before
embarking on his series of lectures, Wilson instructs his students to study not only the
practicalities of law but also its purpose and underlying principles, and to trace specific
statutes to their philosophical origins. Finally, he encourages them to emulate the
examples of men like Bacon, Bolingbroke, and Kaims, “all distinguished by the
accomplishments of an active as well as those of a contemplative life”.20 In this single
statement, Cicero’s subtle influence is discerned. Wilson clearly accepted Cicero’s
belief in the need to combine study and statesmanship, and would also likely have
accepted Cicero’s account of himself as embodying this standard.21
1.3. Second-hand quotations
In a number of cases Wilson quotes Cicero through a secondary source. Although such
cases would initially appear to indicate that Wilson is not influenced directly by
Cicero’s works and legal philosophy, these instances actually serve to establish the
claim in two significant ways.
Firstly, the use of indirect quotations confirms Wilson’s methodology and his
practice of citing the intermediate author from whom he derives an original passage.
Wilson applies the same technique with Cicero that he does when referencing other
17 Ibid. 1:70 on his quotation from Cic. Amic. 5.19; 1:300 on Amic. 23.87-88.
18 Cf. Cic. Off. 1.28.100.
19 Wilson (1804) 1:ix on Cic. Leg. 2.23.59; 1:118 on Leg. 2.4.8; 1:385 on Leg. 3.1.3; 2:170 on Leg.
3.17.39; 2:490 on Leg. 3.1.3.
20 Ibid. 1:44.
21 Cic. Off. 1.1.3
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classical authors through secondary sources. At seven different points in the Law
Lectures, Wilson uses four sources to refer to Cicero: William Blackstone, John
Pettingal, Edward Gibbon, and an opinion from English case law.22 Apart from the one
exception of the quotation drawn from Blackstone, where Wilson critiques Blackstone’s
analysis of the Ciceronian text, he does not mention Cicero in the footnotes. Instead, in
the other six examples, even if they refer to a work of Cicero’s with which Wilson is
undoubtedly familiar and which he may even use in other contexts, he cites only the
secondary author.
Four of the seven instances come from Pettingal’s An Inquiry into the Use and
Practice of Juries (1769). In all of these, Wilson is using the secondary source in order
to examine practical facets of the Roman judicial system. In three of them, Pettingal
alludes to the Milo case and to the Roman practice of permitting both sides in a legal
dispute to challenge a specific number of those balloted as members of the jury.23 In the
final instance, Pettingal comments on the custom of marking the time of an advocate’s
speech by drips of water.24 Although these examples demonstrate Wilson’s trust in the
historical accuracy of the facts reported by Cicero, it is clear that he does not feel the
need to include the original texts and is content merely to cite Pettingal’s account of
them.
The next instance where Wilson references Cicero through an intermediary
source is in the context of the case adjudicated by Lord Mansfield. In this case,
Mansfield appeals to the law of nations in order to justify an interpretation of
international maritime law, and a brief albeit highly modified and unreferenced Latin
passage from Cicero’s de Republica is cited.25 In this instance, since the secondary
source corresponds with his own understanding of the law of nations, Wilson cites only
the law court opinion.
In the quotation from Gibbon, like those from Pettingal and English case law,
Wilson is not analysing Cicero’s philosophical arguments or legal theory. Wilson gives
22 Wilson (1804) 1:375 on the quotation from Sir James Burrow’s Reports of Cases Adjudged in the
Court of King’s Bench (London, 1766-1780). Wilson (1804) 2:19 on the quotation from Gibbon (1901)
457. Wilson (1804) 2:320-321, 2:401, 3:167 on the four quotations from Pettingal’s An Inquiry into the
Use and Practice of Juries (London, 1769). Wilson (1804) 3:39 on the quotation from Blackstone (1979)
4:375.
23 Ibid. 2:320-321; 3:167.
24 Ibid. 2:401.
25 Ibid. 1:375. The Ciceronian passage itself is not referenced, but it is derived from Rep. 3.22.33.
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a brief history of the concept of unwritten law in Roman jurisprudence and the mode of
its alleged transference to Great Britain. He mentions Cicero only in passing, pointing
to Gibbon’s opinion that “the jurisprudence of Rome was adorned and enriched by the
exquisite genius of Cicero, which, like the touch of Midas, converts every object into
gold”.26 Notably, however, Wilson ends the quotation before Gibbon begins to
disapprove of Cicero’s specific viewpoints, some of which Wilson himself defends in
his lectures.27
As is evident in these six examples, by citing the intermediate authors rather
than the original texts Wilson is able to offer secondary perspectives that concur with
his own interpretations of Cicero, his time, and his works. He chooses the secondary
opinions with the same care that he later employs when quoting directly from Cicero.
Only once does Wilson footnote both the original Ciceronian text as well as the
secondary source.28 Even in this instance, he makes it clear in the lecture that he is
referencing the precise quotation used by Blackstone. Unlike the other examples of
secondary sources, Wilson directly addresses Blackstone’s interpretation of the text,
analyses Cicero’s meaning, and offers a slightly qualified evaluation of Cicero’s
statement in its broader context. Then, he concludes by criticising both Blackstone and
Cicero and contrasting their perspectives with his own legal theory. By footnoting the
primary and secondary sources, Wilson directs his readers’ attention to both passages
and enables them to consider his own arguments within the framework of the ancient
and modern authors.
The way in which Wilson employs Blackstone in conjunction with the
Ciceronian passage has important ramifications for the argument that Cicero had a
direct affect upon Wilson’s legal theory. Not only does this example point to the
meticulousness of Wilson’s system of referencing, but it also introduces the second
main point of this section; namely, that even when Wilson cites Cicero second-hand, he
is familiar with the original source and context of the passages being quoted, and that he
26 Ibid. 2:19.
27 After his description of Cicero’s doctrines including those of a universal commonwealth of gods and
men and of a law of nature prescribed by reason, Gibbon says it is possible to see “how firmly Cicero
believed in the specious doctrines which he has adorned”; Gibbon (1901) 457 n. 56. These ideas,
however, were foundational to Wilson’s political theory [Wilson (1804) 1:119, 127, 141].
28 Wilson (1804) 3:39.
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shows himself adept both at handling the classical texts themselves and of weighing
them against the interpretations of later scholars.
The quotation from Blackstone arises in Wilson’s discussion of punishments and
forfeitures in the third set of the law lectures. For Wilson, the law of forfeiture in Great
Britain demonstrates how a self-evident law, such as the principle that the innocent
should not be punished along with the guilty, can be bent and infringed by those
desirous of gain. Since it punishes the children who ought to receive the inheritance of
their parents, Wilson would discard such laws as contrary to “reason and humanity”,29
and with combined wit and sarcasm he condemns Blackstone’s efforts to justify them.
Blackstone bases his argument regarding the practicality and natural justice of
the law of forfeiture upon a quotation from Epistulae ad Brutum 1.12, where Cicero
writes, “nec vero me fugit, quam sit acerbum, parentium scelera filiorum poenis lui; sed
hoc praeclare legibus comparatum est, ut caritas liberorum amiciores parentes
reipublicae redderet”.30 In this letter, Cicero replies to a plea of Brutus. Since his
brother-in-law, M. Lepidus had been declared a public enemy of the state, Brutus was
afraid that his nephews might be denied their inheritance and implored Cicero to act on
their behalf.31 Cicero, however, wrote back justifying the sentence he and the rest of the
senate had passed against Lepidus.
In his response to Blackstone, Wilson begins by qualifying the context in his
effort to demonstrate that Cicero’s statement should not be taken as strongly as
Blackstone would have his readers suppose. Instead, Wilson notes that Cicero is
defending the vote he made in the senate and argues that the letter should be read as an
appeal to Brutus in which Cicero assumes more the position of a “culprit” than a
“judge”.32
Wilson’s familiarity with the context is further supported by his use of Brutus’
letter to Cicero on the same subject, which Blackstone does not mention. Even if
Cicero was only anxiously attempting to justify the senate’s course of action to Brutus,
29 Ibid. 3:37.
30 Blackstone (1979) 4:375. The translation which Blackstone does not provide may be rendered: “Truly
it does not escape me, how harsh it is for the sons to suffer punishment for the crimes of their parents; but
this has been rightly provided by the laws, so that affection for their children may cause the fathers to be
loyal to the state.” The Teubner edition contains two variations: “parentum” and “parentis”.
31 Cf. Tyrrell and Purser (1899) 244-246 n. 1ff. on the background and personal circumstances of these
letters.
32 Wilson (1804) 3:39.
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Wilson still believes his utilitarian argument supporting the confiscation of the property
of the condemned still must be rejected. He says that the law should not allow the
crime of an individual to unjustly victimise the children and their meritorious and
patriotic relatives. Then, to justify his own view of the subject, Wilson employs Brutus’
letter to Cicero, when in the name of his friendship he asks Cicero to consider him as
standing in place of their father, saying that “contra patrem Lepidum Brutus
avunculus”.33 Regardless of the individual bias that causes Wilson to defend his own
reading of the passage, his method of analysis demonstrates his concern with
interpreting Cicero’s quotations in light of Cicero’s other writings and their historical
context.
Wilson’s reasoning throughout this section strongly reveals his experience as a
academic as well as his command of the Ciceronian corpus. Despite his disapproval of
the law of forfeiture, he maintains a high respect and approbation of Cicero,
condemning the legal principle rather than Cicero himself and even feeling the need to
validate his departure from Cicero’s opinions. He clearly agrees with the view of
Cicero presented by Blackstone, who prefaced his argument by saying that it was
supported by the “beautiful sentiment of Cicero”.34 Immediately afterward, Wilson
answers, “Amicus Cicero—sed magis amica veritas. For the high authority of Cicero, I
certainly entertain a proportionate degree of respect, but implicit deference should be
paid to none”.35 Thus, as a scholar, Wilson plays with his knowledge of the Latin
language and with common Ciceronian themes. His own Latin phrase recalls Cicero’s
arguments in de Amicitia, a work he quotes elsewhere, that in friendship one must
entertain a higher regard for speaking the truth than for preserving peace through the
indulgence of another’s faults.36 Additionally, Wilson’s statement as a whole evokes
the position Cicero himself so often takes in admitting the deference and admiration he
has for the opinions of his predecessors, but refusing to wholly align himself with any
33 Ibid. 3:40. Although Wilson does not include any reference to the specific letter or footnote the
Ciceronian source, it is taken from Cic. Ad Brut. 1.13: where Brutus asks, aut ego matri ac sorori
puerisque illis praestaturus sum, si nihil valuerit apud te reliquumque senatum contra patrem Lepidum
Brutus avunculus? (what help will I be able to offer my mother and my sister and those boys, if you and
the rest of the senate will not let their uncle Brutus count against their father Lepidus?). Additionally,
Wilson’s expectation that his readers will possess at least a general knowledge of Latin is evident in that
he does not include English translations, either for Cicero’s statement or for his own.
34 Blackstone (1979) 4:375.
35 Wilson (1804) 3:39.
36 Cic. Amic. 24.89. Jill Harries’s help was appreciated in indentifying that Wilson was referring to this
work.
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particular one. Thus, even in showing himself willing to disagree with Cicero, Wilson
echoes a common Ciceronian sentiment and turns Cicero’s words back on him,
admiring Cicero at the same time he departs from him.
Wilson’s interpretations of Cicero are inevitably influenced by the readings
offered by his predecessors and contemporaries, such as the ones he cites here. This,
however, is true of any author and especially of a scholar as widely read as Wilson;
nevertheless, the essential point that can be drawn from the examination of his second-
hand citations is that Wilson is directly borrowing from Cicero’s works and presenting
his individual analysis and interpretation of them. As the following section further
demonstrates, Wilson quotes frequently from Cicero himself, employing a wide
selection of Ciceronian texts and diverse passages to support his legal theories.
2. Direct Ciceronian quotations
The purpose of this section is to examine the direct Ciceronian quotations in the Law
Lectures in order to further establish the arguments that Cicero forms a foundational
part of Wilson’s writings and that Wilson directly consulted Cicero’s works rather than
receiving and employing his texts through intermediary sources. Although the indirect
quotations and references in Wilson’s writings indicate a strong Ciceronian influence,
the direct quotations offer more observable and conclusive evidence in support of this
claim. This section includes all the passages that Wilson attributes to Cicero and quotes
in his lectures, accurately citing the specific work and subsection. Although some of
the examples mentioned in the previous section as indirect quotations could perhaps be
considered direct quotations since they may provide a correct Latin quotation and some
indication of the work from which they are derived, for the sake of clarity and accuracy
I have only counted a quotation as direct when Wilson explicitly footnotes it.
As will be seen throughout this section, three key observations arise from a close
scrutiny of the direct quotations. The first relates to Wilson’s command of the
Ciceronian corpus, the second to his method of citation, and the third to his proficiency
in translating the Latin passages.
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The first observation is that Wilson’s understanding of the Ciceronian texts and
his ease in providing context and application are evident throughout the lectures. He
quotes from a wide range and from diverse parts of Cicero’s works. In the preface and
introduction to the lectures, Wilson provides three direct quotations from de Legibus
2.23.59, de Oratore 1.45.199, and Brutus 58.211.37
In the first set of lectures, there are a total of seventeen quotations from the pro
Cluentio 53.146, de Natura Deorum 1.44.124, de Legibus 2.4.8, de Natura Deorum
1.16.43, de Republica 3.22.33, de Amicitia 5.19, de Officiis 3.5.25-3.6.28, de Officiis
1.7.22, de Amicitia 23.87-88, de Republica 6.13.13, pro Balbo 13.31, de Officiis
1.11.34, de Legibus 3.1.3, de Officiis 2.12.41-42, de Republica 2.23.41, pro Caecina
26.74-75, and de Oratore 3.50.195.38
In the second set of lectures, there are five direct quotations. The first is a
quotation from the combined texts of de Legibus 3.17.39 and de Lege Agraria 2.2.4.39
The others come from de Officiis 1.17.54, de Legibus 3.1.3, de Officiis 1.17.54, and the
pro Milone 4.10-11.40 Although Wilson cites the same section of de Officiis twice in
this set of lectures, he quotes different portions of it in the text and reminds readers of
his earlier citation of this work.
In the third set of lectures, there are five quotations from pro Domo 41.109, in
Verrem 5.62.162, in Verrem 5.63.163, in Verrem 5.66.170, and pro Sulla 28.78.41
As these statistics demonstrate, a total of thirty direct quotations appear in the
lectures, coming from the fifteen different Ciceronian texts of de Legibus, de Oratore,
Brutus, pro Cluentio, de Natura Deorum, de Republica, de Amicitia, de Officiis, pro
Balbo, pro Caecina, de Lege Agraria, pro Milone, pro Domo, in Verrem, and pro Sulla.
Wilson quotes from seven of these texts at least twice, with six quotations coming from
de Officiis, five from de Legibus, three from de Republica, two from de Oratore, two
from de Natura Deorum, two from de Amicitia, and three from in Verrem.42
37 Wilson (1804) 1:ix, 32, 39.
38 These appear consecutively in Wilson (1804) 1:100, 111, 118, 119, 141, 173-174, 299, 300, 304, 314-
315, 364, 385, 391, 416; 2:46-47, 81.
39 Wilson (1804) 2:170.
40 These appear consecutively in Wilson (1804) 2:476, 490, 493, 496.
41 These appear consecutively in Wilson (1804) 3:61, 157, 157-158.
42 At a first glance at this paragraph, it would appear that the figures are not accurate, since adding the
total number of quotations given to the number of works presented would bring the total number of direct
quotations up to thirty-one quotations rather than thirty. However, this is because I counted the de Lege
Agraria as being a separate Ciceronian work, but as forming a single quotation with de Legibus.
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As the chapter and page range of Wilson’s works reveals, the Ciceronian
quotations are spread throughout his lectures. Additionally, the indirect quotations and
references to Cicero previously mentioned greatly increase the variety and distribution
of quotations in the lectures. Another important point to consider is that the major
sections of the lectures where Wilson does not quote Cicero are chapters dealing with
modern governments and particularly the British and American constitutions.
Wilson concentrates on de Officiis, de Republica, and de Legibus, Cicero’s well-
known texts dealing with issues of political theory, and he applies them to the major
themes of his lectures. He also draws from different parts of the works, including
quotations from all three books of de Officiis and from two books of de Legibus, while
the three quotations from de Republica are all taken from different books. Although
these were well-known and respected texts at that time, Wilson clearly possessed a first-
hand acquaintance with their contents.
In regard to the other Ciceronian works Wilson quotes, and especially in regard
to some of the minor speeches, the question could be raised whether he gained his
citations through the use of indexes rather than actually reading the entire text. The
Ciceronian editions of Wilson’s time did contain a comprehensive index of topics, albeit
entirely in Latin and therefore assuming mastery of the language in order for a reader to
use them effectively. For instance, the entire last volume of the 1692 edition is
composed of indexes, including one of the particular words and subjects occurring in
Cicero’s writings. To a great extent, this establishes that the Ciceronian corpus was in
common usage, forming an important part of the expected classical reading for the
students of Wilson’s time. As both a student and later as a professor of the classics,
Wilson would undoubtedly have familiarised himself with Cicero’s writings.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to prove whether he actually read all of Cicero’s texts or
the degree to which he studied them, and he could have employed indexes when
preparing his lectures and in researching Cicero’s viewpoints on law. As will be seen
through his use of direct quotations, however, many of the quotations do not have the
specific applicability that would warrant their appearance on the index lists, such as the
quotations Wilson uses in his discussion on education. Additionally, in the overall
scope of his lectures, Wilson does not merely quote a number of Ciceronian texts on a
specific topic and then move on to address other issues; instead, he often employs
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quotations to illustrate minor points. Throughout his writing, his citations show his
knowledge of the surrounding context, and he frequently comments on the authority of
the sentiment expressed, its modern applicability, or on Cicero himself.
The second key observation arising from a consideration of the direct quotations
regards Wilson’s methods of citation. In all the examples included as direct quotations,
Wilson quotes either the Latin itself or provides an English translation, in addition to
including a footnoted citation to Cicero’s text. Even when Wilson stretches a
translation to the fullest possible limits to make feasible a broad reading of a Ciceronian
passage, he follows a meticulous and exact system of referencing. The only variation
contemporary readers will find between the older Ciceronian editions cited by Wilson
and their modern counterparts are those in the text of de Republica. Because of its
much more fragmentary nature, Wilson only mentions the book from which he draws
the quotation.43 He also cites the Somnium Scipionis as a separate work from the de
Republica or, as he once refers to it, the Fragments of de Republica.44
Out of the total of thirty direct quotations from Cicero that appear in the law
lectures, when Wilson includes not only a quotation but also a footnoted citation to
Cicero’s texts, only three of the references are incomplete.45 The first two of these refer
to Cicero’s “treatise on the nature and offices of friendship” and to his “book of
offices”, and the footnotes themselves only give a number for the different subsections
of the text.46 The last one cites the whole of the pro Milone without giving notice of a
particular section.47 Although the partial references may point to a momentary lack of
thoroughness, they are more likely the result of the unrevised nature of the lectures, and
the footnotes still direct readers to the specific text. The first two, especially, reveal
Wilson’s assumption that his readers will possess at least a general knowledge of the
different Ciceronian works.
The third observation concerning the direct quotations is that the translations, or
at least the majority of them, are Wilson’s own. His familiarity with the texts and
ability to manipulate the language to fit his individual readings are constantly
43 Wilson (1804) 1:141, 416.
44 Ibid. 1:304, 416. This is consistent with the 1692 edition, which lists the Somnium Scipionis separately
from the fragments of de Republica (see Appendix A).
45 These are the passages from Cic. Amic. 5.19, Cic. Mil. 4.10-11, and Cic.Off. 1.17.54, which appear in
Wilson (1804) 1:170; 2:476, 496.
46 Wilson (1804) 1:170; 2:476.
47 Ibid. 2:496.
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demonstrated by his tendency to analyse the context of a passage, to defend his own
translation and interpretation, and to truncate the original Latin passages and their
English equivalents, thus making them more succinct and applicable to his contentions.
As will be seen, these three observations are borne out by Wilson’s direct
quotations of the texts. The overall pattern of Wilson’s dependence on Cicero becomes
clear by tracing the course of Wilson’s lectures and considering each quotation, the
framework in which he quotes it, and the perspective he attempts to advance through its
use. Therefore, this section is divided into the subsections of Wilson’s lectures so that
each quotation can be analysed in the context in which it appears.
2.1. Introduction and preface to the Law Lectures
In the brief preface to the Lectures on Law, Wilson quotes from de Legibus 2.23.59,
when Cicero says that Roman youth were once required to learn the Twelve Tables “ut
necessarium carmen” (as a necessary song).48 Wilson employs this Latin phrase in
order to stress the importance of young people cultivating knowledge and attachment to
the laws of their nation. This emphasis on the proper education of citizens becomes an
underlying theme throughout the lectures, since he continually returns to the inability of
a people to govern themselves and their state without an understanding of its laws and
customs and a desire to uphold them. Since he believes that free governments
throughout history have been upheld by citizens who knew the law and actively
participated in their civic duties,49 Wilson commends men like Tiberius Coruncanius,
the two Scevolae, and Cato, saying, “In the most shining periods of the Roman
republick, men of the first distinction made the science of law their publick profession,
and taught it openly in their houses as in so many schools”.50 The fundamental aim of
Wilson’s law lectures is to imitate the example of these distinguished jurists of the
Roman Republic by helping to produce citizens who are ready and able to become
political leaders and to responsibly exercise their political obligations.
In his Introductory Lecture, Wilson draws twice more from Cicero to reinforce
different aspects of this topic. The first instance is from de Oratore 1.45.199, when
48 Ibid. 1:ix.
49 Ibid. 1:42.
50 Ibid. 1:31-32.
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Cicero recommends the study and teaching of law as a pursuit of “honour and
ornament”.51 The second instance occurs in an extended discussion on the role of
women in society and the need for them to be cognizant of their nation’s laws and social
customs and to be able to communicate them pleasingly and effectively. Here, Cicero’s
tale of Cornelia is related from Brutus 58.211 (or de Claris Oratoribus, as the work is
designated by Wilson and by the editions of his time), and Wilson dwells on the
influence her example and conversation had on the future of her sons. His footnote
directs readers to the Latin quotation: Legimus epistolas Corneliae, matris Gracchorum:
apparet filios non tam in gremio educatos, quam in sermone matris. In the text itself,
however, he provides the straightforward translation, “I have read the letters of
Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi; and it appears, that her sons were not so much
nourished by the milk, as formed by the style of their mother”.52
Therefore, in these instances, as in others, Wilson appeals to Cicero’s authority
in order to support the basic premises of his legal philosophy. He employs three diverse
sources to clarify and reinforce his individual perspective on the nature and uses of
education. The three quotations he chooses show his knowledge of the texts, since he
does not quote the most obvious Ciceronian references but clearly selects the ones he
feels are the most appropriate to his argument.
2.2. The first set of the Law Lectures
A full seventeen of the direct quotations from Cicero are cited in the first set of lectures;
these quotations consist of four from de Officiis, three from de Republica, two from de
Legibus, two from de Natura Deorum, two from de Amicitia, one from de Oratore, one
from pro Cluentio, one from pro Balbo, and one from pro Caecina.53 As customary
throughout the rest of his work, Wilson draws from the various genres of Cicero’s texts,
quoting from a wide range of dialogues and speeches. Although direct quotations from
Cicero do not appear in every chapter, they are well distributed and Wilson also scatters
many indirect references and non-footnoted short quotations throughout these chapters.
51 Ibid. 1:32. In this instance, Wilson includes the specific Latin phrase in the footnote: decus et
ornamentum.
52 Ibid. 1:39.
53 See above, p. 35 for the specific Ciceronian references and the corresponding page numbers in
Wilson’s lectures.
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Nevertheless, while he quotes Cicero on a number of diverse subjects, Wilson still
clearly employs Cicero’s work to emphasise particular themes. In the first set of
lectures, especially, when dealing with the abstract theory and principles of law, he
frequently uses Cicero’s political treatises to support his theory of obedience and
obligation, as well as his views on natural and customary law, on the duties and rights
of a citizen, and on the role of an individual with respect to those in his own society and
to the people of other nations.
The only direct quotation from pro Cluentio 53.146 occurs in Chapter II, where
Wilson considers the different definitions and subdivisions of law that have been
offered by political theorists throughout history, and where he argues that the principle
of consent is the fundamental basis for any proper understanding of law. Similar to
many others of his period, Wilson believes that it is not only possible but essential to
unite the seemingly competing notions of the liberty of the individual with adherence
and devotion to the laws. Despite his frequent reliance on classical norms and
authority, the primary reason he gives for the ability of the United States to surpass the
glory of the ancients is because its character is marked by “the love of liberty, and the
love of law”.54 Ultimately, for Wilson, no true distinction can be preserved between the
two, since both together encompass the “science of law”.55 Highly critical of
Blackstone, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Grotius, Tacitus, and others, for introducing the
doctrine of superiority into law and thereby alienating both liberty and consent, Wilson
turns instead to Cicero and the Roman Republic for his exemplars.
Customary law holds the highest position in Wilson’s legal philosophy, since it
is based on experience, consent, and common approbation, and therefore joins both law
and liberty.56 Through the course of his lectures, Wilson attempts to establish a line of
historical and scholarly authority: he begins with the customs of the Roman Republic,
traces the theory of consent through to the time of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the Magna
Charta and English common law, and finally argues that it finds its fullest expression in
the American colonies and the Constitution.
54 Wilson (1804) 1:5.
55 Ibid. 1:9.
56 Ibid. 1:64.
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In his effort to prove that the Roman understanding of customary law provides
the necessary basis for liberty, Wilson appeals to the quotation from pro Cluentio
53.146:
Mens, et animus, et consilium, et sententia civitatis posita est in legibus. Ut corpora
nostra sine mente; sic civitas sine lege, suis partibus, ut nervis, ac sanguine, et membris,
uti non potest. Legum ministri, magistratus; legum interpretes, iudices: legum denique
idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.
The mind and the spirit and the deliberation and the purposes of the state are located in
the laws. As our bodies without mind, thus is the state without law, unable to make use
of its parts as muscles and blood and limbs. The magistrates as agents of the law; the
judges as interpreters of the law; finally therefore we are all servants of the law, so that
we may be free.
Although Wilson only includes this direct Latin quotation in a footnote and does not
provide a translation, he is harkening back to the truncated form of the quotation he
inscribed on the title page of his work.57 Clearly, Wilson carefully chose this passage,
believing that Cicero’s statement supports the different angles of his argument on law,
liberty, and consent.58 The quotation is highly rhetorical, since Cicero is defending
Aulus Cluentius Habitus in the law courts and fashioning a one-sided theory of law
without expanding on its implications. Nonetheless, Wilson accurately draws his
fundamental principles of law from the passage: that law is essential to the existence of
a state, that it ensures liberty, and that it is upheld by the common consent and willing
obedience of the people.
Four direct quotations from de Natura Deorum 1.44.124, de Legibus 2.4.8, de
Natura Deorum 1.16.43, and de Republica 3.22.33 appear in Chapter III, ‘Of the Law of
Nature’. Although Wilson appeals to Cicero’s philosophical treatises, he also aligns
himself with the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid and with others who endorsed the
theory that the first principles of knowledge can only be perceived by the dictates of
common sense. Certain self-evident moral principles are innate in all humankind.
Making a distinction between reason and common sense, Wilson emphasises that, “the
ultimate ends of human actions, can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason”.59
Still, Cicero’s writings continue to play an important role in the chapter. Wilson
uses the quotation from de Natura Deorum 1.16.43 to support his argument that
“morality, like mathematicks, has its intuitive truths, without which we cannot make a
57 See above, p. 37.
58 Wilson (1804) 1:100.
59 Ibid. 1:135.
54
single step in our reasonings upon the subject”.60 Once again, Wilson makes no
mention of Cicero in the text, but relies on his judgements as giving credence and
authority to his own. In the footnote, he gives only the Latin quotation:
Quae est gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem
quandam, id est, anticeptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi
quidquam, nec quaeri, nec disputari potest.
What nation is there or what kind of men, which do not have, without instruction, a
certain preconception, that is, certain information received beforehand concerning the
spirit of a thing; without this information nothing is able to be understood, nor to be
inquired into, nor to be discussed.61
In using this quotation, either Wilson does not appear to view himself as departing from
Cicero’s understanding of knowledge and reason, or uncharacteristically, he does not
comment on any divergence from the author he is citing. However, whatever
disagreement might exist between himself and Cicero is glossed over by the subtleties
of his translation. By two key omissions, Wilson significantly edits the quotation,
obviously with the intent of sharpening his argument and forestalling possible
discussion over his contextual use of the passage. The original quotation, both in the
1692 edition and in the Teubner, reads differently:
Quae est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina
anticipationem quandam [deorum? Quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus,] id est, anteceptam
animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam, nec quaeri, nec
disputari potest.62
As the bracketed part reveals, Wilson removes any mention of the gods or of Epicurus.
Undeniably, the quotation, even in its complete form, refers to some type of
preconceived information which humankind possesses by a type of intuition. So far,
then, Wilson’s interpretation appears consistent with the sense of the entire passage.
Nevertheless, while he does not technically alter the meaning of the passage by omitting
the one word deorum, Wilson broadens the interpretation so that it now covers the full
range of principles he wishes to designate as self-evident truths. Thus, he opens the
quotation to a much wider application than the speaker in the dialogue intended.
60 Ibid. 1:119.
61 Ibid. 1:119.
62 The brackets are added to show the words Wilson omits in his Latin quotation. The English translation
of the whole may be read as follows: “What nation is there or what kind of men, which does not have,
without instruction, a certain preconception of the gods? Epicurus calls this preconception ‘prolepsis’,
that is, certain information received beforehand concerning the spirit of a thing; without this information
nothing is able to be understood, nor to be inquired into, nor to be discussed.”
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The second omission is that of Epicurus and the Greek term prolepsis, which the
philosopher uses to refer to these preconceived notions of the gods. At first glance, this
exclusion would appear to remove a potential source of confusion or unnecessary
information from the quotation. However, while it is impossible to pinpoint Wilson’s
precise motivations and while this specific statement by Gaius Velleius is in fact
corroborated by his opponent in the dialogue, Quintus Lucilius Balbus, the truncated
form of the quotation allows Wilson to sidestep any possible discussion of whether it is
appropriate to base his argument on the teachings of the Epicureans. This is particularly
relevant since Wilson uses the quotation to support the existence of self-evident moral
truths which he ultimately argues are codified in the law of nature, as given to
humankind by the “bountiful Governour of the universe”.63 As Wilson was
undoubtedly aware, his perception of this Creator or Divinity stands in direct opposition
to the view of the gods offered by Velleius and the Epicureans. Thus, his knowledge of
both the context and the philosophical issues raised in the text is demonstrated through
his seemingly small omission, which allows him to remove potential issues of conflict.
Wilson’s method of manipulating the texts through his translations is also seen
in his use of the quotation from de Natura Deorum 1.44.124. Much like Plato and
Cicero, Wilson bases the prooemium to law on the existence of a supernatural deity.64
Furthermore, he believes that humankind is obliged to obey the supreme law only
because of God’s “almighty power” and “infinite goodness”.65 Without these essential
qualities, Wilson says that the judgement of Epicurus would be correct, for if the idea
that the gods “were absolutely indifferent to the happiness and interests of men—was
admitted for a moment; the inference would unquestionably be—that they were not
entitled to human obedience”.66 At this point, Wilson footnotes the passage from de
Natura Deorum that he has merely paraphrased in the text. This time, though, he does
not alter or condense the Latin quotation:
Epicurus re tollit, oratione relinquit deos. Deinde, si maxime talis est Deus, ut nulla gratia,
nulla hominum caritate teneatur: valeat. Quid enim dicam, propitius sit?67
63 Wilson (1804) 1:105.
64 Ibid. 1:106; cf. Cic. Leg. 2.7.16; Cic. Rep. 2.14.27; Pl. Leg. 10.887b-c, 10.889e-10.890a.
65 Wilson (1804) 1:111.
66 Ibid.
67 “Epicurus destroys the gods, though allowing them to remain in speech. Then, if there is a god of such
great excellence, so that he has no kindness or affection for men: farewell to him. For what else will I
say, may he be gracious?”
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In this instance, Wilson’s use of the passage as a literary and philosophical support for
his argument does not bend the text itself. His allusion to Epicurus, however, reveals
his awareness of Epicurus’s view of the gods.68 From this context, it is clear that when
using the passage mentioned earlier, Wilson knew that Velleius was advocating the
Epicurean viewpoint. By removing several words from the quotation, Wilson avoided
the appearance that he was accepting Velleius’ overall position.
The other two quotations in Chapter III also address self-evident truths, but more
particularly as they apply to law. In regard to the law of nature and of moral obligation,
Wilson points to the two fundamental principles of principium essendi (the principle of
existence) and principium cognoscendi (the principle of knowing that existence). He
argues that through their moral sense, people are able to recognise that the law of nature
is the same as the law given by God. As Wilson states, “what is the efficient cause of
moral obligation?—I give it this answer—the will of God. This is the supreme law”.69
A footnote in the text directs readers to the Latin quotation from de Legibus 2.4.8,
where Marcus Cicero says, principem legem illam et ultimam, mentem esse dicebant,
omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis dei (that first and ultimate law, they were
designating to be the mind of god by reason either compelling or prohibiting all
things).70 Thus, without qualification or expanding on the passage, Wilson equates his
conception of the law of nature with the supreme law mentioned by Cicero.
The final quotation he gives in the chapter reinforces the connection with
Cicero’s understanding of supreme law. In this section, Wilson advances a theory of
the universal and beneficial qualities of natural law. In his opinion, this directly
corresponds to the philosophy of law given by Cicero in de Republica 3.22.33. Unlike
the other three quotations in this chapter, Wilson only gives the reference in the
footnote. In the text, he translates a long part of this well-known passage into English,
saying:
This law, or right reason, as Cicero calls it, is thus beautifully described by that eloquent
philosopher. “It is indeed a true law,” says he, “conformable to nature, diffused among
all men, unchangeable, eternal. By its commands, it calls men to their duty: by its
prohibitions, it deters them from vice. To diminish, to alter, much more to abolish this
68 Wilson clearly accepts Cicero’s description of Epicureanism and its tenets regarding the gods at face
value. Cicero’s own account in this passage, however, at least appears to be a fair assessment of their
teachings on the gods’ indifference toward humankind [Pease (1955) 14, 16-17]. Cf. Obbink (1989) 202-
215 on ancient accusations calling Epicurus an atheist.
69 Wilson (1804) 1:118.
70 Ibid. n. q.
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law, is a vain attempt. Neither by the senate, nor by the people, can its powerful
obligation be dissolved. It requires no interpreter or commentator. It is not one law at
Rome, another at Athens; one law now, another hereafter: it is the same eternal and
immutable law, given at all times and to all nations: for God, who is its author and
promulgator, is always the sole master and sovereign of mankind”.71
The Latin does not appear in the text or the footnote, but although Wilson omits a few
sentences, they are clearly passed over only for the sake of succinctness, while both the
linguistic style and free-flowing version attest to Wilson’s ease in translation. Wilson
does not elaborate on these two quotations from de Legibus and de Republica, perhaps
because he takes their meaning for granted and considers the quotations themselves
sufficiently straightforward in establishing his arguments. Nonetheless, they help
provide the fundamental basis for his conception of law and reflect on how he interprets
later Ciceronian quotations.
Chapter IV, ‘Of the Law of Nations’, includes two direct quotations, with
Wilson giving his English translations in the text and citing the sources in the footnotes.
For Wilson, the law of nations is still a subsection of the law of nature. Therefore,
although only applicable to states, it also is divinely inspired and applies equally to all
nations. Since the law of nations lays obligations upon a state in regard to both its
foreign and domestic conduct, throughout the chapter Wilson carefully outlines these
various duties.
When discussing the universal goodwill and even the affection that he believes
should characterise the relations between nations, Wilson criticises the philosophers
who have denied or neglected these principles. In contrast, he praises Cicero’s de
Amicitia for its support of them. Notably, though, Wilson selects only a small portion
of the paragraph from de Amicitia 5.19-20 and does not include the Latin this time:
Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnes esset societas
quaedam, maior autem, ut quisque proxime accederet. Itaque cives potiores quam
peregrini,et propinqui quam alieni. cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit, sed ea
non satis habet firmitatis.
71 The Latin text in the 1692 edition reads: est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in
omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat, quae tamen
neque probos frustra iubet, aut vetat, nec improbos iubendo, aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec obrogari
fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per senatum, aut
per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quaerendus explanator, aut interpres eius alius: nec erit
alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex, et
sempiterna, et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, et imperator omnium Deus
ille, legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator. The only variations in the Teubner edition are seen in its
rendering of these phrases: “diffusa in omnis”, “derogari aliquid ex hac licet”, “aut interpres Sextus
Aelius”, and “sempiterna et inmutabilis”.
58
For thus it appears plain to me, we are so born, that among all there is a certain
fellowship, also that this becomes greater indeed, the closer one comes. Therefore fellow
citizens are more important than foreigners, and neighbours than strangers; for with these
nature itself produces friendship, but it is a type of friendship that does not possess
endurance.72
In the latter part of this passage, omitted by Wilson, Cicero continues his argument,
establishing a distinction between the type of friendship that exists merely by nature and
proximity and that of true friendship, which always includes benevolentia and caritas.
Instead, Wilson only quotes the first part of the paragraph, saying:
To the same purpose is the sentiment of Cicero, in his beautiful treatise on the nature and
offices of friendship. “In tracing the social laws of nature”, says he, “it seems evident,
that man, by the frame of his moral constitution, is supposed to consider himself as
standing in some degree of social relation to the whole species in general; and that this
principle acts with more or less vigour, according to the distance at which he is placed
with respect to any particular community or individual of his kind”.
Wilson’s tendency to draw out what he considers the sense of a quotation and to provide
a rendition rather than a literal word-for-word translation fully reveals itself in this
passage. He omits the entire last half of the Latin sentence and completely passes over
Cicero’s focus on the closeness of friendship in contrast to the relations we have with
relatives, fellow-citizens, or foreigners. His translation serves the purpose he intended,
however, and emphasises the common bond between all men, regardless of their
propinquity or shared virtues. By maintaining a loose adherence to the Latin and
glossing Cicero’s original quotation, Wilson is able to provide his own interpretation
through the use of weighted vocabulary. His close engagement with the Ciceronian text
in this passage, and his ability to enlist Ciceronian thought in support of his own
argument, warrants an examination into the particular parts of his English translation.
Appealing to Cicero’s authority as a writer, Wilson adapts the quotation to coincide
with his own philosophy.
The first significant example of this occurs in his inclusion of the statement, “in
tracing the social laws of nature”. Wilson appears to be referring back to the conclusion
of the previous paragraph of de Amicitia 5.19, which deals with the Stoic concept of the
“good man” and says in regard to virtuous men that, quia sequantur, quantum homines
possunt, naturam optimam bene vivendi ducem (because so much as they are able, men
follow nature, the best guide to living). At this point, Wilson comes closest to changing
72 The minor variations in the Teubner edition are seen in the phrases: “quisque proxume”, and
“peregrine, propinqui”.
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the text, but as the division in his full translation shows, he seems to be employing this
merely as an introductory preface to provide background for the main part of his
translation and still includes some sense of the passage in his translation.
Wilson glosses ita natos esse nos (we are so born) to give the interpretation “that
man, by the frame of his moral constitution, is supposed to consider himself”. In his use
of such ethically weighted terms of “moral” and “supposed” he adds a new dimension
of moral responsibility to the passage, broadening it so that the human desire for
sociality includes more than the mere physical instincts of nature. The interpretation
also allows him to give a philosophical twist to the quotation that makes it compatible
with the Ciceronian quotations on law given in Chapter III. Just as Wilson used de
Legibus and de Republica, so he also employs de Amicitia to advance his understanding
of natural law as possessing a type of moral authority.
For the second part of the phrase, ut inter omnis esset societas quaedam (that
among all there is a certain fellowship), Wilson gives the translation “as standing in
some degree of social relation to the whole species in general”. Certainly, the sense of
Cicero’s quotation implies at least some degree of general affinity among all men, but
Wilson reads it as implying the stronger idea of a social relation rather than a mere
commonality. Wilson renders the last part of the sentence maior autem, ut quisque
proxime accederet (also that this becomes greater as one approaches nearer) as “this
principle acts with more or less vigour, according to the distance at which he is placed”.
While this is not a strict translation, it demonstrates Wilson’s adeptness at accurately
capturing the sense of the Latin quotation without falling into stylistic awkwardness.
Wilson only includes the first half of the concluding sentence of the passage,
rendering Itaque cives potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni (therefore fellow
citizens are more important than strangers, and neighbours than foreigners) as “with
respect to any particular community or individual of his kind”. In this instance,
particularly, Wilson puts forward his sense of the quotation, not an exact translation of
the actual words, and he loses the Ciceronian contrasts between fellow-citizens and
strangers and between relatives and foreigners. Despite the gloss he gives the passage,
Wilson is not attempting to deliberately mislead readers through his translations. As
will be seen from the Ciceronian quotations that appear in later chapters and Wilson’s
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use of them to emphasise the theme of a common goodwill that should exist among all
men, Wilson clearly believes himself to be consistent with Cicero’s own meaning.
The education Wilson received undoubtedly served to affirm his propensity to
translate according to sense rather than to provide a strict word-for-word rendering of a
passage. As scholars progressed in their skill, they would have been encouraged to
translate Latin passages into eloquent and understandable English. Wilson’s system is
characterised by a close scrutiny of the texts he quotes and by detailed explanations of
why his own theories either coincide or depart from the arguments presented, and
despite his frequent praise of Cicero’s work, he is also willing to criticise him.73 At the
same time, Wilson’s method of translation allows him to incorporate his own individual
readings of Cicero into the translations themselves, and thus, to create new meanings for
his students and later generations of readers.
The other translation in this chapter, taken from de Officiis 3.5.25 and 3.6.28 and
comprising the longest Ciceronian quotation in Wilson’s lectures, continues the theme
of human fellowship. Although Wilson includes the whole as one long extended
quotation, as he points out in the footnote citation, it is in fact composed of two separate
quotations. The translations, while in clear-flowing English, are more literal this time,
but Wilson also truncates more of the original text. It is evident, however, that Wilson
is not merely scanning de Officiis and seizing upon apparently applicable quotations;
rather, he demonstrates a comprehension of the surrounding context, since the parts he
excludes do not twist the sense of the passage, as is seen from the original Latin
quotation of de Officiis 3.5.25:
Itemque magis est secundum naturam, pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri possit, conservandis
aut iuvandis maximos labores, molestiasque suscipere [imitantem Herculem illum, quem
hominum fama beneficiorum memor in concilio coelestium collocavit,] quam vivere in
solitudine, non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abundantem
omnibus copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque et
splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit.74
Likewise, it is more according to nature, [to imitate that Hercules, whom the tradition of
men grateful for his kindnesses placed in the assembly of the gods,] to undertake the
greatest labours and troubles for the purpose of preserving or aiding all nations, if it could
be done, than to live in solitude not only without any troubles but even in the greatest
pleasures to abound in all wealth, when even excelling in beauty and strength. Wherefore
each person having the best and most splendid character by far prefers that former life to
the latter.
73 Wilson (1804) 3:40.
74 The Teubner edition contains one divergence, as seen in its rendering of the phrase: “in concilio
caelestium conlocavit”.
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Wilson uses this passage in order to further establish his theory of the universal
brotherhood of all mankind:
How beautiful and energetick are the sentiments of Cicero on this subject. “It is more
consonant to nature,” that is, as he said a little before, to the law of nations, “to undertake
the greatest labours, and to undergo the severest trouble, for the preservation and
advantage of all nations, if such a thing could be accomplished, than to live in solitary
repose, not only without pain, but surrounded with all the allurements of pleasure and
wealth. Every one of a good and great mind, would prefer the first greatly before the
second situation in life”.75
Aside from omitting the example of Hercules, Wilson provides a stricter word-for-word
translation than in the previous Ciceronian quotation. However, two significant features
stand out in Wilson’s translation. The first regards Wilson’s own brief comment at the
beginning, when he connects Cicero’s argument with the law of nations and thus adds
an important implication to the passage. Cicero was speaking earlier in de Officiis
about the specific laws of different nations, and frequently in his works, he speaks of a
law that is valid for all men and of universal ties between them. The question arises,
however, whether Wilson is interpreting the text through his own perspective of the law
of nations and adding a new understanding to the phrase as he attempts to place the law
of nations within the philosophical subset of the moral law of nature.
The second item of importance is the omission of Hercules. In part, Wilson
likely removed the example in order to shorten the quotation and make the argument
more pointed without distorting it. At the same time, the exclusion also helps to make
the concept of universal goodwill appear in greater accord with practical reality. Cicero
presents this life of dedicated service to all mankind as a potential ideal but not
necessarily as an achievable task, unless by one possessing the heroic qualities of a
Hercules. Wilson, by contrast, in full agreement with the enlightenment philosophy of
his day, seizes upon this principle not only as a possibility but as a moral obligation
enjoined upon the nations. As he states immediately before introducing Cicero’s
quotation: “The voice of nature, intelligible and persuasive, has been heard by nations
that are civilized: at last it is acknowledged that all men are brothers: the happy time is,
we hope, approaching, when the acknowledgment will be substantiated by a uniform
corresponding conduct.”76
75 Wilson (1804) 1:173-174.
76 Ibid. 1:173.
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Immediately after this Ciceronian quotation, Wilson glides into the next
quotation from de Officiis 3.6.28, marking the separation only by a new set of quotation
marks. In the intervening paragraphs, Cicero makes the point that what is useful or
advantageous for the individual ought to be applied equally to all; however, the absence
of this passage does not change the meaning of the translation or affect Wilson’s
argument.
In the second quotation, unlike the preceding one, Cicero directly addresses not
only the general commonality that exists between men, but also adds elements of
goodwill and moral authority. Wilson does not provide the Latin text in his lectures:
Nam illud quidem absurdum est, quod quidam dicunt, parenti se aut fratri nihil
detracturos, commodi sui causa: aliam rationem esse civium reliquorum: hi sibi nihil
iuris, et nullam societatem communis utilitatis causa, statuunt esse cum civibus: quae
sententia omnem societatem distrahit civitatis. Qui autem civium rationem dicunt
habendam externorum negant: hi dirimunt communem humani generis societatem: qua
sublata, beneficentia, liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur: [quae qui tollunt,
etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt. ab iis enim constitutam inter
homines societatem evertunt: cuius societatis artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari
esse contra naturam, hominem homini detrahere, sui commodi causa, quam omnia
incommoda subire vel externa, vel corporis, vel etiam ipsius animi, quae vacent iustitia.]
Haec enim una virtus, omnium est domina, et regina virtutum.77
For that is indeed is absurd, what some are saying, that no one should rob a parent or
brother for the sake of one’s own benefit, but that a different reckoning is owed to fellow-
citizens. These people think that there is for themselves no binding law, no common
society for the sake of usefulness with their fellow-citizens. This opinion tears apart all
fellowship in the state. Those moreover who say that a rule should be had for fellow-
citizens but deny that it applies to foreigners, they dissolve the common society of the
human race; which having been removed, kindness, liberality, goodness, and justice are
utterly destroyed; [those who destroy these things, they ought also to be judged impious
against the immortal gods. For they overturn the society appointed by the gods among
men, and the closest bond of this society rests in the fact that it is more against the nature
of humankind to rob from men for the sake of their own advantage than to undergo all
disasters, either those to his belongings or to his body or even to his own soul, which are
free from injustice;] for this one virtue is mistress and queen of all the virtues.
Likely conscious of the length of his quotations, Wilson omits several sentences of the
paragraph in his own translation:
It is highly absurd to say, as some have said, that no one ought to injure a parent or a
brother, for the sake of his own advantage; but that another rule may be observed
concerning the rest of the citizens; such persons determine that there is no law, no bonds
of society among the citizens, for the common benefit of the commonwealth. This
sentiment tends to dissolve the union of the state. Others, again, admit that a social
regard is to be paid to the citizens, but deny that this regard ought to be extended in
77 The following alterations appear in the Teubner edition: “detracturos sui commodi causa”, “iuris,
nullam societatem”, “negant ii dirimunt”. A greater difference occurs at the end of the quotation, since
the Teubner edition does not contain the phrase “quae vacant iustitia”, and it renders the first part of the
next sentence as “iustitia enim una virtus”; cf. Gruter, Wilhelm, and Gronovius (1692) 4050 n. 23 on the
inclusion of “quae vacant iustitia”.
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favour of foreigners: such persons would destroy the common society of the human race;
and if this common society were destroyed, the destruction would involve, in it, the fate
also of beneficence, liberality, goodness, justice. Which last virtue is the mistress and
queen of all other virtues.
By including this second quotation from de Officiis immediately after the first, Wilson
is able to establish his argument that the law of nations is based on an ethical mandate.
Notably, in contrast to Wilson, Cicero does not command positive actions of goodwill
toward citizens of other nations but only condemns negative ones. For Wilson, the
moral obligations owed to one nation by another are not merely to refrain from harm,
but also to provide assistance to those needing aid. As he states, “nations are not only
forbidden to do evil; they are commanded to do good to one another”.78 This may
perhaps account for Wilson’s inclusion of the first quotation from de Officiis, which
mentions the need to preserve and aid all men. In the context of the first quotation,
however, the example applied to Hercules as an individual, while by mixing the two
quotations, Wilson applies Cicero’s opinions to relations between states. Moreover,
such a sentiment of positive goodwill is not present in the second quotation.
Once again, Wilson provides a straightforward translation. The only difference
made by shortening the quotation is that Wilson has left out any mention of the
fellowship that is broken with the gods when an individual acts unjustly toward another.
This omission does not change the sense of the paragraph although it does help shift the
focus of the quotation more towards Wilson’s emphasis in this chapter on the self-
evident truths in nature.
The way Wilson employs and connects these two quotations to form a united
whole reveals his careful selection of the specific parts of the Ciceronian quotations that
will aid in strengthening his arguments. He removes the parts that detract from this
purpose, consciously interpreting Cicero’s texts so that they fit more directly and
concisely with the points he advances in the lectures.
In Chapter VII, ‘Of Man, as a Member of Society’, Wilson draws from de
Amicitia and de Officiis, the same two sources he used in Chapter IV, but he quotes
from different sections of the works to support his points on the social relations between
individuals. Wilson’s marked preference for Cicero over any other classical author is
illustrated not only in the frequent references to his work, but in the extended quotations
78 Wilson (1804) 1:166.
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he constantly employs in this chapter and throughout the rest of the first set of lectures.
Even on common political themes like the human tendency toward society and
companionship, where Wilson could have turned to the writings of a number of
classical and modern theorists, he constantly looks to Cicero as a chief authority. In a
number of these longer quotations, Wilson gives only an English translation and then
footnotes the citation of the Ciceronian work.
Like many of the other direct Ciceronian quotations, the translations Wilson
provides from de Officiis 1.7.22 and de Amicitia 23.87-88 help to show that Wilson
borrowed from various sections of the Ciceronian sources and attest to his high level of
literary and stylistic ability in translating the passages. Since both of them bear on the
topic of civic virtue, they are addressed in detail in chapter four.79 Nevertheless, it is
valuable to at least mention them here. Both quotations help to further Wilson’s
enlightenment theory that human beings are constantly progressing toward perfection
and to refute those philosophers who claim that humankind’s need and desire for society
arises from the inevitable wars, tyranny, and selfishness that exist among men. The first
quotation from de Officiis appears in Wilson’s discussion on the happiness, enjoyment,
and pleasure that result from strengthening the bonds of society.80 On the very next
page, Wilson introduces the de Amicitia quotation, which also supports his optimistic
view of human nature and sociability.81
The other two Ciceronian quotations in this chapter from de Republica 6.13.13
and pro Balbo 13.31 deal with the liberty that humans possess even when they are
within a state of civil society. The way in which Wilson contextualises and analyses the
de Republica quotation is especially significant. It establishes that when translating the
quotations, Wilson considers not only the specific vocabulary he employs, but also how
it reflects on the interpretation he gives to the passage and whether it is consistent with
Cicero’s meaning. In Wilson’s opinion, political philosophers have often erred in
blurring the distinction between civil society and civil government. Partially in order to
justify his later arguments in Chapter X that changes of government are not detrimental
to society, he defines civil society as that state which exists by consent previous to any
79 See below, pp. 164-166.
80 Wilson (1804) 1:299.
81 Ibid. 1:300.
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formation of government or to the writing of a constitution.82 Wilson then turns to de
Republica 6.13.13 to validate these arguments, saying that:
It is in this sense that Cicero seems to use it, in the following beautiful passage.
“Nothing, which is exhibited on our globe, is more acceptable to that divinity, which
governs the whole universe, than those communities and assemblages of men, which,
lawfully associated,—iure sociati—are denominated states”.83
Wilson gives a strictly literal translation, although he does not provide the Latin text:
nihil est enim illi principi Deo, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat,
acceptius, quam concilia coetusque hominum, iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur.
For nothing that indeed happens in the lands is more pleasing to that leading god, who
rules the whole universe, than the councils and assemblies of men united in law, which
are called states.84
His individual gloss of the passage is given in his introductory comment, where he
equates his understanding of a civil society with that of Cicero. Since the elder Scipio
Africanus makes this statement in the context of speaking of the city of Rome and of the
wars with Carthage, it is not an obvious conclusion that he is speaking of some type of
society existing without governmental forms. Wilson shows himself to be aware of this
difficulty. Still desiring to appeal to Ciceronian authority and make it correspond with
his political theory, he attempts to meet the problem in two different ways. First, he
softens the force of his argument by saying that this is the sense Cicero “seems” to be
implying in the passage. Next, he leaves the Latin phrase iure sociati untouched, but
also includes his translation of it as “lawfully associated”. Clearly, Wilson is not afraid
that his translation will be questioned; rather, his action emphasises the part of the
quotation he believes will justify his reading. By treating iure as an adverb, he is able to
more easily convey the idea that states are associated before civil government has been
established. Thus, he is not afraid to point out his personal reading, but makes an
obvious effort to show his readers how the English vocabulary he chooses in the
translation process affects the interpretation of the passage as a whole. Furthermore, in
light of his strong focus on the customary laws of the Roman Republic, his viewpoint
on the passage is more easily understood, since he sees this time as one in which custom
and consent were more highly esteemed than governmental structures.
82 Ibid. 1:303-4; cf. 1:383-384 on the stability that can exist in a society even when its form of
government is altered. Under this definition, the American colonies would have existed as a state
previous to the revolution and the writing of the Constitution.
83 Ibid. 1:304.
84 The only difference in the Teubner edition is that it omits “hunc” in the phrase “omnem hunc mundum
regit”.
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The quotation from pro Balbo 13.31 shows the diversity of Wilson’s quotations,
since he does not quote exclusively from the philosophical treatises, but considers
Cicero’s law court speeches as well. In this part of his lectures, Wilson criticises
modern nations like Great Britain that have laws restricting emigration. In his
endeavour to prove a natural right to choose and even to renounce one’s citizenship, he
turns not only to Locke, but also to Justinian’s Digesta and finally to Cicero:
“O glorious regulations!” says Cicero, “originally established for us by our ancestors of
Roman name; that no one of us should be obliged to belong to more than one society,
since a dissimilitude of societies must produce a proportioned variety of laws; that no
one, contrary to his inclination, should be deprived of his right of citizenship; and that no
one, contrary to his inclinations, should be obliged to continue in that relation. The
power of retaining and of renouncing our rights of citizenship, is the most stable
foundation of our liberties”.85
The Latin text, which Wilson does not include here, reveals that his translation
accurately captures the sense of the original while still retaining the stylistic features
marking it as his own.
O iura praeclara, atque divinitus iam inde a principio Romani nominis a maioribus
nostris comparata! ne quis nostrum plus quam unius civitatis esse possit: (dissimilitudo
enim civitatum, varietatem iuris habeat necesse est) ne quis invitus civitate mutetur: neve
in civitate maneat invitus. Haec sunt enim fundamenta firmissima nostrae libertatis, sui
quemque iuris et retinendi, et dimittendi esse dominum.
O illustrious laws and by divine inspiration now thenceforth established by our ancestors
from the beginning of the name of Rome, that none of us can be part of more than one
state (for a difference of state must of necessity have a variety of law), that none against
his will can be moved from the state nor against his will must remain in the state! For
this is the most firm foundation of our liberty, that each one has the power of retaining
and dissolving his right of citizenship.
By means of this quotation, Wilson makes a direct comparison between the laws of the
Roman Republic and those of the American states. In practical matters as well as in
theoretical principles, he relies upon the historical example of Rome and uses Cicero’s
reasoning to support his own legal theory that the United States is warranted in
establishing laws to protect the natural liberty of free emigration.
Wilson cites only one direct quotation in Chapter IX, ‘Of Man, as a Member of
the Great Commonwealth of Nations’. In this instance, as in the previous quotation,
Wilson gives a literal translation of a passage that has a practical application. While the
following argument is an obvious one, he still prefers to consult the sentiments of
Cicero and quotes from de Officiis 1.11.34:
85 Wilson (1804) 1:314-315.
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“There are two kinds of disputation”, says Cicero, “one, by argument and reason; the
other, by violence and force. To determine controversies by the former belongs to man;
by the latter, to the brutes. To the latter we ought never to have recourse, but when all
hopes of success by the former are proved to be unavailing”.86
In addition to providing a strict translation of the passage, Wilson employs it in
precisely the same context as Cicero does in de Officiis, which speaks of disagreements
between nations and the need to declare war only after the means of diplomacy have
failed. Once again, therefore, Wilson’s quotation reveals his understanding of the
context of Cicero’s work as a whole.
Finally, in Chapter X, ‘Of Government’, Wilson returns to the same three
political works of Cicero he focuses on throughout the course of his lectures,
referencing de Legibus 3.1.3, de Officiis 2.12.41-42, and de Republica 2.23.41. The
first only appears in a footnote to Wilson’s discussion on the rules and government that
are indispensable in preserving the “peace and order of society” and that must be
obeyed in order for a society to progress and improve. As Wilson quotes, sine imperio,
nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum
natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest (without governing power, neither any house, nor
state, nor nation, nor the whole race of men is able to remain, neither all the nature of
things nor the world itself).87 Notably, Wilson employs the Ciceronian texts not only to
justify his theories of consent and of the right to alter one’s government, but also to
emphasise the need for permanence and obedience to the laws.
Initially, the quotation from de Officiis appears to be a strict translation, serving
only to provide the historical background for Wilson’s brief overview of the history of
monarchy, which he believes is the oldest of the three simple forms of government.
However, by the subtle use of weighted language, Wilson once again interprets the
concluding sentence of the quotation in such a way as to reinforce his conception of the
law of nature. Wilson does not include the Latin text:
Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam apud maiores nostros,
iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur
86 Ibid. 1:364. Wilson does not include the Latin text: Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi; unum per
disceptationem, alterum per vim: cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum: confugiendum est ad
posterius, si uti non licet superiore.
87 Ibid. 1:385. Wilson includes the Latin without an English translation. In the second set of lectures,
Wilson returns to this quotation, this time only quoting sine imperio, nulla domus stare potest [Wilson
(1804) 2:490]. In this instance, Wilson clearly altered the beginning in order to make the quotation
shorter and easy to read. The Teubner edition renders one phrase slightly different: “imperium; sine quo
nec domus”.
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inops multitudo ab iis, qui maiores opes habebant: ad unum aliquem confugiebant,
virtute praestantem; qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda summos
cum infimis pari iure retinebat. [Eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa, quae
regum. Ius enim semper quaesitum est aequabile. Neque enim aliter esset ius.] id si ab
uno iusto, et bono viro consequebantur, eo erant contenti. cum id minus contingeret,
leges sunt inventae, quae cum omnibus semper una, atque eadem voce loquerentur.88
Wilson’s rendition of the passage omits several sentences, but as can be seen, until that
point he provides a literal translation of the quotation:
“In my opinion”, says Cicero, “it was not among the Medes only, as Herodotus informs
us; but it was among our own ancestors likewise, that kings of good character were
chosen, in order that the administration of justice might be enjoyed. For when the poor
were oppressed by the rich, they fled for relief to some one, preeminent in virtue, who
would protect the weak from injustice, and would dispense equal law to the high and to
the low. If they could obtain this from the mouth of one just and good man, they were
satisfied; but, as they were often disappointed in this reasonable demand, they had,
afterwards, recourse to general law, which spoke one language to all”.89
The two absent sentences should be translated: “and the cause of appointing laws was
likewise the cause of appointing kings. For law has always been sought in equal things;
for otherwise there is no law.” Since they do not affect the sense of the passage, it is
likely that Wilson omits them only because of length and to maintain the flow of his
argument. However, he does conspicuously include the final sentence Id si ab uno iusto
et bono viro consequebantur, erant eo contenti; cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt
inventae, quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur (If from one
just and good man they achieved it, they were therefore content; when this did not
happen, laws were invented, which would always speak to all in one and the same
voice).
Although the topic of the law of nature does not appear in this quotation or even
in Wilson’s discussion of monarchy, he still translates the quotation so that it is
consistent with the interpretation of natural law he expounds in his other chapters. In
the passage, Cicero apparently focuses on the creation of laws that apply to all classes of
a specific nation. Wilson’s translation, on the other hand, implies that the law already
exists as a separate entity; namely, that it is a law that human beings can appeal to if the
governmental form or ruler in place does not dispense equal law and justice, rather than
a law that they themselves establish. Since they have “chosen” kings in order to
dispense justice, Wilson concludes that they may also resist those kings if justice is not
88 Three variances occur in the Teubner edition: “premeretur in otio multitudo”, the placing of “est” after
“semper” rather than after “quaesitum”, and “erant eo contenti”; cf. Gruter, Wilhelm, and Gronovius
(1692) 4022 n. 63 on the use of “inops” instead of “in otio”.
89 Wilson (1804) 1:391.
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upheld. Therefore, Wilson’s translation reveals that even when using a Ciceronian text
in a limited context, he is still aware of the broader implications his translation will have
for his work as a whole and for his interpretation of Ciceronian thought. This is further
supported by his care in interpreting the final quotation he employs in the chapter.
Knowing that he lacks the surrounding context of de Republica 2.23.41, Wilson refrains
from unilaterally stating the intent of the passage.90 As seen, however, even as he
attempts to convey the correct meaning of Cicero’s work, Wilson interprets the texts in
light of his own theories.91
2.3. The second and third sets of the Law Lectures
As noted in the introduction, the final two sets of the lectures focus largely on statutory
matters. Although examples taken from Greece and particularly from Rome continue to
play a role in Wilson’s analysis, most of his citations come from various laws and
contemporary legal thinkers. Nevertheless, references from a range of Cicero’s texts
figure in these sections as well and attest to Wilson’s comprehensive knowledge of the
Ciceronian corpus.
In the second set of lectures, when Wilson is addressing the constitutional
provisions of the United States and of Pennsylvania, he quotes Cicero five times.92 The
first quotation from the combined texts of de Legibus 3.17.39 and de Lege Agraria 2.2.4
occurs in Wilson’s discussion of the institution of the secret ballot in Rome, which he
says Cicero designates as “the silent assertor of liberty”.93 Significantly, Wilson
references both de Legibus and de Lege Agraria on this point, although de Lege Agraria
most closely approximates Wilson’s quotation, when Cicero mentions the ballot as
vindicem tacitae libertatis (the protector of silent liberty). Wilson’s use of this
reference in conjunction with that from de Legibus, which in a similar phraseology
90 See above, p. 17.
91 Two final Ciceronian quotations also occur in this set of lectures. Wilson quotes in the first instance
from Caecin. 26.74-75 in Chapter XII ‘Of the Common Law’, and in the second from de Or. 3.50.195 in
Chapter XIII, ‘Of the Nature and Philosophy of Evidence’. Since these quotations figure prominently in
later discussions, I have addressed Wilson’s translations of them there (see below, pp. 158 and 187).
92 See above, p. 47 for the specific Ciceronian references and the corresponding page numbers in
Wilson’s lectures. See above, p. 67 on the complete quotation from Cic. Leg. 3.1.3, which Wilson only
offers in a truncated form in this set of lectures and which I have therefore confined to the discussion
above. The final Ciceronian quotation in this set of lectures comes from Cic. Mil. 4.10-11; however,
because of its significance in a later discussion, I have addressed it in that context (see below, p. 106).
93 Wilson (1804) 170.
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speaks of the ballot as vindicem libertatis, points to his familiarity with the Ciceronian
texts and his practice of comparing them with one another. In different contexts and
depending on his audience, Cicero commonly invokes both the language of the elite and
the language of the common people. By citing both a speech and a treatise from Cicero
on this point, Wilson points to two separate times in which Cicero mentions the secret
ballot: the first instance a speech where Cicero attempts to gain the favour of the people
and to place himself on their side in opposition to the nobilitas,94 and the second
instance when Cicero speaks more from the side of the optimates.
The second Ciceronian quotation in this set of lectures occurs in Wilson’s brief
discussion of the importance of marriage in society. 95 At this point, he includes only
the Latin text from de Officiis 1.17.54: Prima societas in ipso coniugio est (the first
bond of partnership is in marriage itself). Later, he returns to this passage, once again
quoting only the Latin text. 96 This time, however, he employs a different sentence from
the passage, which focuses on the family unit as the foundation of a community: id
autem est principium urbis, et quasi seminarium reipublicae (this moreover is the basis
of the city and as it were the nursery of the state). Wilson recognises that he is referring
to the general passage again and even draws the reader’s attention to the fact.
Wilson’s use of Cicero within the context of American statute law points to the
connection he saw as existing between his own time and that of the ancients. Despite
his awareness of the differences in culture and government, he still believed in a general
similarity with the legal principles of Cicero’s time and with the institutions the laws
were designed to support.97 This same perspective governs the way Wilson employs the
five Ciceronian quotations in the third set of lectures and applies them to statute laws
regarding crimes and punishments.98
This short set of lectures deal with the practical rather than the theoretical aspect
of Wilson’s writings, a fact which is reflected in the quotations he chooses. In all of
these instances, Wilson quotes only the Latin and provides no translations, perhaps
94 Jonkers (1963) 58.
95 Wilson (1804) 2:476.
96 Wilson (1804) 2:493.
97 See Winterer (2002) 151 on the widely-held belief in eighteenth-century America that the classics
provided an ancient mirror or template in their application to modern times.
98 See above, p. 47 for the specific Ciceronian references and the corresponding page numbers in
Wilson’s lectures.
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because in using these quotations as examples of a general principle, he is less
concerned with the various shades of meaning that could be drawn from the Latin texts.
The first quotation from pro Domo 41.109 appears in Wilson’s description of
punishments for robbery and his affirmation of the principle that “a man’s house is his
castle”: Quid enim sanctius, quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscuiusque
civium? (for what is more inviolable, what is more fortified by every sanctity than the
home of each citizen).99 Later, when commending the laws of Pennsylvania which state
that “a man cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, Wilson turns to
Cicero’s in Verrem.100 Because he believes the speech effectively illustrates Cicero’s
eloquence in support of a righteous cause, Wilson includes three quotations from
5.62.162, 5.63.163, and 5.66.170, putting them together in a single paragraph:
Caedebatur virgis in medio foro Messanae civis Romanus, iudices; cum interea nullus
gemitus, nulla vox alia istius miseri, inter dolorem crepitumque plagarum, audebatur,
nisi haec, civis Romanus sum.101
A Roman citizen, O judges, was beaten with rods in the middle of the forum of Messana;
meanwhile at the time no moan, no other sound was heard from that unfortunate man
during the pain and crack of the blows, except for this, “I am a Roman citizen.”
O nomen dulce libertatis! O ius eximium nostrae civitatis! O lex Porcia, legesque
Semproniae! O graviter desiderata, et aliquando reddita plebi Romanae tribunicia
potestas! Huccine tandem omnia reciderunt, ut civis Romanus, in provincia populi
Romani, in oppido foederatorum, ab eo qui beneficio populi Romani fasces et secures
haberet, deligatus in foro virgis caederetur? Quid, cum ignes ardentesque laminae
caeterique cruciatus admovebantur?102
O the sweet name of liberty! O the excellent justice of our citizenship! O the law of
Porcius, and the laws of Sepronius! O the tribunate power of the Roman people keenly
longed for and finally restored to them! Have things finally fallen so far, that a Roman
citizen, in a province of the Roman people, in a town of those allied to Rome, could be
bound and beaten in the marketplace by one who held his rods and authority by the
favour of the Roman people? What, when the fire and the glowing metal plates and the
other instruments of torture were brought near?
Non fuit his omnibus iste contentus. Spectet, inquit, patriam: in conspectu legum
libertatisque moriatur.
Not satisfied by all these things. “Let him see his native land”, he says, “let him die in
sight of its law and liberty”.
99 Wilson (1804) 3:61. Wilson employs “enim” in the phrase which is rendered by both the 1692 and
Teubner editions as “quid est sanctius”.
100 Ibid. 155.
101 One variation occurs in the Teubner edition, in the phrase “alia illius miseri”. While Wilson is
correctly following the 1692 text at this point, he incorrectly writes “audebatur”, which both the 1692 and
Teubner editions render as “audiebatur.”
102 In the Teubner edition, the phrase occurs as “hucine tandem haec omnia reciderunt”; Wilson,
however, correctly follows the 1692 text.
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Interpreting the passage as a critique of the use of torture against a Roman citizen,
Wilson considers it an equally applicable condemnation of the torture against slaves
permitted in the Roman legal system.103 At this point, Wilson argues that Cicero
himself recognised the futility of such a practice and quotes from pro Sulla 28.78 in
support of this argument:
Quaestiones nobis servorum, ac tormenta accusator minitatur; in quibus quanquam nihil
periculi suspicamur, tamen illa tormenta gubernat dolor, moderatur natura cuiusque tum
animi tum corporis; regit quaesitor, flectit libido, corrumpit spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot
rerum angustiis nihil veritati loci relinquatur.104
The prosecutor threatens us with the questioning and torturing of slaves; in which
although we suspect no danger; nevertheless pain governs that torture, the nature of both
mind and body controls it, the quaestor directs it, desire shapes it, hope perverts it, fear
annuls it, so that in so many difficulties no place is left for the truth.
In this analysis of in Verrem and pro Sulla, Wilson interprets Cicero by referencing his
different texts. As evident from these quotations, the final two sets of Wilson’s lectures
bear witness to his thorough understanding of the Ciceronian texts, as he not only
employs quotations from disparate speeches and treatises, but also compares them with
one another.
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, Wilson shows precision, aptitude, and
awareness in translating and applying Cicero’s texts throughout the course of his
lectures. The detailed examination of this chapter, therefore, establishes that Wilson
relied on the Ciceronian texts and directly consulted them in the formation of his legal
and political thought. On this foundation, the following chapters analyse Wilson’s use
of Cicero within the specific context of his theories of popular sovereignty, the good
citizen, and resistance to written law.
103 Wilson (1804) 157.
104 Two variations occur in the Teubner edition as “accusator ac tormenta”, “cuiusque cum animi”.
Wilson also employs “quanquam”, which is rendered “quamquam” in the 1692 and Teubner editions.
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Chapter 3: The legal doctrine of popular sovereignty
Who, or what, is a sovereignty? What is his or its sovereignty? On this subject, the errors
and the mazes are endless and inexplicable.
James Wilson, Chisholm v. Georgia, 1793
By establishing the direct influence of Cicero on Wilson’s ideas and investigating
Wilson’s use of a wide range of Ciceronian quotations, the previous chapter has
provided the necessary background for the analysis included in the next three chapters
of this thesis. In the following two chapters, I consider the topics of popular
sovereignty and civic virtue within the context of Cicero’s and Wilson’s thought and in
relation to contemporary readings of Cicero’s works. This chapter, devoted to the
theme of popular sovereignty, focuses less on Cicero than on Wilson, who more
strongly emphasised the importance of popular consent. Chapter four, on the subject of
the good citizen, addresses Cicero’s views more thoroughly than Wilson’s, since the
concept of civic virtue is more central to Cicero’s thought. Finally, chapter five
explores the way both men uniquely utilise their philosophical ideas to justify civil
disobedience, with Wilson relying chiefly on his understanding of popular sovereignty,
and Cicero relying predominantly on his theory of civic virtue. As the following
chapters will demonstrate, the relation between Cicero’s and Wilson’s positions on
these topics is nuanced, presenting a degree of similarity but not complete agreement;
often, for instance, Wilson draws unique conclusions from Cicero’s arguments while
remaining true to the logical progression of Cicero’s thought. The relation between
Cicero’s and Wilson’s theories begins in this chapter with a discussion of popular
sovereignty.
While the issue of sovereignty has far-reaching implications and continues to
play a fundamental role in political queries and debates in both the international and
domestic arenas, the complexities mentioned in the statement at the head of this chapter
have not been disentangled with the passing of time. In such a context, Wilson’s
conception of the doctrine of popular sovereignty is vital in understanding the ideology
and policies of the American nation. Because of the primacy of this topic in Wilson’s
own writings as well as its significance in interpretations of American law and in
modern politics, recent scholarship has endeavoured to analyse the role of popular
sovereignty in Wilson’s thought and to chart its origins. As Wood notes, the American
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Revolution itself turned upon this issue of sovereignty, a concept discussed in the
“theoretical terms of political science”, and of all the founders, Wilson took this
doctrine further than any other in both theory and practice.1
In modern times, the phrase “popular sovereignty” has come to indicate the
people as the ultimate authority in determining matters of law and government.2 Thus,
although neither Cicero nor Wilson uses this precise term in his writings, this phrase is
useful when comparing Cicero’s and Wilson’s perceptions of the people’s role in
governing the state. Wilson most nearly approaches the term when he identifies the
people as the source of the state’s sovereignty, saying that the one great principle of law
and government is that “the supreme or sovereign power of the society resides in the
citizens at large”.3
The classics form an essential part of Wilson’s argument in favour of popular
sovereignty. At the same time, it is universally acknowledged that, like the other
founders, Wilson’s thought was drawn eclectically from various schools and political
thinkers.4 For instance, scholars have drawn attention to the prominent influence of the
Scottish School of Common Sense on Wilson’s writings.5 Additionally, many of
Wilson’s views regarding popular sovereignty are reminiscent of statements such as
Locke’s declaration that the people are only bound to obey laws made by those
possessing the “Consent and Appointment of the People”.6 Nevertheless, despite the
diverse elements contributing to his philosophy, Wilson sought to build his conception
of popular sovereignty squarely upon a classical foundation, rooting its legitimacy and
arguments for its practical worth and sustainability in the ancient past and especially in
his reading of the Roman Republic.
Beginning with a consideration of the relation of Cicero’s thought to popular
sovereignty, this chapter explores whether there is a connection between Cicero’s
philosophy and the doctrine as Wilson expressed it. While Cicero’s texts can be read as
1 Wood, G. S. (1969) 530-531, 345. This coincides with the earlier viewpoint given by McCloskey
(1967) 5-6, when he states that the doctrine of popular sovereignty has proved to be the “essential feature
of the American national experiment” and that Wilson based his proposals for the new national
government more fully on this foundation than the others of his day; cf. Read (2000) 89, 91; Wilmarth
(2003) 144.
2 Laski (1919) 202.
3 Wilson (1804) 1:17.
4 See above, p. 14 n. 5.
5 For a helpful account of the influence of the Scottish School of Common Sense and particularly of
Thomas Reid in Wilson’s thought, see Seed (1978) 17; McCloskey (1967) 14-16; Hall (1997) 68-71.
6 Locke, Second Treatise, 19.212.19-25.
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an affirmation of popular consent, they do not put forward a specific doctrine of popular
sovereignty. Wilson, however, attempts to legitimize his view by reference to Cicero’s
principle of popular consent, but diverges from Cicero’s views in both theory and
practice by defining sovereignty as an indivisible principle residing wholly and at all
times with the people.
1. Relation of Cicero’s thought to popular sovereignty
Since the question of popular sovereignty is framed in contemporary terms, it is more
difficult to analyse Cicero’s perspective than Wilson’s. Although it is helpful to note
elements of popular consent in Cicero’s writings and philosophy, care must be taken not
to instil a modern viewpoint into the analysis, as the terminology of popular sovereignty
is laden with modern connotations and was never employed by Cicero. Additionally,
while Wilson’s lectures focus primarily on the function of government in protecting the
liberty of the people, Cicero’s treatises centre upon different questions, such as the best
form of state in de Republica, the best laws in de Legibus, or the role of the statesman
orator in de Oratore. Thus, although many of Wilson’s themes overlap with the issues
addressed by Cicero, popular sovereignty as such never appears as the central
consideration in Cicero’s writings.
Still, the consent of the people forms an important theme not only in Cicero’s
speeches but also in his philosophical treatises. For instance, in Scipio’s history of the
Roman constitution, he recounts that the people willingly and freely obeyed Romulus.7
Repeatedly, Scipio emphasises that the people gave their consent to the rule of the
monarchs.8 Even when mentioning Servius Tullius, whom he designates as the first to
achieve power iniussu populi (unbidden by the people), Scipio takes care to note that he
later ruled voluntate atque concessu civium (with the favour and permission of the
citizens).9 Hence, in Cicero’s view of history, the people must consent at least
theoretically to the form of government imposed on them. Even if these passages are
read only to indicate belief in a necessary fiction, they still affirm the people’s role in
7 Cic. Rep. 2.2.4
8 Ibid. 2.13.25 and 2.20.35.
9 Ibid. 2.21.37-38.
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the governing process. Consent, therefore, functions as a necessary principle of law and
government in Cicero’s writings.
At the same time, in attempting to answer the question of whether popular
sovereignty had a place in Cicero’s texts, a necessary distinction must be made between
his presentation of the Roman Republic and the actual reality. The degree of popular
participation and the role of the people in the Roman Republic has been the subject of
much debate. The picture of Republican politics, portrayed by authors such as Gelzer
and Syme, as a controlled system in which a small oligarchy extinguished any practical
exercise of popular sovereignty has been ably challenged.10 Millar’s work, for instance,
has demonstrated that in the popular assemblies, and particularly in the comitia tributa,
the people played a role not only in consenting to the government but also in the process
of passing legislation.11 He concludes that the populus Romanus, as represented by
these voting assemblies, was at least formally “the sovereign body in the Republican
constitution”.12 Nevertheless, the precise nature of citizen representation is impossible
to determine,13 and an obvious danger of labelling the late Republic as either an
aristocracy or democracy lies in ignoring the nuanced nature of Roman politics and in
obscuring the different elements of the constitution.14
Regardless of the precise nature of Roman politics, Cicero’s perspective of
popular consent does not equate with a modern understanding of popular sovereignty.
As de Republica and de Legibus reveal, in actual practice Cicero views the liberty and
consent of the common people as consistent with senatorial authority and guidance.
Indeed, while Cicero’s definition of a legitimate res publica excludes both tyranny and
mob rule, it would appear that in theory the res publica could continue to exist under a
monarch and still be considered a res populi. An example of Cicero’s conception of
power and consent working together is the form of the dictatorship, which allowed for
untrammelled authority and sovereignty, but only with the people’s prior consent. For
10 Gelzer (1969) 52-53, 139. Syme aptly sums up this position when he describes Roman politics as
being a struggle between elite members of the aristocracy and says that both the early and late Republic
existed as a “res publica populi Romani” only in name [Syme (2002) 11-12].
11 See Millar (2002) 18-22 for an overview of the makeup and functions of the assemblies.
12 Millar (1998) 4; cf. 17-19 on the role of the assemblies; 34, 48 on the participation of citizens outside
Rome; 205-210 on his conclusion that the Roman Republic should be considered a type of democracy. In
support of this view, see also McIlwain (1958) 46, 62; cf. Lintott (1999) 200, which states that “the
powers of the Roman assembly, taken in isolation, would support an interpretation of Rome as some type
of democracy, and the institution of the tribunate would give this view a further dimension”.
13 Millar (1998) 210, 225.
14 Lintott (1999) 191; North (1990) 284-286; Connolly (2007) 30.
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Cicero, popular approval can exist together with the influence and leadership of an
individual or an elite class.
Even in noting the consent of the people in de Republica, Scipio’s account
highlights the guiding role of the leading men or patres in the early Republic.15 As he
recounts the history of Rome’s development, Scipio describes how the people gain
greater liberties but not the complete power of the state. Although it was granted by the
people (cedente populo), the greatest power in the state remained in the possession of
the senate.16 Even after the establishment of the tribunate, which was intended to
diminish the power of the senate, Scipio says that the senate’s authority and influence
rightly remained supreme, since it was by its arms and counsel that the state was
protected.17 One of the principles Cicero appears to support in this historical survey is
expressed by Scipio when he describes the centuriate assembly: quod semper in re
publica tenendum est, ne plurimum valeant plurimi (that which always ought to exist in
the state, that the greatest number not have the greatest power).18 Indeed, Scipio praises
the ability of those leaders qui modica libertate populo data facilius tenuit auctoritatem
principum (who in giving the people a small amount of liberty preserved more easily
the authority of the leading men).19 Present in de Republica, therefore, is the theory that
the best men should rule, albeit with the consent of the people. 20 As will be
demonstrated, Scipio’s statement contrasts with Wilson’s belief that the majority in a
state should possess the greatest power and the ability to legislate for the rest, provided
they exercise this authority within the bounds of natural law and justice.21
A viewpoint similar to Scipio’s notion of leadership continues in de Legibus,
where Cicero explains more clearly the type of political liberty he wishes the people to
possess. Once again, he views the approval of the people as a necessary condition for
laws, but believes the leaders should counsel the people on the best course of action.22
His argument in book III, deliberately framed as Dyck says “so as to win over optimate
15 Cic. Rep. 2.12.23-2.13.25.
16 Ibid. 2.32.56; cf. 2.36.61.
17 Ibid. 2.34.59.
18 Ibid. 2.22.39
19 Ibid. 2.31.55
20 Lintott (2008) 234.
21 For Wilson’s view, see below p. 182.
22 Cic. Leg. 2.5.11.
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sentiment”,23 depicts popular institutions like the tribunate as granting a measure of
liberty to the people so as to ensure the auctoritas of the nobles.24 The strongest
expression of this sentiment occurs during the discussion of the ideal set of laws for the
Republic, when Cicero says that quam ob rem lege nostra libertatis species datur,
auctoritas bonorum retinetur, contentionis causa tollitur (accordingly our law gives an
appearance of freedom, retains the authority of the nobles, and removes the cause of
contention).25 Thus, despite the admission that political power (potestas) resides in the
people while influence (auctoritas) remains in the senate,26 in this treatise Cicero
ascribes the highest wisdom and governing ability to the senate. As Brunt notes, “even
in his conception of the Roman system the liberty of the people and the authority of the
senate are countervailing forces, which must be balanced in such a way as to content the
people but permit the senate to preponderate”.27
Nevertheless, two related concepts in de Republica and de Legibus, regarding
what constitutes a people and what constitutes a state, although not directly drawn from
the principle of popular consent, still support a reading of popular sovereignty in
Cicero’s texts. He indirectly answers the first question as to what constitutes a people
through Scipio’s speech in de Republica 1.25.39:
Res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo
congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.
The commonwealth is the property of the people; however the people is not every
association of men, congregated in any manner whatsoever, but rather the association of
the multitude agreeing in justice and united by a community of mutual advantage.
In speaking of the people as the foundation of the government, Scipio is clearly
including both high and low, both senators and plebeians, within the whole community
of Roman citizens. By employing sociatus within his definition of the res publica, he
invokes the Roman understanding of good faith and partnership and incorporates the
ideology of a voluntary association based on consent into his construct of the state
23 Dyck (2004) 504.
24 Cic. Leg. 3.10.25.
25 Ibid. 3.17.39.
26 Ibid. 3.12.28.
27 Brunt (1988) 326; cf. 55, 324-327 on a fuller analysis of Cicero’s position. Cf. How (1930) 32;
Ferrary (1995) 63; Wirszubski (1950) 18, 30, 43; Keyes (1921) 321: although affirming the power of the
people, these scholars also note the primary role of the senate in Roman politics and Cicero’s affinity for
this system.
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itself.28 Compared to previous political thinkers, the language Cicero employs is
innovative in its approach, inasmuch as it appeals to explicitly Roman conceptions of
law and property. In this sense, therefore, the quotation could indicate that Cicero
views the whole Roman people as the owners of the government and as possessing the
sovereign power over the state in a manner similar to Wilson’s interpretation.
The passage above not only functions as the definition of a people but also of the
state itself. As Schofield notes, it provides a “criterion of legitimacy” unknown in
previous philosophical thought.29 A res publica that ceases to fulfil these outlined
requirements becomes not an unjust state, but, as Scipio later describes it in de
Republica 3.31.43, actually ceases to be a state: ergo ubi tyrannus est, ibi non vitiosam
… sed, ut nunc ratio cogit, dicendum est plane nullam esse rem publicam (therefore
where there is a tyrant, there it is not a depraved state … as reason now proves, clearly it
must not be called a state at all). Cicero applies the same understanding to the unjust
laws in de Legibus, which cease to even bear the name of law.30 In some cases,
resistance to the fallacious state or laws may even be required in order to preserve the
actual state. For example, Scipio praises Lucius Brutus who by overthrowing a tyrant
not only restored the libertas of the people, but totam rem publicam sustinuit (upheld
the entire state).31 When describing the tyranny of the decemvirs, Laelius affirms
Scipio’s argument that a commonwealth in the hands of a faction cannot even be
considered a res publica, saying that when the people overthrew the decemvirs they
merely regained possession of the state: Populi nulla res erat, immo vero id populus
egit, ut rem suam recuperaret (There was no property of the people, in truth the people
acted so as to regain their own).32 Thus, part of a people’s liberty includes their ability
to live under just rule and law, for as Cicero makes clear, when the community of
justice is destroyed, then so is the liberty of the people, and they can rightly act to
recover their liberty and the state.
This reading of popular sovereignty in Cicero’s texts relies on the essential
distinction between the populus as a constitutional part of the mixed government and
the populus as the whole body of citizens and the owners of the state. Asmis, for
28 Harries (2006) 23, 232.
29 Schofield (1995) 64.
30 Cic. Leg. 2.5.13-2.6.14.
31 Cic. Rep. 2.25.46.
32 Ibid. 3.32.44.
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instance, interprets de Republica as upholding popular sovereignty and differentiates
between the people in their governing capacity and the people in their role as the
sovereign possessors of the state.33 This distinction is certainly the perspective Wilson
offers in his interpretation of the Roman Republic and in his own conception of popular
sovereignty. While such an interpretation of Cicero’s texts would support a stronger
connection with Wilson’s thought, it is not clear that Cicero himself expressly makes
this distinction.
Generally, Cicero speaks of the people in their constitutional role. Even in de
Republica, he places more emphasis on the people as part of the mixed constitution than
upon the people as the whole body of citizens. When used in this sense, the people
clearly do not possess sovereignty. Instead, each division of the Roman constitution has
some degree of authority. As Polybius says, it was impossible to state whether the
system was an aristocracy, democracy, or monarchy, since the mixed constitution
ensured that Ἦν μὲν δή τρία μέρη τὰ κρατοῦντα τῆς πολιτείας (there were three parts with
authority over the state).34 Sovereignty, therefore, does not lie with any single element.
Instead, as Polybius or Cicero perceived it, the stability of the constitution lies in the
division of power or sovereignty among the three parts.
Consent, however, is offered by the people as a whole, including both senate and
plebeians. In this sense, Cicero appears to distinguish between the people in their
narrow constitutional role in the voting assemblies, and the people as encompassing all
citizens. Although Cicero would never desire the people in the narrower sense to
possess sovereign authority, his definition of a people united in justice refers to the
people as a whole and, in terms of ownership, suggests that they possess the state.
Nevertheless, this ownership coexists with a constitutional system in which a division is
made between different groups of “the people”. When Cicero speaks of the people’s
role in choosing kings and giving consent to their leaders, he does not present a doctrine
of popular sovereignty but rather one of popular consent, nor does he uphold the
principle that all citizens equally possess the sovereign power in the state.
Obviously, whether or not elements of popular sovereignty can be identified in
Cicero’s texts depends on how sovereignty is defined. Cicero speaks not only of
33 Asmis (2004) 589.
34 Polyb. 6.11.11.
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popular consent as a necessary precondition of laws, but also of popular ownership of
the state, and of the need for laws to promote the interests of the community and to
preserve justice. Since Cicero never uses the term sovereignty, however, and since
modern interpretations colour the term’s meaning, reading a doctrine of popular
sovereignty into the Ciceronian texts can overlook the nuances of Cicero’s position and
can present an interpretation that emphasises the people’s authority too strongly. In
contrast to Cicero’s perspective, Wilson views the people as completely separate from
the mixed government of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. He considers
laws and institutions as established by the will of the majority, and maintains that the
people possess the power to grant or withdraw their consent at all times.
2. Wilson’s doctrine of popular sovereignty
In itself, the fact that Wilson chooses to quote Cicero with the purpose of substantiating
his favourite theories of popular sovereignty and civic virtue attests to his selective
reading of Cicero within the context of the dominant discussions of his time. He
translates Cicerion quotations in such a way as to accommodate his own conception of
the topics, connecting popular sovereignty with resistance, and reading Cicero within
his own personal and political context. While he was undoubtedly cognisant of the
great difference of time and culture separating him from classical thought, and at least
on occasion consciously refrained from a sweeping applicaton of classical models to
the political structures of his time,35 his intention of reading Cicero for the sake of
supporting his own theories often leads him not only to invest terms like lex, libertas,
and populus with his own connotations, but also at times to take Cicero’s arguments
farther than the text warrants as he attempts to follow them to what he deems their
logical conclusions.
This tendency is evident in Wilson’s discussion of popular sovereignty and in
his attempt to locate its historical origins in the Roman Republic. As he describes it, the
history of consent, especially as evidenced through the usage and acceptance of
customary law, is the history of popular sovereignty. He interprets Cicero’s quotations
35 Reinhold (1984) 106 for a significant example of Wilson’s hesitation in too broadly applying classical
examples to his own time.
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within the light of this reading of the Roman Republic, a reading informed by various
classical and contemporary sources. In this section, therefore, I examine how Wilson
employs popular sovereignty as the cornerstone of his political ideology and how he
weaves it into the Roman tradition.
At the outset, one must bear in mind that Wilson’s notion of popular sovereignty
is essentially a practical doctrine. In its fundamental application, he believes popular
sovereignty gives the people the right to alter or abolish not only legislation but also
their form of government. Initially employed as the rationale for revolution, this theory
continued to operate as the underlying principle and justification of the political
decisions he made throughout his life, from his proposals in the Constitutional
Convention debates to his written opinions in the Supreme Court and his spoken
lectures to young students of law.36 Wilson himself acknowledged the primary position
he accorded this doctrine, saying in the Law Lectures that, “All human laws should be
founded on the consent of those who obey them. This great principle I shall, in the
course of these lectures, have occasion to follow in a thousand agreeable directions”.37
Wilson’s attempt to put together a systematic legal theory validating the
separation from Great Britain is representative of the American Revolution as a whole, a
movement unique in the deliberation and political dialogue that preceded and initiated
it. His interpretation of law is inextricably linked to the need to justify the American
Revolution, a theme he consciously brings to the forefront of his writing. The social,
political, and ideological tensions leading to the Revolution were peaking during
Wilson’s period of study under John Dickinson and his early years of legal practice.
Inevitably, Wilson was preoccupied with the questions of the rights of the colonists and
their legal position in regard to the mother country, while his personal background and
education predisposed him toward a positive view of American independence.38
Already, in 1769, Wilson was exploring these issues in his pamphlet
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament; because he thought it too early to publish such opinions, however, the
pamphlet did not appear in print until 1774, virtually on the eve of the Revolution. In it,
36 Konkle (c.1900) 67 on how Wilson’s theory of popular sovereignty directed his thought and must be
considered the “foundation of his political philosophy”.
37 Wilson (1804) 1:200.
38 Kirk (2003) 212 on the democratic and popular basis of the Scottish universities as a subtle backdrop
to Wilson’s thinking on popular sovereignty.
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he bases his argument that Great Britain has absolutely no legislative authority over the
colonies on the premise that “all men are, by nature, equal and free: no one has a right to
any authority over another without his consent: all lawful government is founded on the
consent of those who are subject to it”.39 Beyond appealing to nature, Wilson seeks to
legitimise the revolution by saying that the colonies only desire to maintain the same
principles of liberty that govern the history, hearts, and constitution of the British
nation.40
By establishing consent as the basis of law, Wilson accepts that the power of
changing and removing either laws or a governmental system is fully within the
people’s rights. He grounds even this principle, however, in custom. Like Cicero, he
desires to maintain long-accepted legal traditions, but he makes consent and the will of
the people the guiding principles of that heritage. As will be seen, his view of history
rests on the belief that the same tradition that guided Roman law also enabled the
American colonies to revolt from the oppression of Great Britain.
Wilson’s opinions gained force after the Revolution. During the Constitutional
Convention debates, he continued his outspoken advocacy for popular authority. Here,
in the formation of the specific provisions and phraseology of the Constitution, his
doctrine of popular sovereignty directs his discussion. The members of both branches
of the national legislature, he argues, should be drawn from the direct election of the
people, because “on the great foundation of the people all Government ought to rest”.41
In his opinion, even the presidency must in some way be dependent on election by the
people, either directly or indirectly.42 More than any other founder present, he
constantly returns to the necessary role of the people as the voice and mind behind the
new government. According to James Madison, Wilson desired “vigour in the
government but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the
legitimate source of all authority. The government ought to possess not only the force
but the mind or sense of the people at large.”43
These same sentiments appear in the legal opinions given from the Supreme
Court, where Wilson was appointed as one of the first associate justices. In Chisholm v.
39 Wilson (1804) 3:205-206.
40 Ibid. 3:203-204.
41 Farrand (1966) 1:57; cf. 1:49, 405.
42 Ibid. 1:68-69; 2:56.
43 Ibid. 1:132 (the italics exist in the original quotation, although I have edited the abbreviations).
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Georgia, which dealt with the question of whether a citizen of South Carolina could
bring a charge against the state of Georgia or if as a sovereign entity the state was
independent of the federal courts, Wilson’s statements closely coincide with those he
expressed in the Constitutional Convention. Although repeatedly maintaining that the
individual states were necessary to the continuance and well-being of the union, he also
denied them a sovereign status, saying, “Can we forget for whom we are forming a
Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called States?”.44 In addition,
Wilson argues that states as artificial beings cannot be deemed sovereign. On the
contrary, the only sound and legitimate basis of jurisprudence is the people’s consent:
“laws derived from the pure source of equality and justice must be founded on the
consent of those, whose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his
source, must be found in the man. ”45 Hence, Wilson located the people as the source of
sovereignty and consistently sought to apply his theoretical doctrine to the practical
questions he faced in law and politics.
Although not all of Wilson’s proposals in the Constitutional Convention were
accepted, and the judgement of Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) was promptly overturned
by the 11th Amendment to the Constitution, his doctrine of popular sovereignty became
firmly entrenched in the American mindset. In his Law Lectures, Wilson continues to
rest his interpretation of law on these underlying themes of popular sovereignty and
consent. Here, however, he takes a more thoughtful and thorough approach, analysing
these topics with the rigour and care of an academic and seeking to base his conceptions
upon classical principles of jurisprudence.
While he affirms the sovereignty of the people, Wilson defends the authority of
the laws and of long-standing tradition. At the centre of Wilson’s thought is his
endeavour to reframe his justification of revolution as devotion to law, where loyalty to
an inherited legal tradition calls for resistance to the current state of affairs. At this
point, then, it is necessary to examine the intertwined threads of customary law and
popular consent that form the basis of Wilson’s legal philosophy.
44 Ibid. 1:483.
45 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), concurring opinion.
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2.1. Consent as the first principle of law
Wilson hesitates to provide a decisive definition of law. Fully aware of the limitations
and errors unavoidable in the definitions given by previous thinkers, he prefers not to
add another to the list.46 Nevertheless, for law in its most basic sense, he offers the
simple explanation that it “is a rule prescribed”.47 Law, therefore, dictates specific
directions for people to follow and has the force to compel obedience. After providing
this definition, Wilson moves on to explore the origins of the authority on which such
prescription rests.
Throughout the course of his lectures, Wilson impresses on his students that all
laws created and prescribed by any group or individual derive their legitimacy and
authority from the consent of a sovereign people. In his introductory lecture, he states
that the origin of sovereignty is found “in the free and independent man. This truth, so
simple and natural, and yet so neglected or despised, may be appreciated as the first and
fundamental principle in the science of government. ”48 Law, as Wilson so strongly
phrases it, cannot be purchased at the cost of a subjection that makes people no better
than slaves or beasts who must obey without question.49 In his opinion, laws and
governmental institutions are based solely upon the consent of the people and are
established in order to secure and enhance their liberty.
Wilson constantly maintains this strong connection between law and liberty. As
previously mentioned, he views the science of law as necessarily incorporating the
study of liberty.50 To a great extent, this fundamental premise governing the whole of
his political philosophy comes from the distinction he draws between civil government
and civil society, which is a voluntary agreement based upon consent.51 By separating
the two, Wilson is able to argue that changes in government do not destroy civil society
itself. The civil government and laws afterward erected by a civil society or state are
those which will best promote the happiness and prosperity of the people, and primarily,
those which will protect their natural rights.52
46 Wilson (1804) 1:60.
47 Ibid. 1:63.
48 Ibid. 1:25.
49 Ibid. 1:88.
50 See above, p. 52.
51 Wilson (1804) 1:303-305. See above, pp. 64-65 on Wilson’s use of Cicero in support of this doctrine.
52 Ibid. 2:454.
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While Wilson believes a society can possibly function without government, he
sees laws and institutions as necessary in order for society to improve and prosper and
for the people to possess complete liberty.53 In the context of Wilson’s thought, the
people do not forfeit their liberties in submitting to the governance and power of lawful
authority, because it rests by definition on consent.
If a government ceases to protect the rights of a people, essentially those rights
of property, character, liberty, and safety, Wilson believes it also ceases to be a
government of the “legitimate kind”.54 He takes issue with Burke and Blackstone,
whom he interprets as saying that people must give up their natural liberty in order to
secure the protections and benefits of government.55 In contrast, while he recognises
Blackstone’s distinction between natural and civil liberties, Wilson argues that the
natural liberty of an individual actually ought to increase under a just and wise
government.56 Wilson’s conception of natural rights is inextricably twined to his theory
of natural law,57 and because he views natural law as prohibiting selfish or injurious
behaviour, he argues that such actions have absolutely no connection with natural
liberty.58 Hence, he views the diminution of natural liberty that takes place under a civil
government as incidental when compared with the greater safeguards for natural liberty
that government can ensure.
Since the establishment of laws should increase rights rather than lead to their
surrender, Wilson places strict limits on the legislature. The only laws that should be
instituted are those which will measurably serve the public good, since every “wanton,
or causeless, or unnecessary act of authority, exerted, or authorized, or encouraged by
the legislature over the citizens, is wrong, and unjustifiable, and tyrannical”.59 Always
53 Ibid. 1:384-385. On Wilson’s use of Cicero to support this theory, see above p. 67.
54 Ibid. 2:466.
55 Ibid. 2:454-457.
56 Ibid. 2:458.
57 Ibid. 1:310. Hall also recognises that natural law serves as the basis for Wilson’s understanding of
natural rights, and he makes it one of the central points in his study of Wilson’s thought [Hall (1997) 46,
105].
58 Wilson (1804) 2:457; cf. 2:457-458 where Wilson goes on to explain, “In a state of natural liberty,
every one is allowed to act according to his own inclination, provided he transgress not those limits,
which are assigned to him by the law of nature: in a state of civil liberty, he is allowed to act according to
his inclination, provided he transgress not those limits, which are assigned to him by the municipal law.
True it is, that, by the municipal law, some things may be prohibited, which are not prohibited by the law
of nature: but equally true it is, that under a government which is wise and good, every citizen will gain
more liberty than he can lose by these prohibitions. ”
59 Ibid. 3:70.
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the practical legislator as well as the abstract academic, Wilson understands that pure
political theories do not immediately devolve into easy, packaged realities. As he
admits, the frequent making and changing of laws often becomes the great bane of
democratic legislatures.60 Nonetheless, the fact that useless or even harmful legislation
may result from the people choosing their own laws does not justify the removal of that
right.
In practical terms, the principle of consent in the United States is carried out
through the medium of the people’s elected representatives, who for specific times and
under specific conditions are appointed to make the laws, execute them, and administer
justice under them.61 Although Wilson supported representation, he would not deny
that direct democratic voting also upholds the doctrine of consent. He locates the origin
of this principle in several of the Greek states and the early Roman Republic and praises
them for upholding it, but still acknowledges that in larger and more modern nations
this model is no longer viable in practice.62
The theory of representation, Wilson argues, appears to have been unknown in
ancient times and has not been fully implemented in even the modern European
nations.63 He views Republican Rome as defending the principle of consent, since the
“sovereign power, the dominium eminens, as it is called by the civilians, always resided
in the collective body of the people”, but he also believes that Rome failed to maintain
this principle in all its practical workings.64 Similarly, the British system also failed to
protect popular sovereignty, since the colonists were not able to participate in
government by forming and adopting the specific laws that ruled them.
Representation, as Wilson portrays it, ought to be fully distributed in every part
of the government.65 Additionally, legitimate representation must follow two practical
rules: first, the representatives must act as the people themselves would if they
possessed the same information, and second, an equal number of representatives must
act for an equal number of constituents.66 Under Wilson’s definition, Great Britain
failed to adequately support the principle of representation in its legislative branch, and
60 Ibid. 2:177.
61 Ibid. 1:190.
62 Ibid. 2:128.
63 Ibid. 1:429.
64 Ibid. 1:210.
65 Ibid. 1:430.
66 Ibid. 1:128-129.
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did not even attempt to do so in its executive and judicial branches. In contrast, by
implementing representation more fully and consistently than in Rome or Great Britain,
the United States Constitution is more dependent on the people’s consent. As Wilson
notes, the Constitution, in every part, rests “on the great democratical principle of a
representation of the people”.67
In its practical implications, Wilson’s theory of representation rests uneasily
with Blackstone’s definition of law as a prescribed rule the people are always bound to
obey; for Wilson, whether in election, legislation, or the intervening periods,
representation serves as a type of continual consent always afforded by the people and
ever within their power to withdraw.68 Clearly, Wilson’s theory of representation
coexists with a range of perplexities, which he is far from solving. Such questions
include whether representation can be deemed a sufficient substitute for direct consent,
how far a representative may act upon his own views, and what difference exists
between representation in matters of election and matters of law. Practically, Wilson
desires representation to reflect the will of the majority as directly as possible.
Therefore, when arguing in the Constitutional Convention for direct election of both
branches of the legislature, Wilson notes, “Election is the exercise of original
sovereignty in the people—but if by representatives, it is only relative sovereignty.”69
As previously noted, however, Wilson believed the indirect mode of representation still
protected the consent of the people.
Ultimately, Wilson’s doctrine of popular sovereignty rests on the principles that
liberty is only secured when the people have given their consent to the laws and
institutions by which they are governed and that this liberty must remain solely and
continuously in their hands. Consent and the consequent protection of liberty, however,
may be manifested in various forms:
[T]he sole legitimate principle of obedience to human laws is human consent. This
consent may be authenticated in different ways: in its different stages of existence, it may
assume different names—approbation—ratification—experience: but in all its different
shapes—under all its different appellations, it may easily be resolved into this
proposition, simple, natural, and just—All human laws should be founded on the consent
of those, who obey them.70
67 Ibid. 2:123; cf. 1:429-430 for Wilson’s belief that the United States’ system of representation
constitutes a key progression of the science of government not only beyond the classical legal systems but
also beyond the modern European states, as well.
68 Bailyn (1967) 174.
69 Farrand (1966) 1:365.
70 Wilson (1804) 1:200.
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Central to Wilson’s lectures is his account of how this principle of consent appears
throughout history in the laws of different nations.
2.2. Wilson’s history of popular sovereignty
A specific reading of history provides Wilson with the necessary tools for substantiating
his view of popular sovereignty. In a pattern similar to Cicero’s method in de
Republica 2.1.1-2.37.63 when recounting the history of the Roman constitution, Wilson
takes a real constitution and shows how it evolved though history to become the perfect
model. Although Wilson’s understanding of the role of the people and the liberty they
possess differs from Cicero’s account of the libertas gained by the populus during the
development of the Roman state, like Cicero, Wilson appeals to history as he seeks to
demonstrate that his state possesses the best possible constitution. For Wilson, the
principles enshrined in the United States Constitution are the most perfect embodiment
of the ancient classical traditions originating in the Greek states and especially in the
early Roman Republic. Unlike modern political scholars, the founders did not clearly
differentiate between the diverse traditions they received from classical, British, or other
sources, but viewed them all as forming one “tradition of liberty”.71 By tracing his
ideology of consent throughout history, Wilson not only attempts to legitimise his
theory, but also to demonstrate that the colonies have upheld a proper interpretation of
law and have become the true heirs of this tradition.
Although Wilson did not have access to the historical account of the Roman
constitution given in book II of de Republica, he was aware that he was following
Cicero’s approach. He quotes from Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire as
a secondary authority that also attests to Cicero’s method, saying that Cicero “for the
use of his republick, formed a system of laws. In this system, he expatiates on the
wisdom and excellency of the Roman constitution.”72 In the same manner, Wilson does
not describe a merely theoretical constitution. He notes that while the ancient laws and
governments provide examples worthy of study, he intends to appeal to the “constant
71 Richard (1994) 9, 82-83; cf. Wood, G. S. (1969) 7-8.
72 Wilson (1804) 2:19.
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standard” of the laws and institutions of the United States.73 Still, while he views the
United States as the prime example to follow and as the nation where the principles of
liberty exist in the fullest form yet known in history, he believes the science of
government and politics is yet in its beginnings.74 Thus, Wilson’s conviction that the
United States has implemented the “best” and “purest” form of government in a way
that achieves the greatest “point of perfection hitherto unattained”, does not mean that
he views it as complete.75 Even in making this argument, he continues to follow a
reading of Cicero’s de Republica which portrays the constitution of the Roman
Republic as the best possible form of government rather than as an abstract and
philosophical ideal.76
Ultimately, Wilson believes the science of government will evolve and progress
to an even greater height of knowledge and general prosperity.77 The pessimism and
apprehension regarding the fate of liberty that Bailyn notes in the mindset of the
colonists is absent from Wilson’s writings.78 Although Wilson does not view the
institutions, government, and constitution of any nation as indestructible, he remains
convinced that the laws and constitution of the United States will continue to progress
indefinitely despite minor alterations. As Read recognises, Wilson’s stance was
fundamentally different from that of Madison and Jefferson, who were constantly
preoccupied with the power struggles that could potentially overthrow the individual
freedoms of the people and the proper balance of government.79 While Wilson warns
that despotism and false notions of government threaten and often overturn the
principles of liberty,80 his study of history, far from causing him anxiety, actually gives
him confidence that the freedoms of humankind and the knowledge of just laws and
governmental institutions will continually advance toward perfection.81
73 Ibid. 2:255.
74 Ibid. 1:23; cf. 1:26, 30, 191.
75 Ibid. 1:417.
76 Cic. Rep. 2.30.52. Cf. Cic. Leg. 2.10.23, 3.5.12 on Cicero’s designation of the Roman constitution as
the best possible. Cf. Powell, J. G. F. (2001) 26-27 for a similar reading of the text.
77 Wilson (1804) 1:384.
78 Bailyn (1967) 79.
79 Read (2000) 114-115. Read even goes so far as to question the applicability of Wilson’s views of law,
saying that the optimism of Wilson’s writing perhaps indicates that he did not fully understand the
“selfish and violent tendencies at work in American life”.
80 Wilson (1804) 1:272.
81 Ibid. 1:412.
91
Consent is the key factor in Wilson’s designation of progress. He constantly
evaluates ancient and modern governments by the degree to which they upheld the
consent and thereby the sovereignty of the people. In his estimation, the more the pure
and long-standing consent of the people is reflected in their governmental institutions,
procedures, and laws, the more the science of politics is advanced.
Wilson fixes the earliest origins of popular sovereignty in some of the Greek
city-states, which voted in direct assembly and which Wilson refers to as
“commonwealths” and as “small republicks”.82 Citing from book one of Homer’s Iliad,
where the Athenian government is designated as the Δῆμος,83 Wilson points to such
references as proof of the consent of the Athenian people, who are considered free
because they would only be “governed by laws which they themselves made”.84 He
later reiterates this theme, and even while acknowledging the diverse provisions of
Athenian laws and institutions, he argues that their great unifying principle and the
reason for their success was that a citizen was “bound only by laws to which he had
given his consent”.85
His information on Greece is largely derived from secondary sources. In
referring to specific aspects of its government, he draws from John Gillies’s The History
of Ancient Greece, Richard Burn’s Ecclesiastical Law, John Pettingal’s An Inquiry into
the Use and Practice of Juries, and the works of John Selden.86 Dealing briefly with
the history of Greece, Wilson focuses more on the Roman Republic, devoting the
greater part of his discussions to this period and viewing it as an essential step in the
transmission of the law of consent to the ancient Saxons.
Livy is his primary source in contending that the laws and customs of Greece
were incorporated into Roman law. Wilson looks to the account given in book III of ab
Urbe Condita, where Livy speaks of the Roman deputation sent to Athens in order to
study their laws, customs, and institutions.87 In this version, the Athenian laws and
constitution, as originally established by Solon and then improved on by later Athenian
82 Ibid. 1:4, 6; 2:128.
83 Ibid. 2:118. The reference, which is correctly given by Wilson, is from Hom. Il. 2.547. On this point,
Wilson also includes a second reference to Potter’s Antiquities of Greece, which makes the same
argument based on the text from Homer, but which does not include the specific citation to the text
[Potter (1706) 12].
84 Wilson (1804) 2:120.
85 Ibid. 2:317; cf. 2:13, 318.
86 Ibid. 2:111-112, 119, 318-319.
87 Ibid. 2:13-15; Livy 3.31-34.
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leaders, were brought for consideration before the Roman people. Regardless of the
reliability of Livy’s narrative, its focus on the liberty of the whole Roman population,
both plebs and nobility, in adapting and accepting their system of laws played a key part
in the formation of Wilson’s view of the Roman Republic. Wilson’s personal legal
ideology is particularly evident in his discussion of Livy. He draws special attention to
Livy’s insistence that the laws were amended to fit the circumstances and manners of
the Romans and that they protected the interests of the whole Roman people by being
“equal and impartial to the high and to the low”. 88 Most particularly, Wilson
emphasises that the Twelve Tables and the ensuing laws of the Republic were based on
the principle that “the Roman people should have no laws, but such as were ratified as
well as ordered by the consent of all”.89
Wilson then proceeds to trace the underlying thread of consent through the
Roman system. He sees even the written statutes as operating under the people’s
consent and claims that in their earliest periods the people directly voted as an
assembled body.90 Even during the period of the Roman monarchs, Wilson argues that
the people still possessed the sovereign power of choosing their rulers. Although he did
not have access to the passages in book II of de Republica where Cicero touches on the
role of the people under the monarchs, Wilson applies part of the passage he translates
from de Officiis 2.12.41-42 to this argument:
It was among our own ancestors likewise, that kings of good character were chosen, in
order that the administration of justice might be enjoyed. For when the poor were
oppressed by the rich, they fled for relief to some one, preeminent in virtue, who would
protect the weak from injustice, and would dispense equal law to the high and to the low.
If they could obtain this from the mouth of one just and good man, they were satisfied;
but, as they were often disappointed in this reasonable demand, they had, afterwards,
recourse to general law, which spoke one language to all.91
As is noticeable from his translation of “were chosen” for constituti, Wilson reads the
passage as evidence that the people were consenting to this rulership in order to
maintain justice, and he uses it to support his view of popular sovereignty.
Additionally, by referencing this passage he highlights the equality enjoyed not only by
the elite but also by the weak (tenuiores) and low (infimi). Wilson, therefore, argues for
88 Ibid. 2:14-15.
89 Ibid. 2:15. This quotation from Wilson is also directly drawn and translated from Livy’s account,
which states eas leges habiturum populum Romanum, quas consensus omnium non iussisse latas magis
quam tulisse videri posset (3.34.5-6).
90 Wilson (1804) 2:128.
91 Ibid. 1:391. See above, pp. 67-68 for the more detailed examination of this passage and the Latin text.
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two fundamental principles at work in Rome’s history: first, that both the higher and
lower classes of Roman society possessed the sovereign right of consent as well as
equality before the law, and second, that if they were denied that right, they had
recourse to a legal solution that would rectify the situation.
Wilson also draws attention to several provisions of the Roman constitution,
which he believes uphold the principle of consent. First, in outlining his understanding
of the Roman system, Wilson details the precautions taken by the magistrate in forming
a bill and the approval then required by the senate, and he finally concludes that a law
had to be accepted in the “comitia” where members of the assembly and even private
citizens could speak before the law was voted on by the centuries.92 Second, when
mentioning the people or the citizen body of Rome, Wilson includes both patricians and
plebeians; furthermore, he claims that one of the main reasons for the transition from
giving votes “viva voce” to the implementation of the silent ballot was in order to
protect the influence of the lower orders.93 This, he says, is why Cicero refers to the
secret ballot in de Lege Agraria 2.2.4 and in de Legibus 3.17.39 as “the silent assertor of
liberty”.94
An essential part of Wilson’s understanding of Roman law and its preservation
of the principle of consent centers on the existence of unwritten or customary law in
Rome. Although Wilson’s efforts as a statesman were primarily concerned with written
law, he still affords a profound and even greater respect to unwritten law, which he
views as a manifest testimony of popular sovereignty. For Wilson, the presence of
customary law in a nation bears witness to the prominence placed on the people’s
consent. Because the people choose to place themselves under its commands,
“customary law” not only protects liberty but is also the most pragmatic and effectual
type of law.95 As he concludes, “a customary law carries with it the most
unquestionable proofs of freedom in the country”.96 Thus, consent is best viewed
through the medium of unwritten or customary law.
Because it is based upon popular consent, the phrase “customary law”
symbolises for Wilson the fundamental principles that he believes should characterise
92 Ibid. 2:168-169.
93 Ibid. 2:170.
94 Ibid. 2:170. For the more detailed discussion of this passage, see above, pp. 69-70.
95 Ibid. 1:64.
96 Ibid. 1:207.
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all laws. Customary law refers not to precise statutes, but rather to an abstract concept
of law itself. Thus, Wilson does not attach the term customary law to the specific laws
of Rome or any other nation. Despite the differences in their governmental institutions
and statutes, the commonality uniting the nations he commends is their whole-hearted
acceptance and reliance on customary law. As he notes in reference to customary law,
“Among the earliest, among the freest, among the most improved nations of the world,
we find a species of law prevailing, which carried, in its bosom, internal evidence of
consent”.97
The ability to frame unwritten customary law, therefore, in addition to the right
to vote on written laws, was the means by which Rome protected the people’s liberty
and consent. Believing that the greatest periods of freedom and happiness in the Roman
Republic were those when customary law was highly esteemed, Wilson states that at
such times, “it was thought immaterial whether a law received the sanction of the
people by their formal suffrage, or by the uniform course of their conduct and manners.
Thus did Romans speak and reason while they enjoyed the blessings of liberty.”98
Many of the Founders saw the commencement of the Roman Empire as a sign of
liberty’s complete destruction.99 Wilson, however, presents a more moderate view of
the period under the emperors. Although the form of government was corrupted by the
institution of the monarchy, Wilson asserts that the ideals of the Roman Republic, with
its observance of customary law and its respect for the approval of the people, still
continued under the Roman Empire.100 Indeed, he traces the principles of unwritten law
and consent up to the time of Justinian and the Corpus Iuris Civilis, citing the definition
of law offered in Digesta as “a general convention of the citizens” and believing that
Institutiones affirms his view that the Romans placed as much obligatory force on
customary law as they did on written law.101 In actual practice, the government of the
97 Ibid. 1:100.
98 Ibid. 2:15-16.
99 Cf. Richard (1994) 84 on this prevailing view among the founders of the tyranny that began under the
Roman Empire; cf. 88-89 on specific examples from the writings of Thomas Jefferson, John Dickenson,
and Samuel Adams, who describe the corrupt and despotic periods in Roman history under the emperors.
100 Wilson (1804) 2:16; cf. 1:100, 2.24.
101 Cf. Wilson (1804) 1:101 on the quotation from Digesta, for which he does not provide a specific
reference or footnote. It is likely translated from Digesta 1.3.2, which quotes Demosthenes’ definition of
law as τοῦτό ἐστι νόμος, ᾧ πάντας ἀνθρώπους προσήκει πείθεσθαι διὰ πολλά, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι πᾶς ἐστι νόμος 
εὕρημα μὲν καὶ δῶρον θεοῦ, δόγμα δὲ ἀνθρώπων φρονίμων, ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων 
ἁμαρτημάτων, πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή, καθ’ ἣν ἅπασι πρσήκει ζῆν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει (Law is that which all
people ought to obey, for many reasons but especially because every law is an invention and a gift of
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Roman Empire is clearly not an example of popular sovereignty. Nevertheless,
Wilson’s belief in the theoretical importance of tradition and popular consent in the late
Roman Empire is not unfounded. As Harries notes, inseparable from the autocracy of
the late Roman imperial system was the “insistence that the legitimacy of government
depended on the consent of everybody, the ‘consensus universorum’”.102
By means of these arguments, Wilson defends the tradition of consent and
customary law operating in the Empire and then attempts to explain its progress to
Great Britain and its integration into Saxon law. At this point, Wilson’s use of the term
“common law” becomes prominent. Both customary law and common law are
inseparable from his theory of consent. At times, he even equates the two terms,
describing common law as that “founded on long and general custom”, and then asking,
“On what can long and general custom be founded? Unquestionably, on nothing else,
but free and voluntary consent.”103 Like customary law, he defines common law as
unwritten law, but says that it can have written expressions:
We have mentioned the common law, as a law which is unwritten. When we assign to it
this character, we mean not that it is merely oral, and transmitted from age to age merely
by tradition. It has its monuments in writing; and its written monuments are accurate and
authentick. But though, in many cases, its evidence rests, yet, in all cases, its authority
rests not, on those written monuments. Its authority rests on reception, approbation,
custom, long and established. The same principles, which establish it, change, enlarge,
improve, and repeal it. These operations, however, are, for the most part, gradual and
imperceptible, partial and successive in a long tract of time. It is the characteristick of a
system of common law, that it be accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies,
and the conveniencies of the people, by whom it is appointed. Now, as these
circumstances, and exigencies, and conveniencies insensibly change; a proportioned
change, in time and in degree, must take place in the accommodated system. But though
the system suffer these partial and successive alterations, yet it continues materially and
substantially the same.104
This quotation provides an essential overview of Wilson’s conception of the common
law. Four main points appear the paragraph: first, the common law is unwritten and
orally passed on to successive generations; second, it has written reflections that testify
to its authority; third, the actual authority of the common law finds its source in the
people, who have the ability to accept or reject it. Finally, the people have the ability to
change the common law over time, but even as they change it, the common law remains
essentially the same. Thus, the common law may be confirmed through written means,
God, and an ordinance of wise men for correcting both voluntary and involuntary faults, a common
agreement of the city, and in accordance with which it befits all those in the city to live).
102 Harries (1999) 58; cf. Millar (2002) 63.
103 Wilson (1804) 1:206-207.
104 Ibid. 2:37-38.
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such as judicial decisions or actual statutes, but its binding authority rests on custom and
therefore on the consent of the people.
Significantly, Wilson’s blurring of the distinction between customary law and
common law aids him in applying the appellation of “common law” to the legal systems
of different countries throughout history. Since he has defined the laws of Greece and
Rome as frequently based on the consent of the people and on customary or unwritten
law, Wilson also believes the term “common law” applies to their laws, and he is not
alone in his definitions of these terms. At one point, he looks for support of his method
to Sir Henry Finch’s legal treatise, Laws, or a Discourse Thereof, written in 1627,
which draws attention to Euripides’ and Plato’s designation of the laws of Greece as
“common laws”: “It opens the original and first beginning of the common law: it shows
the antiquity of the name; it teaches common law to be nothing else but common
reason—that refined reason, which is generally received by the consent of all.”105
This interchanging of the concepts of customary law and common law occurs
periodically throughout Wilson’s account, and especially in Chapter XII, ‘On the
Common Law’. For instance, he states that Roman customs were confirmed by
common consent,106 that the term common law need not apply only to the laws of
England since the Greek city states also had recourse to such law,107 that the Lycians
were ruled entirely by customs rather than written laws, and that the ancient Britons
were governed not by written laws but by the “customary laws of the Druids”.108 In this
context of English law, he uses the two terms in close proximity, reaffirming that
unwritten laws protect liberty and declaring that “the common law of England is a
customary law”.109 Although Wilson particularly views the time until the Norman
Conquest as a period marked by adherence to law based on custom and consent,110 he
even sees the days under the early British parliament as a time when the people
followed customary law and freely bound themselves to laws of their own choosing.111
105 Ibid. 2:4. See Finch (1759) 74-75 for the longer commentary on the passage from Plato that Wilson
has truncated.
106 Wilson (1804) 1:63-64.
107 Ibid. 2:4.
108 Ibid. 1:99.
109 Ibid. 1:100.
110 Ibid. 2:28.
111 Ibid. 1:207-208.
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His summary of the “history of the common law” draws together the various threads of
consent and custom into one united tradition of liberty:
We have seen its rise taking place, by slow degrees, in ages very remote, and in nations
very different from one another. We have seen it, in its converging progress, run into one
uniform system, mellowed by time and improved by experience. In every period of its
existence, we find imprinted on it the most distinct and legible characters of a customary
law—a law produced, extended, translated, adopted, and moulded by practice and
consent.112
Thus, Wilson frequently uses the term “common law” to designate an overarching
theory of law based on the consent of the people. In an abstract sense, Wilson
essentially views common law as a heritage of unwritten law, expressing the general
will and social values of a civil community, gaining obligatory force through
established tradition and consent, and proving through long usage its ability to promote
not only the prosperity and wellbeing of the community as a whole but also the
individual freedom and happiness of its members. In his philosophical portrayal of the
common law, Wilson makes little distinction between the laws of different nations,
focusing rather on the unity they share in upholding the principle of popular consent,
and viewing both customary and common law as distinct in this general sense from the
statutes of an individual nation
Nevertheless, while Wilson frequently uses the term “common law” as a concept
distinct from the customs of a particular state, he is also aware of the written
expressions guiding interpretation of the common law and of its specific application to
the laws of Great Britain. While he realises the judicial basis undergirding English
common law, he is not concerned with analysing the finer points of the common law
until his final practical lectures. A reader of Wilson’s lectures, therefore, must be
cognisant of the separate meanings Wilson associates with these terms in their different
contexts.
Wilson’s frequent equation of common law and customary law do not result
from his own lack of knowledge, but rather are the result of his attempt to connect the
laws of England with the customary law tradition of Rome. His legal studies under
John Dickinson as well as his own writings attest to his thorough knowledge of English
112 Ibid. 2:28. Cf. Pocock (1975) 340-341 on the English ideology of common law as immemorial
custom and the responsibility of each citizen to preserve and refine it.
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common law and to his understanding of its history and legal scholars.113 Clearly, he
recognised the distinct application of the term “common law” as it applied to the
specific laws and judicial decisions of England, and when using the term “common
law” to refer to English statutes and judicial decisions, he avoids employing the term
“customary law”, which he appeals to only in the lectures where he examines the nature
of law and the philosophy which should govern its use. Wilson’s care is especially
evident in the third part of his lectures, where he addresses the rules governing the
definitions and punishments for specific crimes. Although he incessantly refers to the
statutes as derived from English common law and assumes they are established by
consent, Wilson never mentions customary law. Drawing on his extensive knowledge
of English law, Wilson summarises the practical role and extent of the common law by
turning to Sir Matthew Hale, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 1671 and an
esteemed writer on English law and jurisprudence. He quotes from Hale’s History and
Analysis of the Common Law of England, saying that the common law not only
regulates and directs the proceedings of the courts, but has further effects:
It guides the course of descents and successions to real estates, and limits their extent and
qualifications: it appoints the forms and solemnities of acquiring, of securing, and of
transferring property: it prescribes the manner and the obligation of contracts: it
establishes the rules, by which contracts, wills, deeds, and even acts of parliament are
interpreted.114
In speaking of the specific laws adopted by the United States from English common
law, Wilson also exclusively uses the term “common law”. For instance, he follows
such a practice when he explains how the language of the common law relates to
property, and when he explores the use of evidence, the relations between nations, and
how the United States Constitution has applied the common law to trials.115 Therefore,
although he never clearly distinguishes between customary and common law, the
contexts in which he uses the term common law bear witness to his appreciation of its
various shades of meaning.
113 Throughout his lectures, Wilson repeatedly examines the opinions of English law cases and scholars.
For a modern scholar’s view, see Read (2000) 113 on Wilson’s acquaintance with the English tradition of
common law liberties.
114 Wilson (1804) 1:204-205.
115 Cf. Wilson (1804) 1:50 on the common law divisions of property; 2:378 on the credibility of evidence
used in court; 1:374 on the common law as applying to relations between states; 1:373 on how the
national constitution has employed common law principles in its management of trials, prosecutions, and
punishments.
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Although Wilson’s understanding of the English legal tradition and his
interpretations of the writings of common law scholars are beyond the limits of this
discussion, it is important to recognise that Wilson’s presentation of English common
law is essentially different than that propounded by Blackstone. For Blackstone, the
common law is a purely British construct. It is “that ancient collection of unwritten
maxims and customs” which has “subsisted immemorially in this kingdom”.116 The
common law, as he presents it, can never be separated from its judicial foundation, since
the courts are the “depositary of the laws” and their decisions are the “principal and
most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a custom as shall
form a part of the common law”.117
Unlike Blackstone, Wilson desires to legitimise his conception of law by
locating it in the classical past and supporting it with the authority of the ancient
authors, particularly Cicero. Although Blackstone, like earlier common law theorists
and like Wilson himself, frequently cites Cicero and admits that some aspects of the
common law have connections with Roman law, he views the common law as
distinctively British and completely separate from the Roman tradition of civil law.118
In his opinion, one should not venerate Roman laws and customs “unless we can also
prefer the despotic monarchy of Rome and Byzantium” to the “free constitution of
Britain”.119 As Blackstone describes it, the English common law developed as a free
system, independent of the civil laws of Europe, which he connects with the Roman
Empire and Justinian.120 Wilson, by contrast, presents a much more optimistic and
positive view of the freedom of the Roman system and of Roman legal philosophy, and
he uses the Roman tradition to support his doctrine of popular sovereignty and
consent.121 Ironically, he attempts to employ Blackstone’s arguments in support of his
116 Blackstone (1979) 1:17.
117 Ibid. 1:69.
118 Cf. Blackstone (1979) 1:35, 64, where he admits that some principles of the English common law are
traceable to Roman law.
119 Blackstone (1979) 1:5; cf. 1:73.
120 Blackstone returns to this theme more than once; for instance, see 1:17-19, 67, 80-82. Cf.
Vinogradoff (1968) 97-118 on the influence of Roman law in England; cf. Stein (1999) 56-57, 86-88 on
the reception of Roman law in England and Scotland; cf. Stein (1963) 212-216 on the influence of Roman
law in Scotland; cf. Ayres (1997) 5 on the tendency to esteem the common law tradition as contrasted
with the laws of Justinian.
121 Cf. Wilson (1804) 2:33 on his argument that Roman jurisprudence operated in England long before
the Digesta of Justinian was discovered at Amalfi. On this point, although he does not note it, Wilson
makes an obvious divergence from Blackstone’s account of the Digesta and its ensuing influence
[Blackstone (1979) 1:17-18].
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own case, saying that even Blackstone admits that the common law was founded upon
custom and the consent of the people.122
In his second set of lectures, Wilson attempts to broaden the understanding of
common law not only as it functions as a type of customary law but also as it relates to
the English judicial system. After finishing his explanations on the philosophy of law
and moving on to address the law as applied to judges in the United States courts,
Wilson introduces a more practical and concrete understanding of the common law.
The common law, whether of England or of the United States, was expressed primarily
through written interpretations that acquired a specific and binding force through
judicial decisions. Although Wilson does not indicate that he is referencing Blackstone,
he quotes directly from the Commentaries to say that “judicial decisions are the
principal and most authentick evidence, which can be given, of the existence of such a
custom as is entitled to form a part of the common law”.123 Although Wilson laments
their lack of system, he says that English case law decisions, collected over the
centuries, and reported by great judges like Lord Coke, Mr. Peere Williams, and Sir
James Burrow represent the “precious materials of the common law. These are the
authentick experiments, on which a sound system of legal philosophy must be
formed.”124 Wilson views the provisions of common law as operating in a similar
manner in the United States within the framework of judicial decisions, written law, and
particularly the Constitution.
The connection between unwritten customary law and its written expressions or
“written monuments”125 is undoubtedly complex, partly due to various understandings
of a “constitution”. In his presentation of the common law, Wilson attempts to maintain
a unity between the authority of the common law and that of written laws and
constitutions, while recognising the competing definitions of a constitution. Many
British thinkers, he observes, understand their constitution to be the whole system of
laws, customs, and institutions of their nation, and others define it in a more limited
sense as the balanced form of their government.126 While he tends to employ the latter
122 Wilson (1804) 1:208.
123 Ibid. 2:303. Cf. Blackstone (1979) 1:69.
124 Wilson (1804) 2:411.
125 Ibid. 2:38.
126 Ibid. 1:427-429. Cf. Wood, G. S. (2006) 610-611 on the American development of the idea of a
written constitution and how it differed from Great Britain.
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meaning of a constitution, Wilson still holds to the theory that the basis and framework
for these written laws and governmental forms is the common law. For instance, in the
Preface to his lectures, he emphasises that the written statutes of a state only exist in
order to supplement and aid the common law.127 Since it contains the general principles
of law, the common law serves as a commentary and an explanation for written statutes,
which are applied only when the common law itself is imperfect or inapplicable.128
Therefore, while the people can express their view formally through elections and direct
access to the law-making process, an informal mechanism also exists in the mechanism
of the law itself, as the common law and the interpretations of the courts guide the
application of prescribed statutes.129
Because of the close relationship between common law and written statutes,
when addressing the progression of political science throughout history, and more
particularly, the evolution of the common law, Wilson describes the unwritten
principles of the common law as often overlapping with written law or even forming
part of the governmental structure itself. In his explanation of the process in which
unwritten customs become inscribed in statute, Wilson makes a direct contrast between
the laws dictated by a superior and those accepted on the basis of long-established
custom. He personifies the voice of customary law as humbly petitioning for
acceptance and saying, “I never intruded upon you: I was invited upon trial: this trial
has been had: you have long known me: you have long approved me: shall I now obtain
an establishment in your family?”.130 For Wilson, therefore, the consent that is a
necessary condition for law is best gained when a nation inscribes customs in the
catalogue of its written statutes.
At the same time, custom also exists alongside of written law. On this topic,
Wilson refers to the Twelve Tables. As a form of written law consented to by the
people, the Twelve Tables formed the basis for all the later laws of Rome, and
particularly for the responsa prudentum or the “commentaries of lawyers”, which
127 Wilson (1804) 1:vi.
128 Ibid. 1:vi-vii.
129 On this point, Wilson faces a similar philosophical contradiction to that encountered by the great
proponents of English common law. Cf. Pocock (1972) 255 on how the belief that written documents and
statements of the common law were expressions of “an immemorial ius non scriptum” rested in an uneasy
alliance with the fact that different readings of these documents inevitably resulted in various and diverse
interpretations.
130 Wilson (1804) 1:207.
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Wilson designates as the ius non scriptum in contradistinction to the written laws of
Rome.131 He describes the Twelve Tables as the “foundation of that immense fabrick of
jurisprudence, which has extended the influence and the glory of Rome, far beyond the
limits and existence of the Roman power”.132 The written Constitution of the United
States, with its delineations of the powers and limitations of the branches of government
provides a similar framework for ensuring the popular consent of the people. Like the
Twelve Tables, Wilson views the Constitution as protecting custom and popular consent
and serving as an overall framework for written law.
The use of custom played an entirely different role in the Roman legal system of
Cicero’s time, and precedent served not as an absolute authority but as an important
means of argumentation in the courts. In this way, the popular consent of the people as
represented by the iudices was constantly maintained. For Wilson, however, the
decisions of previous judicial cases would serve as binding on later rulings. Still,
although through different means, Wilson’s view of popular sovereignty seeks to ensure
that perpetual consent guides both the law and its interpretation.
In reading Wilson’s lectures, his audience cannot be forgotten. Wilson’s
understanding of custom and written law have a direct application for his students. The
Law College of Philadelphia began through the initiation of students preparing for or
already engaged in legal practice, who desired to acquire a thorough understanding and
instruction in law.133 In speaking to students who desired to present their cases in court,
Wilson continually instructs them not to restrict their studies to the intricacies of written
statutes. Instead, he wants them to view law not as a mere occupation for private
advantage but as an act of civic participation.134 Wilson continues his portrayal of the
ideal and truly successful lawyer by taking a highly Ciceronian approach. At one point,
he indirectly cites the Latin text of Cicero’s de Oratore 1.55.236 through the
intermediary source of Lord Kaims of Edinburgh, thus employing both classical and
contemporary sources to condemn the type of lawyer who is nothing nisi leguleius
quidam cautus, et acutus praeco actionum, cantor formularum, auceps syllabarum
(except a certain pettifogging lawyer, wary and sharp, a crier of legal suits, a singer of
131 Wilson (1804) 2:15.
132 Ibid. 2:15.
133 Konkle (c.1900) 620.
134 Wilson (1804) 1:42-44.
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formulas, a catcher of syllables).135 The true lawyer, as Wilson presents him, is one
who understands the key principles of law,136 refrains from using mysterious or
professionalised language,137 and emulates those lawyers and judges who were
“distinguished by the accomplishments of an active, as well as a contemplative life”.138
If a lawyer is to achieve this standard, he must first comprehend the underlying
principles of law and particularly the common law, which Wilson regards as a more
important object of study than the niceties of legislative statutes. In applying the
decisions of previous cases to current ones, a lawyer must not only employ his
knowledge of written statutes but must also know how the common law guides their
interpretation in accordance with natural justice and equity.139 The lawyer, therefore,
uses common law as the interpreter of statutory law when arguing cases. Whether his
application of the common law is the correct interpretation must necessarily depend on
its acceptance or rejection by the court.
In contrast to the concerns of the Anti-Federalists, such as those expressed by
the anonymous author of the ‘Centinel’, 140 Wilson does not worry about the possibility
of the courts abusing their powers of interpretation. Along with prominent Federalists,
he argues that separating the judicial branch of the government will help ensure
liberty.141 Most importantly, however, Wilson’s apparent nonchalance toward the
possibility of judicial tyranny can be traced back to his doctrine of popular consent.
The sovereign power of law residing in the people at large gives them the moral right to
change or alter law, while the newly-established constitution ensures that those rights
are protected.142 The remedy for judicial oppression is built into the system itself.
Flexibility and the perpetual continuance of popular interpretation of the common law
are still maintained. If a court should attempt to establish a binding precedent based on
an interpretation of common law that defies popular custom, the people are able to
reverse it and to impose their own interpretation.
135 Ibid. 1:43.
136 Ibid. 1:14.
137 Ibid. 1:10.
138 Ibid. 1:44.
139 Ibid. 2:407, 411.
140 Ketcham (1986) 232-233; cf. 246 on the views expressed in the Pennsylvania Minority.
141 Wilson (1804) 1:405-408. Cf. Willis (1982) 394 on Hamilton’s argument in Federalist Paper
Number 78.
142 Wilson (1804) 1:417-422. In this respect, Wilson believes that the United States has surpassed Great
Britain, which fails to fully protect the principle of popular consent.
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Thus, the consent of the people continues to function as the underlying
foundation of Wilson’s political philosophy. Through popular consent, Wilson argues,
the colonies fully possess the right either to accept or to discard the provisions of the
common law inherited from Great Britain. Although he conceives of the colonies as
remaining under the rules of the English common law and benefiting by their adoption,
and he later praises the United States Constitution for accepting and following the
maxims of the common law, Wilson remains convinced that England could not
legitimately force the colonies to abide by all the laws of parliament.143 Instead, since
the “rules of the common law are introduced by experience and custom; so they may be
withdrawn by discontinuance and disuse”.144 On this basis, those parts of the common
law which proved inapplicable or unhelpful to the circumstances of the colonies could
be rightfully rejected. In short, common law provisions, founded as they are upon
custom and popular consent, may be used or abandoned in accordance with their
usefulness and general acceptance in a civil society. Although he commends the
colonies for applying the common law more fully than even their British
contemporaries,145 Wilson also maintain that it was fully within their authority to reject
it simply by disuse.146 In jettisoning a common law statute, one can still retain the
fundamental principle of the common law, which is “consent given after long,
approved, and uninterrupted experience”.147
For Wilson, therefore, the doctrine of popular sovereignty rests on the basis of
consent. Since custom “necessarily carries with it intrinsick evidence of consent”,
popular sovereignty is not only evidenced through the direction legislation and votes of
the people, but is especially revealed through unwritten customary law and statutory
laws based upon the common law.148 Furthermore, the consent of the people is both
indivisible and continuous, remaining at all times in their power to grant or to withdraw;
therefore, popular sovereignty implies not only the right to consent to the establishment
of laws and governmental forms, but also to do away with them.
143 Cf. Wilson (1804) 2:48-55 on his account of the history and governance of English law in the
colonies.
144 Wilson (1804) 2:53.
145 Ibid. 2:29.
146 Ibid. 2:53.
147 Ibid. 1:200.
148 Ibid. 1:204-205.
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In Wilson’s opinion, Blackstone and other English writers who accepted the
supreme authority of the legislative branch of government acted inconsistently with the
principles governing Britain’s original laws and institutions; accordingly, Wilson argues
that in separating from Great Britain the American colonies were reverting back to the
spirit of the Magna Charta and to a far older and more established legal tradition of
consent.149 Thus, he supports his justification of the American Revolution with legal
terminology and a specific interpretation of law. This “common-law interpretation of
history”, which views the unwritten laws of time and experience as providing the
highest legal authority in the present, forms an inherent part of Wilson’s perspective.150
By locating the origins of the common law in the “customary laws” of Rome, he is able
to justify the American Revolution not only in the discourse of the English tradition but
also in the language of the classics. Thus, Wilson forms a conception of popular
sovereignty that bears directly upon the practical politics of his time and that legitimises
the course of action taken by the American colonies.
3. Wilson’s slant on Cicero
As seen in the previous section, Wilson believes Republican Rome functioned as a
democracy, although in a less complete form than that perfected in the Constitution and
representative system of the United States. Primarily, he supports this perspective not
from Cicero, but from Livy, whom he quotes in order to establish his argument that the
Roman people were sovereign in ratifying and consenting to the laws by which they
were governed.151 Other contemporary sources and histories on Rome also influenced
his overall perspective of the laws and customs of the Roman Republic. Although
Wilson primarily derives this historical view apart from Cicero, he nevertheless reads
Cicero as concurring with this picture of the Roman Republic and uses Ciceronian
quotations to reinforce his belief that the Roman source of sovereignty rested in the
people.
149 Ibid. 2:44.
150 Pocock (1957) 51; cf. 33-35 on the common law mindset and tradition; cf. Zetzel (2001) 85 on the
similarity between Cicero’s account of the formation of the Roman constitution in de Republica and the
English understanding of the superiority and authority of common law.
151 See above, pp. 91-92.
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Many of the Ciceronian quotations Wilson employs refer to a natural or higher
law, such as those from de Natura Deorum, de Republica, and de Legibus, and he uses
them to support his interpretation of an outside standard that all humankind should
obey.152 To support his contention that Cicero’s philosophy upholds the right of the
people to consent to and change their laws, he uses a few key quotations. The first
quotation is that from de Officiis 2.12.41-42, which Wilson translates as saying that the
early kings were chosen by the people; thus, he reads it as denoting a type of popular
sovereignty even under the monarchy where the people had a direct role in the
government and were the final authority, especially because if they were “disappointed
in this reasonable demand” of requiring just kings with good character, they had
“recourse to general law, which spoke one language to all”.153 At this point, Wilson’s
translation reflects the inseparable connection he draws between higher law and
resistance. While he links these concepts together in his readings of Cicero, garnering
support for his conclusion that a people may resist unjust written laws or governments
which violate the principles of natural law, Wilson is undoubtedly influenced by the
more modern strands of political thought that developed and emphasised such
theories.154
The other two quotations Wilson uses to strengthen his perception that the laws
and philosophy of the Roman Republic protected the principles of democracy come
from Cicero’s judicial speeches. In Wilson’s examination of the natural rights of
individuals, although he does not provide an English translation, he footnotes the pro
Milone 4.10-11:
Est igitur, judices, haec non scripta, sed nata lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus,
legimus; verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti,
sed facti, non instituti, sed imbuti sumus; ut si vita nostra in aliquas insidias, si in vim, si
in tela aut latronum aut inimicorum incidisset, omnis honesta ratio esset expediendae
152 See above, pp. 53-56.
153 Wilson (1804) 1:391. This passage forms an important part of several of Wilson’s key arguments;
therefore, I have referenced it in both the general discussion of Wilson’s use of Cicero in chapter two (see
above, pp. 67-68) as well as in the section of Wilson’s history of popular sovereignty (see above, pp. 92-
93).
154 Cf. Skinner (1978) 2:338-348 for a helpful overview of the formulation of theories of popular
sovereignty and resistance in Scotland. Wilson’s reliance on the works of theorists like Pufendorf, Locke,
Reid, and others for his natural law theories has also been noted (see above, p. 74 n. 5). The use of Cicero
in arguments for higher law and resistance also occurs in writings likely unknown by Wilson, such as
Jacob Heyndrix’s argument in 1582 that the Netherlands were justified in resisting Philip II of Spain. See
Gelderen (1993) 173, 177, 185, 224 for Heyndrix’s treatise on Political Education, which employs the
same quotation from Off. 2.12.41-42 and argues that de Officiis as a whole supports the justice of their
cause.
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salutis: silent enim leges inter arma; nec se expectari iubent, cum ei qui expectare velit,
ante iniusta poena luenda sit, quam iusta repetenda.155
This is therefore, O judges, a law not written but born; which we have not learnt,
received, or read, but in truth which we have absorbed, drunk, and wrung from nature
herself; a law which we were not taught but to which we were made, not in which we
were trained but which was ingrained; that if our life should have fallen into any traps,
into violence, into the weapons either of robbers or enemies, every method of procuring
safety would be honourable: for laws are silent when one is attacked; they do not
command that one wait for their assistance, since he who wishes to await the laws, will
first pay an unjust penalty, before he may claim a just recompense.
In the context of the speech, Cicero is distorting the facts and attempting to portray
Milo’s murder of Clodius as an act of self-defence.156 His argument that the natural law
of self-defence permits a man to protect his own life, however, is still valid: since the
written laws cannot restore an undeserved loss of life, a man has the right to defend
himself in situations where physical violence is threatened. While applying Cicero’s
reasoning primarily to the defence of life, Wilson broadens its application to include
other rights he believes are guaranteed by nature, such as liberty, property, and the right
to choose the laws by which one is governed, and he views the preservation of such
rights as permitted by natural law even when one must defend those rights against a
political authority.157 Therefore, he regards the protection of life as only one expression
of the natural lex mentioned by Cicero in this quotation. Wilson would not view
himself as incorrectly reading Cicero, however, since he views the quotation as relating
to other Ciceronian passages that he cites in his lectures, such as de Republica 3.22.33,
which speaks of an unwritten and eternal lex governing all nations.
The final quotation employed by Wilson in the context of popular sovereignty is
the oft-repeated statement from pro Cluentio 53.146: “law is fundamental to liberty …
we are all servants of the law, so that we may be free”.158 This opinion, Wilson
believes, reveals “internal evidence of consent”,159 since the people are agreeing
together to obey the laws; liberty can only exist with obedience, but this submission to
155 Wilson (1804) 2:496. Wilson’s Latin text differs in two instances from the 1692 edition, which
employs “exspectari” and “exspectare” rather than “expectari” and “expectare”.
156 Cf. Lintott (2008) 33-34, 119-120 for a brief examination of Cicero’s manipulation of the facts of the
case.
157 Wilson (1804) 2:496. Cf. Wright (1931) 281-285 on the centrality of natural law in Wilson’s
philosophy and in his method of applying it to public policies; cf. Hamburger (1993) 908-909, 922-929
on the view in the American founding that natural rights were subject to natural law. For more
bibliography on the general subject of natural law and Cicero’s influence in its formation, see below, p.
163 n. 245.
158 For the whole of this quotation and Wilson’s contextualisation of it, see above, p. 38.
159 Wilson (1804) 1:100.
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the law also indicates the people’s position of freedom in consenting to it. In the pro
Cluentio, Cicero urges the jurors to decide on the basis of law and not on preconceived
judgements formed from the accusation that in a previous case Cluentius falsely accused
his father-in-law of murder and bribed the jury. In this context, Cicero’s main purpose
is not to present a philosophical argument or an examination of the precise purpose and
function of law. Rather, he is employing a rhetorical strategy by focusing his
audience’s attention on the sanctity of law and attempting to sway their opinion of the
case. Wilson’s repeated use of this quotation for a didactic purpose within the
framework of his lectures and within his study of political thought overemphasises
Cicero’s rhetorical topos. Nonetheless, Wilson pinpoints the subtle correlation made
between law and true liberty in the pro Cluentio.160 While he does not distinguish
between Cicero’s various approaches in his philosophical and rhetorical works, Wilson
identifies aspects of popular sovereignty in the speeches and uses Ciceronian concepts
and phraseology for his own purposes.
Wilson draws a final conclusion from the pro Cluentio passage that is
unsubstantiated by the text. Attempting to respond to Pufendorf, who criticises the
Romans for describing their laws as “common agreements”,161 Wilson appeals to
Cicero’s statements in the pro Cluentio for confirmation of his argument that custom
not only invests law with the power of compelling obedience but also serves as
evidence of popular sovereignty. While Wilson’s view is not necessarily inconsistent
with Cicero’s philosophy, Wilson is using the quotation from the pro Cluentio in a
context of customary law, whereas in the actual case Cicero was referring solely to
written law.
Although he attempts to connect his history of customary and common law with
Cicero’s texts, on this point Wilson is clearly departing on his own philosophical trail
and constructing an angle on law founded not upon Cicero but upon his own view of
custom and consent. Nevertheless, while Wilson’s connection of common law and
customary law is not based on Cicero’s writings, Cicero does place a special
significance on unwritten law. For instance, in his early de Inventione, Cicero
160 Cf. Wirszubski (1950) 7 on the implied distinction the pro Cluentio makes between libertas and
licentia, with liberty being enjoyable only under law. Wilson takes a similar position throughout his
lectures; indeed, his whole theory of popular sovereignty is limited by the view that the people are only
free to act in accordance with virtue and justice.
161 Wilson (1804) 1:100; cf. 1:199.
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emphasises that an advocate can argue in opposition to written lex if an action is in
accordance with the principles of justice and equity, because no law can require an
inutilem (inexpedient) or iniquam (unjust) act; moreover, an effort to follow the intent
of the law may even require an individual to disregard written statutes.162
Cicero’s general understanding of law also points to the weight he accords
unwritten law. Although he avoids providing a precise definition of law, in Topica
5.28, Cicero offers a definition of the law’s divisions that supports the joint authority of
both written law and unwritten tradition, since the ius civile consists of legibus, senatus
consultis, rebus iudicatis, iuris peritorum auctoritate, edictis magistratuum, more,
aequitate (written statutes, senatorial decrees, judicial decisions, the opinions of experts
in the law, the edicts of magistrates, custom, and equity). Even when arguing the pro
Cluentio, Cicero tells the jury they should take into account not only lex, but also
religio, aequitas and fides,163 thereby reminding the people of their responsibility to set
aside prejudice and to uphold the written laws and the unwritten traditions of justice
accepted by the community as a whole. Thus, the language of the courtroom reveals the
public need for decisions to be justified not only through written law but through
principles based on ancient custom and equity. As Harries notes, “in a given theoretical
case, arguments could be advanced for written law, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the case for proportional fairness, or aequitas. Knowing law was furthered complicated
by a third element, custom, or consuetude.”164
Unwritten law in the Roman Republic, therefore, attests to the role of popular
consent, especially since the people, as represented through the iudices, could constantly
reinterpret the law in light of unwritten custom and equity. Although this regard for
customary law is not equivalent to Wilson’s conception of popular sovereignty, it shows
the importance Cicero placed on public consent.
For Wilson, however, popular sovereignty meant not only consent but a direct
involvement in the state and an authority over its laws and forms of government.
Unlike Cicero’s distinction between the people as an entity of the mixed government
162 Cic. Inv. 2.47.138, 2.48.141. As an example of deduction or syllogistic reasoning, Cicero retells the
story of Epaminondas, the Theban general, who won a great victory through neglect of the written statues
(Inv. 1.33.55-56, 1.38.68-69). Although Cicero is using this as an example rather than actually arguing
the point, it demonstrates the pattern of argumentation that could take place in the courts.
163 Cic. Clu. 50.159
164 Harries (2006) 152.
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and the people as the whole body of citizens, Wilson unites the two. Viewing the
people as separate from the mixed form of government and as continuously holding
sovereign power to alter the government or its laws, in practical terms Wilson maintains
that the majority should have the greatest influence in the state.
Thus, even if Cicero views the senate’s role as advising and guiding the people
rather than as possessing the real power behind legislation, Wilson’s philosophy still
diverges from the aristocratic tendency of Cicero’s thought. While Cicero appeals to
the elite to pilot the Republic through the dangers besetting it, Wilson appeals to the
citizen body. Although a firm supporter of the consolidated national government and
one of the main writers of the Constitution, Wilson’s trust in the common man
resembled the sentiments of the Anti-Federalists, who believed civic virtue and local
representation would be sufficient to prevent the evils of factions and to retain the unity
of the states.165
Broadening Cicero’s conception of popular consent, Wilson abandons the view
of an elite body of citizens governing the people. Instead, he makes no distinction
between the elite and the common citizens, and rather than fearing the dangerous
impulse of this class of citizens, he trusts in their virtue and their ability to govern
themselves.166 On one level, the similarity with Cicero still remains, since Wilson also
believes that the people should choose from among themselves men to govern them
who are most excellent in education and experience, and that these representatives must
serve as examples to the rest in knowledge and character. Additionally, Wilson admits
that a proper deference to individuals possessing wisdom and authority is necessary in a
stable society.167 Nonetheless, Wilson looks to all citizens to hold the leaders
accountable rather than looking to the representatives to direct the citizens.168 He
asserts that, in contrast to the British constitution, which upholds the institution of the
165 Cf. Ketcham (1986) 270-280 for these anti-federalist views expressed by ‘Brutus’; cf. 208 for Patrick
Henry’s speech before the Virginia Ratifying Convention; cf. Wood, G. S. (2003) 90-91 on the general
Anti-Federalist position.
166 Wilson did uphold the franchises of the respective states and supported the provision in the federal
constitution allowing the states to determine their own voting qualifications [Wilson (1804) 2:131]. In
this sense, therefore, a type of qualified majority exists in the system, although in many cases, the
qualifications of an elector did not even include a property requirement but were simply based on paying
the tax. Regardless of the system itself, however, in theory Wilson does not differentiate between classes.
167 Wilson (1804) 2:303.
168 Ibid. 1:436. Cf. Pocock (1975) 519 on the similar viewpoint in English politics that emphasised the
virtue of the people rather than that of their representatives, who were in danger of becoming corrupted
while in office by the lure of power and ambition.
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nobility in order to promote public virtue and to form a barrier between king and
people, the United States has no “separate orders of men”.169 Although Wilson believed
the most virtuous and gifted should be elected, a perspective which Manin labels a
“défense de l’aristocratie naturelle” entailing that “les représentants ne seraient pas
comme leurs électeurs et ne devaient pas l’être”,170 Wilson looked to a educated and
virtuous public who would desire, praise, and perceive these qualities in those they
elected from among themselves. Based on the premise that all citizens are equal in their
nature and in their rights, he argues that the discretion of the citizens may be trusted in
their choice of representatives and maintains that those endowed with governing powers
must be a “faithful echo of the voice of the people”.171
Fundamentally, Wilson’s perspective was shaped by the specific form of tyranny
he perceived in the colonial states—not the despotism of a king or individual, but that of
an elite nobility, namely Parliament. This view is reflected in his readings of Cicero,
which apply Cicero’s denunciations of tyranny and calls for freedom to the
circumstances of his own age. Cicero, however, is concerned not with the tyranny of
the senate but with that of a dictator such as Caesar or Antony. While he says in de
Republica that an aristocracy can result in tyranny,172 thus qualifying it as an
illegitimate form of a state, the situation serving as the subtle backdrop to his final
writings is his desire to uphold the authority of the senate against the tyranny of an
individual.
Still, Cicero views the destruction of the tyrant as essential in upholding the
liberty of the people. In a letter to Atticus on 27 April 44 B.C., he notes that tyranny
still exists in the Republic and regrets that the Ides of March libertatem populo Romano
non dederunt (did not impart liberty to the Roman people).173 Again, in his appeal to
Brutus in December 44, Cicero beseeches him to take action and to free the Republic
from tyranny on behalf of the senatus populusque Romanus.174 A final instance occurs
in the Second Philippic, when in a grand storm of eloquence, he recalls his former
defence of the res publica and professes himself willing to die if by so doing the
169 Wilson (1804) 1:435.
170 Manin (1995) 155; cf. Mansfield (1991) 115, 131-132 on the view that representation combines the
benefits of democracy and aristocracy.
171 Wilson (1804) 1:433; cf. 1:108, 441.
172 Cic. Rep. 1.28.44
173 Ibid. Att. 14.14.
174 Ibid. Fam. 11.5.
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populum Romanum liberum reliquam (the Roman people may remain free).175 Thus,
the theme persists throughout his writings that he is heeding the voice of the populus
Romanus and acting on their behalf to restore freedom to them and to the Republic.
While Cicero is likely exploiting the language of popular sovereignty and in actuality
desires a return to senatorial authority,176 he still affirms the necessary role of the
people. Liberty, as he understands it, is compatible with both the freedom of the people
and with the guiding influence of the senate and ultimately consists in the protection of
both.177
For Wilson, however, consent serves as the basis of sovereignty, an indivisible
principle continually residing in the people and allowing them the freedom to alter or
abolish their government. In a sense, Cicero’s struggle against the tyranny of Antony
could be more properly compared with the attempt of the English barons to limit
monarchical power at Runnymede. Wilson, on the other hand, views himself as striving
against Parliament in order to limit the power of the aristocracy and to place all
sovereignty in the possession of the people. Although he still advocates a mixed
constitution, the people are separate from this division of government and the
sovereignty they possess cannot be divided. The mixed constitution, therefore, balances
only the governmental powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, while
the people remain distinct from the government. Even in assigning powers to those in
the government, the people possess the “sovereign power”, which is expressed through
the written constitution.178 Since sovereignty remains solely with the people, they may
act at any time to change the law or to remove any of the powers previously entrusted to
the government.179 Wood rightly notes that Wilson’s innovative theory of sovereignty
extended further than that offered by earlier political thinkers: not content with arguing
that “all governmental power was derived from the people”, Wilson went a step further
and insisted that “all governmental power was only a temporary and limited agency of
the people – out, so to speak, on a short-term, always revocable, loan”.180 Thus,
175 Ibid. Phil. 2.46.118-119.
176 Lintott (2008) 377; Brunt (1988) 330-331.
177 Cf. Cic. Sest. 65.137 on Cicero’s view of the senate as the custos, praeses, and propugnator of the
Republic and of its role in protecting and increasing the liberty of the people.
178 Wilson (1804) 1:417-418; cf. 1:82-83, 185, 439.
179 Ibid. 1:25, 160, 190.
180 Wood, G. S. (2006) 621-622.
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Wilson’s more modern conception of sovereignty cannot be applied accurately to the
Ciceronian texts.
In terms of the larger picture, two main points appear regarding the way Wilson
slants Cicero’s principle of popular consent. First, although Wilson’s view of the
democratic nature of the Roman Republic assumes a greater involvement and authority
in political affairs than that presented by Cicero, this view is not without support.
Wilson’s selection and application of Cicero’s quotations overemphasises the
democratic element of his position and overlooks its aristocratic tendencies;
nevertheless, he aptly employs the discourse of popular consent from the Ciceronian
texts.
At the same time as he uses Cicero to support his arguments for popular consent,
Wilson recognises that he is developing broader applications of Cicero’s principle.
Although Wilson is able to divine from the fragments of de Republica that Cicero
endorsed a mixed constitution as the best type of government, he says that in the United
States the principle of popular sovereignty has been more perfectly achieved through the
benefits of a written constitution and the theory of representation.181 Wilson’s approach
to the classical texts, therefore, is governed by this conscious attempt to derive
principles from them that he can adapt and apply to the political structures of his own
time. Drawing on the concepts of freedom, tyranny, and popular consent used by
Cicero, Wilson deliberately conceptualises them within his own framework of thought.
The second main point regarding Wilson’s slant on Cicero is that while Cicero
does not link popular sovereignty and revolution, Wilson does link these two concepts
in an attempt to follow what he conceives to be the logical outcome of Cicero’s
arguments. Though speculative, it is worthwhile to note that Wilson could have
constructed a more solid case for popular sovereignty in Cicero’s works if he had not
lacked the portions of de Republica now available. Although the fragment of de
Republica 1.25.39 containing the definition of a res publica and a populus was
transmitted through Augustine’s de Civitate Dei, Wilson lacked the surrounding
context. On both a legal and philosophical basis, it is possible to read de Republica as
promoting a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate rule, and the definitions it
provides of a people and of a state would appear to imply that if a state or its laws
181 Wilson (1804) 1:416-417, 429.
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ceased to be just, an individual may act to place the state upon a legitimate basis once
again. It would have been a simple step for Wilson to apply this notion of legitimacy in
defence of the American Revolution. Significantly, although he lacked much of de
Republica, Wilson skilfully employed the quotations he did possess from this text,
along with others from Cicero’s works, to support his conclusion that the existence of a
higher law of reason allows for the preservation of true law and justice even to the point
of revolution. While he takes the argument further than the texts warrant, his very
attempt to construct a legal justification of civil disobedience is an imitation of Cicero’s
own approach.
Although Wilson consistently applied his doctrine of popular sovereignty to his
practical decisions, whether as a lawyer or a judge, he did not believe the will of the
people could be accepted as the absolute law. In his conception of popular sovereignty,
the people are not only placed in a position of authority that allows them to change and
alter the laws whenever they see fit, but they are also circumscribed by a defined set of
moral and political duties. The individual citizen is bound to obey the laws he has
chosen, not only because he desires to protect the common interests and thereby to
preserve the state, but primarily because of a personal obligation to observe the
principles of virtue and justice. As will be seen in chapter four, Wilson’s perception of
civic virtue is more consistent with a Ciceronian viewpoint than his attempt to base his
doctrine of popular sovereignty on the authority of Cicero’s texts.
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Chapter 4: The good citizen as the foundation of the state
The chief task of philosophy in all ages has consisted precisely in finding the connection
that necessarily exists between personal and common interests.
Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina
Cicero’s conception of the good citizen functions as a necessary backdrop to Wilson’s
doctrine of popular sovereignty. On a basic level, some degree of civic virtue must
inevitably supplement a trust in popular sovereignty, since without virtue the state will
inevitably degenerate into a democracy characterised by lawlessness, ruled only by the
effrenatam insolentia multitudinem (the arrogance of the unbridled mob).1 Although
Wilson accepts the checks and balances promoted by the Federalists as a means of
ensuring both virtue in leaders and permanence in political institutions,2 he chiefly
depends on the people themselves to maintain a stable form of government. In the Law
Lectures, Wilson employs Cicero’s understanding of the good citizen as a fundamental
support to his own theory of popular sovereignty and primarily relies on quotations
from de Officiis in his exposition of civic virtue. While Wilson spends significantly less
time addressing civic virtue than popular consent and does not provide an extensive
analysis of Cicero’s quotations, the text of de Officiis offers a comprehensive account of
the civis bonus and the necessary connection Cicero draws between individual virtue
and the stability of the state. Therefore, the main part of this chapter focuses on
Cicero’s development of the civis bonus from de Officiis, and then it progresses to
Wilson’s view of civic virtue and his slant on Cicero.
1. Cicero’s conception of the good citizen in de Officiis
In de Officiis, Cicero offers a focused analysis of the good citizen as distinct from the
purely political statesman of his earlier treatises. At times in his other treatises,
Cicero’s idealisation of the statesman orator who willingly takes the helm of the state
and directs it in peace and turmoil overlaps with the duties he ascribes to the individual
citizen. What separates the description of the statesman given in earlier treatises from
1 Cic. Rep. 1.42.65.
2 Wilson (1804) 1:393.
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that of de Officiis is the innovative and binding connection Cicero makes between
private virtue and active statesmanship, between the good man and the good citizen.
This section explores Cicero’s conception of the good citizen and demonstrates its
centrality in his effort to reshape the political culture of the Republic. The ethical duties
of daily existence thus become not only an integral part of the state but in fact the very
basis of the Republic.
1.1. Context of de Officiis
Cicero composed his final philosophical treatise in autumn 44 B.C. The detailed
correspondence he maintained throughout the months of uncertainty after the
assassination of Julius Caesar in March reveals Antony’s bid for power, the failing
attempt to restore the Republic, and Cicero’s own indecision. Originally full of
optimism that Caesar’s death would assure the future of the Republic, Cicero began to
realise that the Ides of March did not fulfil their hopes and that vivit tyrannis, tyrannus
occidit (the tyranny lives, though the tyrant is dead).3 While he agreed with Antony’s
confirmation of Caesar’s acta in the senate meeting on 17 March, it was only on the
basis of peace and tranquillity.4 Indeed, Cicero looked upon it as a political concession
that Antony had subsequently abused to increase his own authority.5 As he writes to
Atticus, quae enim Caesar numquam neque fecisset neque passus esset, ea nunc ex
falsis eius commentariis proferuntur (for policies which Caesar would never have
composed nor allowed are now being produced from his falsified notebooks).6
However, under the current circumstances and while Antony was consul, it
appeared that little could be accomplished, and Cicero was concerned about his own
safety, the possible threat of civil war, and the lack of confidence they could place in the
young Octavian.7 Additionally, he had received conflicting reports of his son’s progress
in Athens, where Marcus was pursuing his studies, and Cicero desired to see him.8 En
route to Athens where he planned to visit Marcus, Cicero received news of the senate
3 Cic. Att. 14.9.2; cf. 14.12.1, 14.14.3.
4 Cic. Phil. 1.16.
5 Cic. Fam. 12.1.1-2
6 Cic. Att. 14.13.6; cf. Phil. 2.39.100; Off. 2.7.23.
7 Cic. Att. 14.12.2, 14.13.2 and 4, 14.22.2, 15.10.1, 15.12.2, 15.18.2.
8 Ibid. 14.16.3, 15.16.1
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meeting scheduled for 1 September at which it was hoped that Antony would yield to
the authority of the senate, and he returned to Rome.9
He writes to Atticus from his estate at Puteoli near the end of October 44, not
only sending him the recently completed text of the Second Philippic but also
mentioning de Officiis for the first time, saying that he is composing a marvellous work
on the subject of καθῆκον addressed to his son.10 In another letter to Atticus, dated 5
November, Cicero writes that he has finished the first two books of de Officiis, and
plans to finish the third after he receives a copy of Posidonius’ book dealing with the
apparent conflict between moral duty and expediency.11 At the same time, he was in
correspondence with Octavian, who was urging him to return to Rome and take an
active role.12 The final mention of de Officiis occurs in a letter to Atticus later in
November, where he further defends his translation of καθῆκον as “officium”.13 By 9
December, he had returned to Rome, as is attested in a letter to Brutus, in which he
declares his own commitment to the Republic and entreats Brutus to liberate it from
tyrannical rule for the sake of the senatus populusque Romanus.14 Thus, de Officiis was
likely finished only a year before Cicero’s death in December 43 and in the midst of
much political doubt and turmoil. These circumstances and his relation to public events
inevitably led to a hasty writing of the work and prevented him from an attempt at
careful revision.15
De Officiis reflects Cicero’s position in regard to the political situation in which
he finds himself. For a time, due to political necessity, he had acquiesced with Caesar’s
rule and policies,16 but now in de Officiis, Cicero freely condemns his tyranny, policies,
and destruction of law and justice.17 Since his initial display of approval on the Ides of
March, Cicero recognised that his joy at Caesar’s death could not be recalled. In a letter
to Atticus, he notes with concern that if civil war should arise, it will not be possible as
9 Ibid. 16.7.1-2.
10 Ibid. 15.13.1, 6.
11 Ibid. 16.11.4
12 Ibid. 16.11.6
13 Ibid. 16.14.3
14 Cic. Fam. 11.5.1.
15 Dyck (1996) 9.
16 Cic. Fam. 4.4.4. Cf. Cic. Att. 11.7.3-5, 11.8.2, 12.51.2; cf. Shackleton Bailey (1971) 186-200 on
Cicero’s life under Caesar.
17 Cic. Off. 1.8.26, 2.7.23, 2.24.84, 3.21.82-84. Cicero’s bitterness against Publius Clodius is not
forgotten in his personal attacks (2.17.58).
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previously, to take neither the one side nor the other.18 Although Caesar’s legacy
remained an issue of fierce debate in Roman politics, Cicero knew that he could not
retract the view that Caesar’s reign was a tyranny and his murder was justified on behalf
of the Republic. Thus, at this time of political ambiguity and fluctuation, while writing
de Officiis and the virulent Second Philippic, Cicero was forming a determined
denunciation of Caesar and taking an irreconcilable stand against Antony. Despite
Caesar’s death, the Republic and senatorial authority were not reinstated. In contrast to
the theme of strengthening the Republic that Cicero emphasises in earlier philosophical
treatises like de Republica, he now frequently laments the loss of the old political
system,19 but portrays himself as working for its restoration.
On occasion throughout the text, an apparent contradiction appears in Cicero’s
approach as he depicts himself both as writing in retirement but also engaged in active
service for the state. He feels the decline in his position and influence, saying that he
consoles himself with writing philosophy since he is deprived of public duties (rei
publicae muneribus) and is exiled from the senate and the forum.20 Nevertheless,
Cicero is not willing to divorce himself from politics and depicts himself as one with the
qualifications and willingness to re-enter public life and to guide the state. In the end,
despite his common complaints about his inability to engage in oratory and statecraft,
Cicero believes he still has an active service to perform. Indeed, he believes that he is
currently fulfilling that duty, since he would be in Athens giving instructions to his son
Marcus, were it not that me e medio cursu clara voce patria revocasset (with a loud
voice my country recalled me from the midst of my travels).21 Thus, although he wryly
mentions to Atticus that writing is his only occupation,22 de Officiis and his other works
become an aspect of the centre role he is taking in the political arena, as the struggle for
the senate and the destiny of the Republic are determined.23 This portrayal of himself as
serving the state in retirement not only justifies his past inactivity under Caesar, but also
assists in defining his political image and preparing for future engagement in politics.
18 Cic. Att. 14.13.2.
19 Cic. Off. 1.11.35, 2.8.29, 2.8.29, 3.1.4.
20 Ibid. 2.2.6, 3.1.2.
21 Ibid. 3.33.121.
22 Cic. Att. 16.11.3.
23 Steel (2004) 137 on the role of the philosophical treatises “as an aspect of, and not a substitute for,
political activity”; cf. Douglas (1965) 136.
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1.2. Purpose of de Officiis
From the beginning, Cicero intended de Officiis as an address to his son Marcus.24 He
had received no news from Herodes, one of Marcus’ teachers, and a letter from his tutor
Leonides gave Cicero matter for additional concern; he wrote to Atticus that non est
fidentis hoc testimonium sed potius timentis (this is not evidence of confidence but
rather of fear).25 Later reports, such as a letter from Gaius Trebonius, noted better
progress,26 but did not dispel Cicero’s anxiety. Thus, de Officiis presents the advice
Cicero desired to give in person.
Throughout the spring of 44 B.C., Cicero’s paternal care for Marcus is evident
in his constant discussions with Atticus about providing him with funds;27 despite
apprehensions concerning his son’s diligence, Cicero desires him to be supplied and
upon hearing of satisfactory progress wants to indulge him.28 Although he couches his
message in the form of a philosophical treatise, Cicero’s fatherly voice is constantly
present throughout de Officiis, and he refers to his son’s career, study, teachers, and
philosophical position. As his only surviving child, Marcus represents the dignity of the
family name; therefore, Cicero’s designation of his son as mi Cicero serves both as a
affectionate reminder of this fact and as an exhortation to make the most of the
opportunities that have been afforded him and to advance his own reputation in
accordance with the distinguished name and legacy his father has handed down to
him.29
This concern for the family name and Cicero’s identification with it also appear
in other contexts, such as his letter to his brother Quintus. Written in December 60
B.C., the epistle seeks to advise Quintus as he begins the third year of his governorship
of Asia. While much of the letter concerns matters of provincial government and
personal recommendations pertinent only to Quintus, like the necessity of guarding his
temper,30 similar to de Officiis, Cicero also elaborates on the themes of seeking gloria
for the family name as well as for oneself and basing it upon deeds that will be praised
24 Cic. Att. 15.13.6, 16.11.4.
25 Ibid. 14.16.5.
26 Cic. Fam. 12.16.
27 Cic. Att. 14.17.5, 14.20.3, 15.15.4.
28 Ibid. 15.17.2.
29 Cic. Off. 2.13.44, 3.2.5-6.
30 Cic. QFr. 1.13.37.
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by later generations.31 Undoubtedly intending this letter to be made public to a broader
audience, Cicero also weaves in references to his own labours on behalf of the state and
thus bolsters his political image. Many of these same concerns appear in de Officiis, as
Cicero employs his writing to serve more than one purpose. Nonetheless, as a
philosophical treatise that combines praise of his own past and present deeds on behalf
of the state and calls Marcus to follow in his footsteps, de Officiis fulfils a unique
purpose among Cicero’s texts.
Firstly, Cicero’s evident awareness of his age, and his desire to record and pass
on his political legacy to the coming generation are motivating factors in the
background of de Officiis. Only a few months before, he was writing his essay de
Senectute,32 and as he remarks once to Atticus, old age is causing him to become bitter
and irritable; since he has lived, viderint iuvenes (the young men must see to it).33 Such
reflections on the closing of his own political career and on the coming generation are
echoed again in de Officiis, when he recalls his past efforts and honours, and hopes that
Marcus will imitate and live up to them.34 Yet while his first and ostensible purpose is
to encourage Marcus in his studies and to restrain him from squandering the time and
resources entrusted to him,35 he is also addressing a broader audience. Especially,
Cicero aims to advise the rising generation of young men who will be seeking to gain
gloria through political and military offices.36
The apparent acknowledgement on Cicero’s part that his own time is ending
and that, as is evident in his exhortations to Brutus,37 he looks instead to the boldness
and energy of the young men to accomplish much for the Republic is nevertheless
accompanied by a need to declare his own achievements and his worth as a mentor and
counsellor. The theme of gloria was already in his thoughts. A few months previous he
completed his text, no longer extant, of de Gloria.38 This concern with gloria and his
personal legacy continues to manifest itself throughout de Officiis as he explains his
31 Ibid. 1.15.43-44. Note the obvious comparison with his words to Marcus in Off. 2.13.44.
32 Cic. Att. 16.3.1.
33 Ibid. 14.21.3.
34 Cic. Off. 3.2.6.
35 Ibid. 3.2.6.
36 Cic. Off. 2.13.45; cf. 3.2.6.
37 Cic. Fam. 11.5.2.
38 Cic. Att. 15.27.2, 16.2.6.
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conception of a lasting glory based on actual deeds,39 boasts of his past
accomplishments to his son, and portrays himself as a hero of the Republic in contrast
to the negative example of Caesar and others.40 As he tells Marcus in reference to his
suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, it is right for him to boast (glorior) about his
triumph of rescuing the Republic from great peril since ad quem et hereditas huius
gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet (to you remains both the inheritance of this glory
and the responsibility of imitating these deeds).41
Even as he emphasises his past triumphs, however, he still views his political
philosophy and guidance as essential to the life of the Republic. For instance, he
suggests that if his advice had been followed when Caesar and Pompey were at odds,
the destruction of the Republic may have been prevented.42 And as previously noted, he
ends the work by declaring to Marcus that he is once again devoting his efforts to
restoring the state. Thus, his exhortations to his son to follow his own example are also
intended to serve as a written legacy that puts his actions in the specific context in
which he desires others to view them. He justifies his course of conduct, praises his
past successes, reminds those who are favourable to him of what he has accomplished
on behalf of the state, and urges them to model their actions and political philosophy
after his example. Indeed, as Long remarks, de Officiis can justly be viewed as
“Cicero’s political testament”.43
The form Cicero uses adds a second unique element to de Officiis and conforms
to the interpretation of the work as a political legacy. Instead of employing a dialogue
form, he uses a didactic yet personal, first-person approach and voices a decided
opinion on the various moral questions under consideration. This approach stands in
marked contrast to the dialogue style he commonly employs, which allows for more
ambiguity and for presenting different points of view without an authoritative
conclusion in a manner conducive to the philosophy of the New Academy.44 In de
39 See especially Cic. Off. 1.19.65, 1.25.83, 2.12.43.
40 One key example of this occurs in Off. 3.21.83, when Cicero says that Caesar gained the title “Father
of the Country” through his destruction of the laws and liberty of the Republic. He thus makes an
implicit contrast with how he gained the same title through the preservation of the state.
41 Cic. Off. 1.22.78.
42 Ibid. 1.11.35.
43 Long (2006) 308; Dyck (1996) 30, 36; Wood, N. (1988) 69.
44 Fox (2000) 267-268.
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Officiis, therefore, Cicero willingly abandons the potential for opposing viewpoints and
identifies himself with the political and ethical position he offers throughout the work.
While he could have conveyed his advice by letter as he did to Quintus and still
have accomplished his aim of reaching a wider public audience, Cicero formulates it as
a philosophical treatise. At first glance, this may appear an unusual form of imparting
advice, but on closer scrutiny, it can be seen that it distinctively fits his purpose. Cicero
views it as applying particularly to his son’s studies and wishes to demonstrate his own
proficiency in philosophical subjects.45 Furthermore, he wishes Marcus to progress on
the basis of his own judgement and initiative,46 and therefore instead of merely telling
his son to conduct himself in a specific manner, he provides him with an explanation
and justification for doing so. As he says, of all the teachings of the philosophers, those
on officium have the greatest application to life.47
Beyond their relevance to Marcus, however, the teachings on duties also relate
to the issues Cicero himself was dealing with at the time. Although it addresses
questions of moral duty, de Officiis is primarily concerned with their political
implications and is structured around Roman realities. Atticus, in fact, objected to
Cicero’s rendering of καθῆκον as officium; although Cicero himself had no doubt about
the appropriateness and merely asked if Atticus had a better suggestion.48 The question
appears to remain unanswered, for Cicero returns to it in a later letter, asking why
Atticus does not consider it suited to a discourse on the state, since nonne dicimus
“consulum officium, senatus officium?” (do we not speak of the duties of consuls, of the
senate?).49 While it is not clear what Atticus’ specific objection was, it seems at least to
suggest uncertainty about the Roman political context in which Cicero was applying a
term laden with Stoic conceptions.50 Regardless, it is plain that as Cicero considered
the duties of a citizen toward the state and other members of the community, he also
sought to provide a rationale for his individual actions and politics.51
45 Cic. Off. 1.1.1, 1.2.4.
46 Ibid. 1.1.2.
47 Ibid. 1.2.4, 3.2.5.
48 Cic. Att. 16.11.4.
49 Ibid. 16.14.3. The Teubner edition renders the phrase differently, including an extra example: nonne
dicimus “consulum officium, senatus officium, imperatoris officium?” (do we not speak of the duties of
consuls, of the senate, of an imperator?).
50 Dyck (1996) 6-7.
51 Long (2006) 324 on the striking parallels between the Philippics and de Officiis, with de Officiis as its
“appropriate philosophical accompaniment”; cf. Atkins (2000) 513.
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The political ambiguity of the time increased the difficulty of discussing
officium or καθῆκον, best rendered in English as “appropriate action”.52 Due to the
downfall of the Republic and the accompanying political uncertainties, the relationship
between the individual and the state becomes more complex. Cicero is no longer able
to urge the same active role of public service upon Marcus and the other young men of
the day that he has advocated in the past. Although one can achieve glory through a
military career, Marcus’ own military service under Pompey was cut short with the end
of the Republic.53 In Cicero’s opinion, even the oratory of the law courts, which once
presented young men with great opportunities for distinguishing themselves and
advancing on the cursus honorum, has declined amid the political turmoil of recent
events.54
However, these facts do not diminish one’s responsibility to the state. The
officium required may not be defined in the same way, but if anything it becomes even
more pressing in times when peril threatens or has even overthrown the Republic. As
Cicero maintains, the greatest officium is still that which is owed to one’s country55 and
a life of active public service will be sought by the best and most noble natures.56
Furthermore, although he feels that rem vero publicam penitus amisimus (in truth we
have thoroughly lost the republic),57 Cicero preserves an optimistic expectation that it
can be regained, saying that quamvis enim demersae sint leges alicuius opibus, quamvis
timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando (for however much the laws have
been overcome by someone’s power, however much liberty has been alarmed,
nevertheless they arise again somehow).58 Such a restoration would inevitably require
great dedication in the young men he addresses; an officium that is willing to face
dangers and to risk both glory and the favour of others for the sake of the state.59
52 Sellars (2006) 120; Atkins (2000) 505; R.W. Sharples (1996) 105.
53 Cic. Off. 2.13.45.
54 Ibid. 2.19.67, 3.1.2-3.
55 Ibid.. 1.17.58.
56 Ibid. 3.5.25.
57 Ibid. 2.8.29.
58 Ibid. 2.7.24.
59 Ibid. 1.24.83.
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Throughout de Officiis, therefore, Cicero labours to identify the practical moral
duties required of all men and to explain their relationship to politics.60 On the one
hand, he endeavours to uphold his long held belief that active service to the state is a
necessary path to virtue and greatness. Unless prohibited by outward circumstances or
lack of personal abilities, one is obligated to enter public office and actively seek to
manage and benefit the state.61 At the same time, as Cicero notes in his own case, one
cannot exercise consilium or auctoritas when the state is controlled by a despotic
power.62 This new tension unfolding itself in de Officiis allows for a greater discussion
of the role of the individual citizen, as Cicero takes a more lenient position toward a life
of philosophical retirement than he has done in the past and acknowledges that a man
can achieve honour through individual observance of moral duties as well as through
public office. Thus, although limited by Cicero’s perception of a citizen as a Roman
male of the governing class, the officium of the vir bonus and its relation to the civis
bonus becomes the overarching theme of the text.
1.3. Structure and Philosophical Approach
Despite the clear lack of revision, the general outline of de Officiis remains focused on
Cicero’s intent of expounding the subject of practical moral duties.63 The structure, as
he explains, is purposely borrowed from an earlier work on duties by Panaetius, the
Stoic philosopher from Rhodes.64 In his first three books, Panaetius discussed the
questions of whether a thing is honestum or turpe, and then whether it is utile or inutile;
however, although he lived thirty years after writing this text on duty, he never
completed his plan of a final book dealing with questions regarding an apparent clash
between the morally good and the expedient.65 While he considers Panaetius’ work the
most thorough of any written on the topic of moral duties, Cicero believes Panaetius
failed to adequately address the issue. Not only is it necessary to deal with the question
60 Brunt (1986) 12 on the fact that although Cicero clearly desired to obtain public approval and
justification for his actions, his desire to perceive and fulfill his officium cannot be ruled out as a
motivating factor of his conduct.
61 Cic. Off. 1.21.72.
62 Ibid. 2.1.2.
63 Ibid. 1.2.7.
64 Ibid. 3.2.7; Cic. Att. 16.11.4.
65 Cic. Off. 3.2.7-8.
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left unanswered by Panaetius, but sometimes, Cicero insists, a conflict may arise as to
which of two moral duties should be performed or which of two expediencies should be
chosen.66
In the initial and longest volume of his text, Cicero addresses the first issue on
moral duties raised by Panaetius; namely, that of honestum and of the four cardinal
virtues, which are the sources of all that is honourable or morally good.67 He is less
concerned with wisdom, briefly mentioning its importance as it applies to cognitio veri
(knowledge of the truth).68 The main part of the volume addresses the division of the
remaining three virtues, which he says must support those things by which the practical
activity of life is sustained.69 Thus, Cicero is not concerned with the precise nature of
virtue, as he was in de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, but with raising the question of
how the virtues apply to everyday life and to the preservation of societas.70
Although Cicero uses Panaetius as the main source for de Officiis and references
his arguments to vindicate the logic of his own propositions, Cicero says he is following
his personal interpretation, altering and going beyond Panaetius’ teaching.71 While
many scholars have scrutinised Cicero’s portrayal of the Hellenistic schools, the
derivation of his ideas from them, and the precise nature of his position among them, a
resolution of this highly debated topic is not necessary to examining his position in de
Officiis. Rather than slavishly copying the work of Panaetius, Cicero subordinates it to
his own purposes, using it to support his message and to promote a specific image of
himself.
First and foremost, de Officiis is concerned with the Roman politics of Cicero’s
time.72 Even in the first volume, Cicero addresses the questions of officia while
66 Ibid. 1.3.10; cf. 1.43.152, 1.45.161, 2.25.88.
67 Ibid. 1.5.15. Cicero’s division of the virtues is more complex than the common designation of the
virtues as sapientia, iustitia, fortitudo, and temperantia. The second virtue, for instance, which Cicero
never specifically names, consists of both iustitia and beneficentia or liberalitas (Off. 1.7.20). Cicero’s
system allows him to focus on the practical application of each virtue and apply it to his Roman audience;
however, for reasons of clarity and because it does not materially affect the examination of the good
citizen in de Officiis, I have chosen to use the common designation of each virtue. Cf. Schofield (2009)
207 on Panaetius’ reshaping of the cardinal virtues.
68 Cic. Off. 1.6.18-19.
69 Ibid. 1.5.17.
70 Ibid. 1.3.7, 1.5.17.
71 Ibid. 2.17.60, 3.2.7 3.7.34.
72 Long (2006) 308, 312, 321 on the viewpoint that while Cicero borrows from Panaetius, his focus is not
on Greek philosophy but rather on Roman values and their relation to “actual and potential Roman
statesmen”; cf. MacKendrick (1989) 255.
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employing specifically Roman terms and examples, situating his discussion of the
virtues within this context. For instance, he refers to Antony’s destruction of the state,73
Caesar’s lust for power and robbery of private property,74 and Cato’s suicide.75 In
marked contrast, he shows how he has fulfilled the requirements of officia and
preserved the state through his counsel and diligence.76 Thus, as Dyck notes, Cicero’s
philosophical approach in de Officiis is dictated by his endeavour to provide a
programme for “reforming the political culture at Rome”.77
Nevertheless, any examination of de Officiis must at least briefly address the
philosophical schools, and an overview of Cicero’s explanation of his position helps to
illuminate his conception of the good citizen. To a degree, his careful use of Panaetius
for his own purposes accounts for his frequent mention and acceptance of Stoic
philosophy. Especially, Panaetius’ interpretation of Stoicism and his practical approach
to politics and ethics as well as his connection with the Scipio family would have
appealed to Cicero and harmonised with his own approach in de Officiis.78 He
acknowledges his debt to Stoicism and says that his arguments on moral duty are
consistent with its teachings.79 For instance, in addition to commending the Stoic
definitions and etymology of the virtues, Cicero also upholds the necessity of
humanity’s collaboration for the purposes of mutual aid as well as the need to follow
nature as a guide.80 Still, in a manner similar to his use of Panaetius, Cicero plainly
states his intent to deviate from Stoicism when he feels it is necessary to his argument.81
For Cicero, Stoicism does not present the only possible way of approaching
ethics. The one premise he absolutely adheres to is that the moral good or the
honourable is either the only thing worth seeking for its own sake or at least the thing
most worth seeking for its own sake.82 Hence, he believes the subject of moral duties
can be addressed fully and adequately not only by the Stoics, but also by the Academics
73 Cic. Off. 1.17.57.
74 Ibid. 1.8.26, 1.14.43.
75 Ibid. 1.31.112.
76 Ibid. 1.22.77.
77 Dyck (1996) 31.
78 Griffin (1991) xx; Dyck (1996) 18, 354.
79 Cic. Off. 3.4.20.
80 Ibid. 1.7.22-23, 1.29.62, 1.40.142.
81 Ibid. 1.2.6.
82 Ibid. 3.7.33.
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and the Peripatetics.83 Since the Stoics, in contrast to the Old Academy and the
Peripatetics, consider the moral good as the only good to be sought rather than the best
of preferred goods, Cicero thinks it is the simplest position to defend and thus assumes
it for the sake of ease and clarity in constructing his theories.84 Epicureanism, since it
divides expediency and virtue into two separate categories, is the only philosophical
school that Cicero uncompromisingly rejects, saying that it is fundamentally
irreconcilable with any assertion of moral duties.85 He even concludes the text with a
final discussion of how virtue must be sought for its own sake if it is to be sought at all;
otherwise, virtue turns into mere expediency and therefore ceases to be virtue.86
In regard to his own position, Cicero aligns himself with the New Academy and
attempts to prove its compatibility with the bold and categorical statements he makes
throughout his work.87 As he says in defence of his consistency, the New Academy
allows him to adopt the viewpoint that appears the most probable and thus allows him to
adopt doctrines from the various schools.88 This predilection for the New Academy can
perhaps be viewed as another instance of Cicero’s desire to reserve the right to follow
his own course and not wholly embrace a specific philosophical school. This dislike of
dogmatism frequently reoccurs in his writings; even in his early days as a student of
oratory, he stated his intention to borrow from previous thinkers without unthinkingly
adopting a particular viewpoint.89
The second volume also proceeds along the structure employed by Panaetius.
Cicero takes up the topic of the expedient or utile, and seeks to prove that one can
properly pursue gloria and its accompanying “expediencies” such as wealth, praise,
influence, and friendship without violating honestum or its component part iustitia. In
fact, he insists that it is only by means of justice that one can acquire the secondary
advantages.90 Even as he unites moral goodness and expediency, Cicero attempts to
demonstrate that what undermines moral goodness by masking itself as expediency
proves ultimately inexpedient. For instance, generosity shown to the wealthy rather
83 Ibid. 1.2.6.
84 Ibid. 3.4.20; cf. Dyck (1996) 37.
85 Cic. Off. 3.33.16; cf. 1.2.5.
86 Ibid. 3.33.118.
87 Ibid. 2.2.7-8. Cf. Wood, N. (1988) 47-48, 58-61 on the New Academy and Cicero’s affinity to this
school of thought; cf. Douglas (1965) 142-144; Long (1995) 39-42; McKeon (2009) 26-31.
88 Cic. Off. 3.4.20.
89 Cic. Inv. 2.2.10.
90 Cic. Off. 2.10.38, 2.20.71.
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than to the poor can actually produce less loyalty, since the rich tend to forget or only
lightly value the favours shown them.91 In the end, he tries, with some measure of
success, to prove that “expediencies” gained through the destruction of justice rebound
to one’s hurt.
By crafting an ideology with practical applications for politics, Cicero is able to
offer advice of particular pertinence to the younger generation of Romans who desire to
succeed in their careers. As part of the exposition on gaining gloria, Cicero includes a
discussion of specific policies such as the protection of property rights for the elite and
the dangers of passing agrarian laws or abolishing debts,92 thereby putting forward his
conservative viewpoints and attempting to justify their validity.
The final volume culminates with Cicero’s analysis of the apparent conflict
between expediency and virtue and his effort to show the constant agreement between
the two. At this point, he has finished with the outline of Panaetius’ text and declares
that he is now proceeding on his own since he cannot recommend any other works on
the topic.93 Earlier, he had written to Atticus, saying that he intended to examine a book
by Posidonius and a κεφάλαια (analysis) of it that dealt with the apparent conflict
between moral right and expediency.94 Apparently, he either never received the book or
perhaps found it unsatisfactory, since he says Posidonius only mentions the topic briefly
in his commentariis.95
Possibly because of the difficulty of completely reconciling honestum and utile,
the third volume has a more disorganised structure than the first two. Nonetheless, it
represents Cicero’s desire to show how a philosophical adherence to moral duties
reveals itself in practice, even though the link between abstract moral theory and its
application may not be easily determinable. In particular, he raises the question of how
officia apply to the common interest and to actions between individual members of the
91 Ibid. 2.20.70.
92 Ibid. 2.22.78, 2.24.84.
93 Ibid. 3.7.34.
94 Cic. Att. 16.11.4.
95 Cic. Off. 3.2.8. In a later letter to Atticus, Cicero says that he did receive a ὑπόμνημα (commentary)
from Athenodorus, whose κεφάλαια he had earlier requested (Cic. Att. 16.14.4). Over time, differing
perspectives have emerged on the question of Cicero’s sources. Dougan and Henry (1905) xxv on the
view that Cicero had Posidonius’ book; in contrast, cf. Wood, N. (1988) 69. Ultimately, it is best to
recognise that the question remains indeterminate [Kid (2004) 188]. However, while it is unclear what
sources Cicero possessed, the evidence suggests he had access to at least one Greek source, if not more
[Dyck (1996) 484].
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community. When focusing on specific situations, he not only looks at the moral duties
but also at the civil laws that apply to these cases. In his opinion, individuals can
properly pursue their own best interests provided they do not violate the twin rules of
justice: to do no harm to another and to preserve the common interest. Otherwise,
Cicero concludes, societas will disintegrate. By introducing societas into the
discussion, a term referring to a partnership or association and relating to bona fides
(good faith), Cicero imparts a legal as well as a philosophical connotation to officium.
In the language of a legal agreement, this societas or partnership between all the citizens
binds the state together and ensures the mutual advantage of all.96 Preserving societas
and the state is Cicero’s ultimate goal, and the individual citizen who follows the
principles of officium protects both.
1.4. Examination of the Good Citizen
In his earlier treatises, Cicero was already emphasising the importance of the individual
citizen to the continuance of the Republic. Although only fragments remain of the fifth
book of de Republica, it is clear that in addressing the subject of the optimus civis, he
was focusing on the indissoluble connection between the citizen and the laws of the
state.97 The only form of government Scipio designates as equitable and stable is the
one combining the three forms of government—by king, nobles, and people.98 The
mixed constitution, however, despite its primary importance in maintaining a balanced
state, cannot be maintained without the active commitment of its leading citizens, as
Cicero explains in de Republica 5.1.1:
Nam neque viri, nisi ita morata civitas fuisset, neque mores, nisi hi viri praefuissent, aut
fundare aut tam diu tenere potuissent tantam et tam fuse lateque imperantem rem
publicam.
For neither men, unless a state is thus endowed with customs, nor customs, unless these
are given power by men, could either have been able to establish or for so long to
preserve such a great republic whose command is so extensive and broad.
Although the topic of de Republica is the best possible form of state, Cicero’s
conclusion is that Rome already possesses this type of state.99 His diagnosis of what
96 Asmis (2004) 580, 598; cf. Harries (2006) 23.
97 Atkins (2000) 495.
98 Cic. Rep. 1.45.69.
99 Ibid. 1.21.34, 1.56.70, 2.16.30.
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Rome needs at this crucial point in her history is not a new constitution but rather
virtuous leaders who by following in the political legacy of their forefathers will ensure
the state’s continued protection and welfare.100 Accordingly, in de Officiis Cicero
expounds on the moral virtues within the context of Roman political life, and he seeks
to inculcate in Marcus and others a conviction that adherence to these virtues, as he
defines them, will bring glory both to themselves and to the Republic.
Despite Cicero’s emphasis on political involvement and duties owed to the state,
his concept of the state does not absorb the individual. The tension between individual
and communal interests is one of the key themes of de Officiis, but a marked strand of
individualism still pervades the work.101 In fact, Cicero focuses primarily on the
individual in de Officiis—specifically on the well-being of each individual and the
officium he must perform, not only in public affairs but also in private relations with
others.
1.4.1. The concept of officia
Officia refers to the responsibilities or obligations of individuals in regard to their role
and to their relationships with others and the state.102 While καθῆκον does not
necessarily carry moral overtones, in de Officiis Cicero gives officium a moral
connotation by including in its definition an inseparable bond with virtue and honestum.
The four cardinal virtues, he explains, are the sources of all that is honestum.103 He
identifies honestas (the state of being honourable), a term closely connected to one’s
position in the public sphere, as the proper aim of every individual.104 By cherishing
and carrying out the principles of moral duty (officium), one achieves honestum, while
neglecting them is turpitudo or base.105 Hence, officium should not be viewed as a
virtue in itself; instead, by living in accordance with the virtues and properly applying
them in regard to one’s role, circumstances, and situation, an individual fulfills his
officia and attains a praiseworthy and honourable life.
100 Powell, J. G. F. (1994) 27. Zetzel (2001) 86 supports this interpretation of the importance of the
individual citizen in de Republica, noting that “for Cicero, the individual citizen was of crucial
importance, and central to the design of his work” and drawing attention to Cicero’s “strong belief in the
power of individuals to preserve and even to improve the res publica”; cf. Zetzel (1998) 23.
101 Wood, N. (1988) 68.
102 Griffin (1991) xlv.
103 Cic. Off. 1.5.15.
104 Dyck (1996) 69 on the relationship between honestas and public standing.
105 Cic. Off. 1.2.4.
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Cicero’s introductory statement on the extent of officium is particularly
important to his conception of the good citizen. Although de Officiis analyses the topic
of officium within a political context, Cicero is careful to note that it applies equally to a
private context as well:
nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis, neque privatis, neque forensibus, neque domesticis
in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio
potest.106
For no part of life is without duty, neither in public or private matters, nor in affairs in the
courts or in the household, whether you are acting in matters that concern yourself or in
things that concern another.
Thus, in his opinion, officium and the application of virtue it implies, encompasses
every area of public and private life. In de Amicitia, which he was writing at the same
time as de Officiis, Cicero again emphasises this point, arguing that the same ethical
principles govern both public and private friendship.107 Regardless of station or
situation, each individual is morally bound to live according to virtue as a standard of
all conduct.
While Cicero sustains this emphasis on private and public virtue throughout the
text, to conclude that he equates civic with individual virtue would be an
oversimplification.108 Instead, it is more accurate to say that he views officium as
including both the relationship toward the state and toward the individual, but as
dictating different applications toward each. Although he has chosen to address an
audience of elite Romans desirous of succeeding in the political arena, Cicero does not
limit his understanding of officium to that context; on the contrary, he believes his
discussion of duty applies primarily to the arrangement of ordinary life.109 As Dyck
comments on this passage, “vita communis, though it includes politics, goes beyond it
and encompasses the activities of one who enriches the community”.110
Even as he insists that each person should aim for honestum in both public and
private life, Cicero allows that in practice the virtues may widely differ depending on
such factors as an individual’s age, vocation, abilities, or even temperament. This point
is especially relevant in his discussion of the fourth virtue of decorum. In addition,
106 Ibid. 1.2.4.
107 Lintott (2008) 365; cf. 364 on Cicero’s dismissal of Epicureanism and its belief that expediency
should govern the rules of friendship.
108 For such an analysis, see Moore (2005) 60-62.
109 Cic. Off. 1.3.7.
110 Dyck (1996) 77.
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circumstances often change the exercise of virtue. For instance, although officium
demands the fulfilment of a promise, the vir bonus will not keep a promise to another’s
hurt.111 Similarly, although virtue forbids slaying a fellowman, one may honourably kill
a tyrant—a theory enabling Cicero to justify the murder of Caesar.112
From considering officia as duties incumbent on all citizens but changeable in
their application to everyday life, Cicero naturally moves to reflecting on the moral duty
of an individual apart from the state. Whereas in de Oratore and de Republica, Cicero
focused solely on the leader of the state and the primary duty of service owed to the
commonwealth, he now not only examines the rights of an individual, particularly those
of property, but also acknowledges that an individual can live honourably and attain a
worthy position in life apart from an active role in politics.113 As he says, even in the
vita otiosa (life of retirement) men of noble spirit have investigated important matters
and engaged in great undertakings while limiting themselves to their own concerns.114
Clearly, then, non-political roles can still be consistent with honestum. The
issue to consider regarding a life of retirement is whether one is thereby neglecting the
duty owed to the state, which is of the foremost importance in Cicero’s hierarchy of
officia.115 Unless a man has a valid reason such as outward circumstances or lack of
talent for not engaging in active political service, Cicero insists he should devote
himself to his country.116 As in his previous texts, Cicero criticises those philosophers
who become occupied with theoretical speculations to the neglect of public duties,
charging them with committing the crime of passive injustice.117 Accordingly, the
private individual, in order to be a civis bonus, must seek to uphold the tranquillity and
honour of the state.118 Ultimately, however, despite Cicero’s insistence on the
connection between public service and honestum, de Officiis offers a broader
understanding of virtue than that which appears in de Republica. So long as one serves
111 Cic. Off. 1.10.31.
112 Ibid. 3.4.19.
113 Ibid. 1.33.121.
114 Ibid. 1.26.92.
115 Ibid. 1.17.58, 1.45.160.
116 Ibid. 1.21.72.
117 Ibid. . 1.9.28.
118 Ibid. 1.34.124.
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humanity and does not live wholly in pursuit of self-interest, political leadership is not a
necessary condition of honestum or of the civis bonus.119
Despite its extensive discussion of virtue, de Officiis falls far short of being a
philosophical discourse on universal ethics. While the virtues defining a good citizen
and a good man are not necessarily tied to politics and apply by definition to all, Cicero
narrows the scope of his text to the Roman elite. Although he touches briefly on the
officia required of aliens, saying they should avoid politics altogether, he does not
address the officia of women, slaves, or those employed in what he considers vulgar
occupations. Nor does he consider the different classes of Roman citizens. He writes to
Roman youth aiming to become statesmen, and his aim is to give political advice and
expound on the officia they should perform. Unfortunately, then, the broader
implications of Cicero’s arguments are left unexplored, as he analyses the concept of the
civis bonus in the limited field of the governing class rather than extending his topic to
the whole of Roman citizenship.120
Cicero’s limited focus creates an interesting dilemma in his perception of virtue.
On the one hand, he argues for a universal standard of virtue achievable by all and
describes such a mutual conception of the virtues as the necessary foundation of the
state; however, at the same time, his ideal presupposes an elite culture with the ability to
shape popular conception of the virtues. Nonetheless, the very nature of officium, as he
defines it throughout de Officiis, inevitably puts all humankind on an equal standing,
since the ability to perceive what is honestum and to apply it in given situations is
instinctively present in all through natura and ratio.121 In this regard, his viewpoint in
de Officiis only renews his earlier assertion in de Legibus that all are constituted by
nature to share a sense of justice.122 Significantly, in his development of reason and
natural law, Cicero purposely affords them a universal position rather than confining
knowledge of them to the elite.123 Not only are the virtues perceivable by all, but they
are likewise required of all, both leaders and people. In stressing the universal
application of this standard of virtue, Cicero seeks to unite all members of the
community in supporting the law by which they are governed. For him, it is this
119 Ibid. 1.44.156.
120 Griffin (1991) xxv.
121 Cic. Off. 1.4.11-14.
122 Cic. Leg. 1.12.33.
123 Harries (2002) 56; Vander Waerdt (1994) 4874-5.
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collective understanding of “justice, law, and right” that binds the community
together.124
Clearly, however, general conformity regarding virtue and officia cannot always
be maintained. Indeed, the third book of de Officiis focuses on this problem. As his
examination of the views of Diogenes and Antipater demonstrates, even scholars and
the viri boni do not always agree on how officia apply to given situations. Even more
concerning is when, as a result of perverse public habits, neither custom nor the written
laws forbid behaviour that undermines the bond of societas (partnership).125 In these
cases Cicero looks to the statesmen leaders he advises in de Officiis. He believes that
by retaining the tradition of the mos maiorum and by conforming their lives and the
laws to the virtues it dictates, the leading citizens will be able to bring the proper
interpretation of officium back into popular agreement.126 Ultimately, then, while
Cicero relies on an elite definition of virtue, his perception of a legitimate and enduring
state is still one where the entire Roman populus are agreed on justice (ius). For a
people cannot exist where neque esset unum vinculum iuris nec consensus ac societas
coetus (there is no one bond of justice nor a partnership joined in agreement).127
Within the community, as a res populi, every person has moral obligations,
whether statesman or private individual. In Cicero’s estimation, performing officia is
both necessary and sufficient for the good citizen. As he says in praise of the man who
observes his duties toward both others and the state, talem enim et sentire bonum civem,
et dicere solemus (for such a one we are accustomed to think and speak of as a good
citizen).128
1.4.2. The spheres of officia
As the above quotation demonstrates, Cicero’s view of the good citizen does not
differentiate between civic responsibilities and private relationships and behaviour.
Unlike several more modern trends in political thought, which differentiate between the
good citizen and the good man, in Cicero’s model, the distinction does not even arise.
124 Harries (2006) 224.
125 Cic. Off. 3.17.69.
126 Cic. Rep. 2.42.69, 3.3.4-5; cf. Ferrary (1995) 72.
127 Cic. Rep. 3.31.43.
128 Cic. Off. 1.34.124. The Teubner edition renders the phrase slightly different: talem enim solemus et
sentire bonum civem et dicere.
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One cannot exist without the other.129 In his analysis of how officia operate toward
other individuals and the state, it becomes clear that if a civis bonus ceases to properly
fulfil his duties in each sphere of life, he ceases to be a good citizen. Similar to the
opinions of Roman juries, which judged not only on the facts of the case, but also on a
consideration of a person’s character, Cicero offers a broad perception of the civis bonus
incorporating not only one’s relations toward the state, but also one’s motives, intent,
and behaviour in personal affairs. Although officia enter into every human relationship,
in Cicero’s development of the theory of moral obligations, three main spheres emerge
that are particularly relevant to the current discussion: the duties of an individual toward
others, toward himself, and toward the state.
Cicero’s view of the officia owed to other individuals is based on his account of
the formation of social and civil communities. The positive view of association
presented by Cicero throughout de Officiis asserts that humankind joins together
through a natural desire for society. While he acknowledges and praises the cooperation
that provides not only the enjoyments and requirements of human life but also
civilization itself,130 Cicero asserts that even if an individual was provided with all the
necessities and refinements of life, he would still solitudinem fugeret (flee from
loneliness) and find someone else to ease his solitude.131 According to the analogy he
uses, men are like the honeybees, which first come together because they are social by
nature and only then make the honeycomb. In the same way, people join together
through social instinct and then aid each other in providing for their mutual wants and
desires.132 Cicero does not mention other conceivable factors for association such as
fear or aggression. Although one should not assume too much from this omission, it
does indicate his conception of the positive need for fellowship as the primary
motivation for association.
This description of association echoes Cicero’s account of the state in de
Republica 1.25.39, when Scipio explains why humankind joins together:
res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo
congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.
eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam inbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam
129 Wood, N. (1988) 140.
130 Cic. Off. 2.3.12-2.4.15.
131 Ibid. 1.44.158.
132 Ibid. 1.44.157; cf. Cic. Rep. 1.25.39, 5.5.7.
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hominum quasi congregatio; non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc, sed ita
generatum ut ne in omnium quidem rerum affluentia…
The commonwealth is the property of the people; however the people is not every
association of men, congregated in any manner whatsoever, but rather the association of
the multitude agreeing in justice and united by a community of mutual advantage.
Moreover, the first cause of this association is not so much weakness as a certain
community which is natural to men; for this race of humankind is neither single nor
solitary, but is so made that not even in the flowing abundance of all things…
In a sense, this quotation combines the two issues of de Officiis: those of moral
goodness and expediency. A popular agreement both in regard to right and justice and
in regard to what is mutually beneficial is not only necessary for the preservation of the
state but also serves as the foundation of its existence and defines its legitimacy.
Nevertheless, while Cicero acknowledges the role of self-interest in a community, he
regards it as a secondary consideration, and a sanguine view of human kinship and
cooperation governs his perception of the state and community. Schofield concurs,
saying that by rejecting imbecillitas as the basis of association, Cicero is alluding to the
debate in Plato’s Republic over the nature of justice and attempting to establish the
position that justice and human association do not originate from a social contract
agreed upon by the weak, but from a natural desire for fellowship.133 This positive
perspective is reiterated in de Legibus 1.15.43 when Cicero, as the main speaker in the
dialogue, asserts that the virtues and justice originate because natura propensi sumus ad
diligendos homines, quod fundamentum iuris est (we are inclined by nature to love other
men, and this is the foundation of justice). With such a statement, Cicero once again
seeks to repudiate the view that self-interest and utility are the basis of human
association, and to affirm that virtue and fellowship are natural to humankind.134
Although Cicero portrays an optimistic view of community in de Officiis, he is
not indifferent to the negative side of human relations. Humans not only prove to be the
greatest possible benefit to each other, but also the greatest curse,135 since characteristics
like ambition for wealth or glory often cause a group or individual to sunder the bond of
fellowship. Fundamentally, however, Cicero views the latter state of affairs as a
perversion of the natural order of things. While such a distinction may seem slight in
theory, it acts as the foundation for his conception of the good citizen as an individual
133 Schofield (1995) 71; cf. Asmis (2004) 583-584.
134 Cf. Dyck (2004) 188.
135 Cic. Off. 2.5.16.
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who pursues his own interests without sacrificing the interests of all or neglecting the
performance of officia toward others. In analysing this relationship between an
individual and the community, it is necessary to look at two key terms, iustitia and
societas, used by Cicero to express this concept.
Cicero’s examination of iustitia provides the clearest picture of the connection
he draws between the vir bonus and the civis bonus. Justice in actions and intent not
only defines the good man but also governs his relations with others; hence, a just man
will be the one above all others who deserves to be called a good citizen.
As one of the virtues, Cicero defines iustitia as a good that must be sought for
itself alone. However, he also allows that it can be sought for the lesser goods it brings:
Omni igitur ratione colenda et retinenda iustitia est tum ipsa propter sese: nam aliter
iustitia non esset; tum propter amplificationem honoris et gloriae.136
Justice, therefore, on every account should be fostered and retained for its own sake—for
otherwise it is not justice—then for the increasing of honour and glory.
Although he appears to make a significant departure from traditional Stoic philosophy
in attempting to demonstrate the practical usefulness of iustitia for an ambitious and
competitive Roman audience, Cicero is not necessarily maintaining an inherent self-
existing value of honour or glory.137 Instead, when the quotation is taken as a whole
and in context, Cicero’s purpose becomes evident. He seeks to establish justice as an
intrinsic good to be unconditionally sought even if it should necessitate the
relinquishment of expedient things like reputation, glory, and praise. Since justice
enables a man to willingly sacrifice even life or wealth for the sake of equity, such
individuals are admired and called viri boni.138 This quality of justice, however, also
causes other men to praise, respect, and look to them to fill positions of leadership in the
state. Iustitia, therefore, as the passage of de Officiis 2.12.14 indicates, must be sought
first for its own sake and only afterward for the sake of utility, always provided that one
is willing to forgo the pursuit of utility if necessary in order to preserve justice.139
In practice, iustitia becomes apparent in relations with others. The two
principles Cicero connects with justice are firstly, not to harm anyone, and secondly, to
136 Ibid. 2.12.42. The Teubner differs in its rendering of the phrase: “iustitia est cum ipsa per sese— nam
aliter iustitia non esset”.
137 Dyck (1996) 422, 354.
138 Cic. Off. 2.11.38.
139 Cf. Long (2006) 310-311; Cic. Leg. 1.15.42-43.
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serve the common interests.140 By combining the negative prohibition with the positive
command, Cicero can then apply iustitia to every situation of human interaction.
Because of its quality in enabling humans both to abstain from harming others and to
work together for the common good, Cicero emphasises that it is on the basis of iustitia
that men are called boni.141
A good citizen, therefore, must be one who evinces iustitia, whether as a ruler
who guarantees it for the people, or as an individual who never pursues his own
interests to the detriment of another. Even further, the primary task of iustitia is the
preservation of societas. By fulfilling the demands of iustitia, individuals promote and
preserve the good of the state.
The second key term Cicero uses to express the relationship between the
individual and the community is societas. In de Officiis, societas denotes not the
modern understanding of society but rather an alliance, partnership, or fellowship. As
an advocate, Cicero consciously employs a term which dictated specific legal and social
obligations in the partner relationship it established between two parties. He repeatedly
uses the term throughout the work, explaining the different ties of societas and the
officia applying to them. Directly connected to his positive view of association is his
insistence that the first and most rudimentary bond of societas exists between all
members of the human race.142 Closer instances of societas exist, however, such as
those with one’s state, or those between spouses, friends, and members of the same
family or community.143 Different officia govern each of these relationships. For
instance, the duty required toward a family member is greater than that required toward
a foreigner. As Cicero explicitly states, in deeds of beneficentia, one must consider
whether the specific tie of societas warrants such an action.144
Instead of conflicting with each other, the fulfilment of officia in one area of
societas will also serve the best interests of the others. In its long history in Roman law,
the term essentially signified not a reciprocal transaction but “the pooling of resources
(money, property, expertise, or labour, or a combination of them) for a common
140 Cic. Off. 1.10.31.
141 Ibid. 1.7.20.
142 Ibid. 1.16.50-51.
143 Ibid. 1.17.54-57, 3.17.69.
144 Ibid. 1.14.45.
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purpose”.145 While such intent did not always translate into practice, the partnership
required the good faith of both parties in order to function.146 Thus, when Cicero
appeals to the bonds of societas between individuals and the republic, he is promoting a
positive partnership of interests that ensures the good not only of the community as a
whole but also of each individual.
Ultimately, the preservation of all types of societas depends upon iustitia. The
basic bond of justice ties all humankind together and is the officium required in every
association of societas, whether between two members of a family or between members
of different nations. Justice, and the underlying promise of good faith it entails,
guarantees that a man will fulfil his word, render to others what is due, and never harm
another in order to promote his own interests; therefore, any blow to justice also
destroys societas.147 As a result of this role in maintaining human fellowship, Cicero
names iustitia the mistress and queen of the virtues.148
When an individual acts unjustly, Cicero considers him to have broken the ties
of societas and no longer have a claim to its benefits. For this reason, he warns against
the dangers of ambition for power and glory, which caused Caesar to forget the
demands of iustitia.149 His argument for the legitimate murder of tyrants is based on
this theory; since, by their lack of regard for justice, tyrants not only place themselves
outside all bonds of societas but become destroyers of it.150
Thus, the vir bonus of de Officiis is the individual who seeks to preserve societas
through justice. Rather than harm another, he will suffer loss to his own person or
interests.151 As previously noted, the legitimacy of the state depends upon the people
uniting behind justice. The citizen who is necessary to the state, therefore, is the
individual who upholds the principles of iustitia in his private and official relationships
and who consequently maintains the bonds of societas.
Although Cicero gives specific instances, especially in the third book, of what it
means to protect the common interests and not to harm another, he focuses primarily on
145 Zimmermann (1992) 451; cf. Griffin (1991) xlvi.
146 Crook (1984) 229-231.
147 Cic. Off. 1.5.15, 1.7.23, 3.5.21.
148 Ibid. 3.6.28. Cf. Cic. Off. 1.7.20; Cic. Leg. 1.10.28, Cic. Rep. 2.42.69.
149 Cic. Off. 1.8.26. Cf. Schofield (2009) 207-209 on Cicero’s development of magnitudo animi and its
necessary connection with justice and serving the state.
150 Cic. Off. 3.6.32.
151 Ibid. 3.6.28.
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the general principles illustrated by the examples. For Cicero, if an individual truly
seeks to protect societas and rightly apply iustitia in the various situations of life, he is
likely performing his officia toward others.
Closely linked to Cicero’s discussion of the duties one owes another is the
second main sphere of moral obligations, that of self-interest or of duties toward
oneself. In analysing the interests of the individual, Cicero does not speak of one’s
officia toward oneself in the same way he mentions the officia owed to the gods,
parents, country, and hominum societas. Nevertheless, he does affirm the ability and
right of individuals to seek and protect their own interests. According to Cicero, the
impulses of self-preservation and of providing for one’s necessities and comforts are
consistent with nature.152 Furthermore, when discussing expediency in book two,
Cicero describes the diligent accumulation of wealth, the wielding of influence, and the
gaining of friends as useful objects of pursuit. Thus, while his focus on the preservation
of the common interests would seem to require much personal sacrifice, Cicero does not
lose sight of the individual. Despite holding a position patently full of tension, he
believes it is possible to secure the interests of both the individual and the community.
In fact, Cicero cannot view the common interest apart from its connection with
private self-interest and property, and part of his definition of justice is founded upon
the preservation of private property. As mentioned previously, justice consists of two
tasks, of which the first is to harm no one. He defines the second task of iustitia as
dictating that common property is used for the common welfare, while private property
is used for one’s own welfare.153 Shortly afterward, he restates the principles of justice,
only this time he explains the second task of justice in narrower terms: namely, to
preserve the common interests.154 By first distinguishing between common and private
property and then apparently combining the two under communis utilitas, Cicero
appears to indicate that the common interests are best served when individuals have the
ability to also pursue their own goods and interests.
In conjunction with his earlier assertion that society is not founded upon human
vulnerability but on a desire for fellowship, Cicero also attempts to defend the theory
that laws and governments were established to protect justice and private property.
152 Ibid. 1.4.11-12.
153 Ibid. 1.7.20.
154 Ibid. 1.10.31.
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When mentioning the early kings of Rome, he says the people chose their kings in order
to enjoy justice, because they were helpless (inops) and desired the protection of a
virtuous man to rule over them. While this view may appear to lend support to the
argument that justice originated from weakness, Cicero sees a crucial distinction
between the premise that the people, from a sense of their own helplessness, created
justice, and his own view that the people sought to enforce justice as an already existent
standard and in order to produce equity. In de Officiis 2.21.73 he makes a similar
argument:
Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerent, res publicae civitatesque constitutae sunt.
Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum
urbium praesidia quaerebant.155
For this is the greatest reason for the establishment of states and cities, that men might
preserve their own property. For although men assembled by the dictates of nature, yet
the protection of cities was sought in the hope of defending that which was their own.
This passage implies a separation between the entity of the people and the state. The
state and its laws belong to the people and are established by them for specific purposes;
however, the association of the people itself exists separately from the state. In
summary, neither the people nor justice derives from weakness; rather, men draw
together from a natural desire for fellowship. In Cicero’s model, however, once they
have come together they seek to constitute specific laws and forms of government that
will maintain justice, part of which includes the protection of their own property within
that community.
The main thrust of Cicero’s attack against policies such as the land and agrarian
reforms or the cancelling of debts derives from his conception of justice and self-
interest. The importance he places on the interest of the individual is equally weighted
with his condemnation of statesmen who attempt to increase their own popularity by
impinging on one individual to enrich another. Justice, in Cicero’s analysis, should not
only prevent one person from robbing another of his property, but should prevent a
statesman from doing the same.156
Nevertheless, one cannot be wholly driven by self-interest without violating
officium, which prescribes certain limitations upon it. Most obviously, in the same way
that justice enables an individual to protect his own property, it also protects the
155 The Teubner edition contains the one variation of “tenerentur”.
156 Cic. Off. 2.23.84.
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interests of others. As Cicero cautions, one may serve his own interests insofar as he is
acting sine alterius iniuria (without injury to another).157 Even further, he invokes the
Stoic doctrine that men are born for the sake of other men, that each may be able to
benefit the others.158 Hence, Cicero criticises those who avoid inflicting actual iniuria
but occupy themselves only with increasing their own property; in this way, they have
violated the terms of justice: deserunt enim vitae societatem, quia nihil conferunt in eam
studii, nihil operae, nihil facultatum (for they forsake the fellowship of life, because
they add to it none of their zeal, none of their efforts, none of their abilities), a critique
severe in its intimation that they have forsaken their officia by thus severing the bond of
societas with their fellowmen.159
By affirming the mutual responsibilities of contributing to social life and
promoting the common good, the limitations of self-interest provoke certain egalitarian
questions left unaddressed by Cicero. The balance between the good of an individual
and of the community is itself fraught with tension; however, the greatest qualification
Cicero places on the pursuit of self-interest comes from his conception of utility.
Throughout de Officiis, Cicero employs a dual definition of utility or self-interest, and
he constantly struggles to maintain this definition amid apparent contradictions.
Operating simultaneously with his evident definition of self-interest, which
includes such things as the accumulation of wealth and the gaining of honour and
influence, is the overarching premise he presents at the beginning of de Officiis.
Asserting his previous proof of this premise in de Finibus, Cicero acknowledges that his
argument throughout de Officiis rests on the assumption that the summum bonum is
inseparable from virtue and that honestum is either the only or the principal thing worth
seeking for its own sake.160 By thus making virtue necessary in the securing of
εὐδαιμονία,161 Cicero establishes another sense of utility, widely divergent from his first,
and equates virtue with self-interest. As Dyck agrees, this combination of honestum and
utilitas forces Cicero to “give utilitas a meaning different from that in ordinary use”.162
157 Ibid. 3.20.42
158 Ibid. 1.7.22.
159 Ibid. 1.9.29.
160 Ibid. 1.2.5-6.
161 Dyck (1996) 70.
162 Ibid. (2004) 187.
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At the same time, Cicero attempts to prove to his readers that virtue, although a
good in itself, is also the best way to gain the lesser objects of self-interest, whether
property, friends, or glory. Virtue, therefore, becomes both a good in a lasting and
moral sense, so that an individual willingly suffers loss of body or property for its sake,
and an expedient and temporal good since it benefits the community through mutual
helpfulness and aids in achieving other desirable expediencies. Both types of self-
interest must be pursued, because the individual who acts only in partial self-interest
and tries to gain an expedient good without virtue will ultimately fail of both.
Consequently, Cicero states that virtue reveals itself in a proper accumulation of wealth
and advantages, but far more in being able to view them with indifference.163
An apparent paradox emerges, inasmuch as by placing honestum or moral
character as the height of utility, those who have ceased to care about their own tangible
interests have actually attained to the greatest possible self-interest. Although Cicero
encourages individuals to seek the more obvious expediencies, he idealises heroes like
Hercules and Regulus, who, while not apathetic about their self-interest were willing to
place the common good above it, believing they were attaining honestum and convinced
that later generations would honour their actions. Therefore, when advocating
indifference to self-interest, Cicero actually uses a comparison in which devotion to the
utilitas communis renders the importance of lesser goods insignificant.164
His retelling of the story of Gyges, who by means of a magic ring steals a
kingdom, exemplifies the logical outcome of his argument that one’s best self-interest
comes through pursuing virtue as the supreme good. Unlike Gyges, the vir bonus will
seek honestum even at the risk of his self-interest,165 counting the loss of body or
property insignificant in comparison to the far greater danger of harming his soul and
falling into turpitudo.166 As he said in de Legibus, the vir bonus will act justly even if
he is alone in the dark.167 Demoralization is not dependent on punishment or even the
shame that would result if others were aware of one’s actions.
Therefore, Cicero’s dual conception of utile attempts to prove the main point of
de Officiis: specifically, that to live without honestum and to fail in officia produces
163 Cic. Off. 1.5.17.
164 Ibid. 3.5.24.
165 Ibid. 3.9.38.
166 Ibid. 3.5.26, 3.8.36.
167 Cic. Leg. 1.14.41; cf. Cic. Off. 3.19.77.
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self-destruction in two ways, most importantly in the demoralization of one’s self, but
secondly and in a material sense, in the devastation of the mutual cooperation so
necessary to the state and to one’s interests. While Cicero views the former motivation
as a necessary foundation for his argument, his focus in de Officiis is on the latter,
because it would hold greater appeal for ambitious Roman statesmen. Cicero does not
desire to engage in a mere philosophical discourse; instead, he desires to show that his
viewpoint promotes Roman values and the practical politics of expediency. In this
context, his insistence on the connection between iustitia and societas becomes clear:
both together enable him to unite his definitions of utility. The societas hominum
coniunctioque (fellowship and union of men), as Long points out, is “the supreme utile,
in the language of Off., because it comprehends the particular interests of every
individual”.168 The place of honour Cicero affords iustitia is based on its expediency
and its role in ensuring the benefits of societas. Because justice closely touches human
relations and is essential to the state’s well-being, Cicero can most easily demonstrate
the tangible worth of this virtue as opposed to a more theoretical value. The strength of
the state lies in this conjoining of self-interest with that of the common interests.
The third main sphere of officia addressed in this section, therefore, is that of the
moral duties owed to the state. Significantly, in a work set within a political context
and dedicated to the analysis of officia, Cicero focuses less on political or governmental
affairs and more on an enumeration of personal virtue and its effect on other
individuals. While he views honestum as the foundation for the strength and stability of
the state, Cicero is far from advocating it for the sake of the state alone. Once again, the
premise that honestum must be sought for its own sake provides the philosophical
underpinning for his theory of virtue and citizenship; to seek virtue only so that the state
may survive would make his argument collapse upon itself.
At the same time, to promote the glory and permanence of the state is an
essential part of officia and defines both the good man and the good citizen. It is no
accident that Cicero names devotion to country first in his comparison of duties and
says that love of country compels even the sacrifice of one’s life.169 As Atkins notes,
“Cicero sees the res publica as the most important societas”.170 Current events were
168 Long (2006) 327.
169 Cic. Off. 1.17.57-58.
170 Atkins (1990) 275.
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clearly in his mind when he praised Regulus for remaining true to his officia by placing
the good of the state and the obligations of iustitia and fides before his own
preservation.171 Similarly, one of his main criticisms against the statesmen of his time
is that they pursue their own glory rather than serving the state. As an example, Cicero
mentions Antony, who, ignorant of the true path to glory, was unwilling to be an equal
among cives and instead desired the sole power in the state.172 He also condemns those
who promote agrarian laws for the sole purpose of gaining popularity and influence.173
As these illustrations demonstrate, officia demand that one seek the utilitas of the state
before the expediencies of self-interest.174
Although he tends to support overarching principles with examples of general
truth, instead of listing specific political duties, Cicero does name some of the officia
due to the state. In particular, he expounds on the duties of a statesman who rightly
seeks to advance the state in power, territory, and revenue.175 Notably, although the
precise officia of a statesman differ from those of a private citizen, the defining
characteristic of the civis bonus, whether a leader of the state or an individual, is the
same.
The task of each citizen is to combine the interests of every individual so that
they are compatible with each other. By striving to accomplish this object, a citizen
ensures the best interest of the state. At this point, Cicero is developing his political
theory from observable facts. Clearly, the strength of the state lies in the degree to
which the communality of interests is preserved. Also obvious is the fact that if an
individual pursues self-interest at the cost of weakening this bond, he destroys not only
the state but eventually his own self-interest, since the stability of the state is what
enables him to pursue this end.176 Based on these premises, Cicero’s conclusion is
predictable; what is inexpedient for the state can never be expedient for the
individual.177 His test of the true citizen fits within this context. Instead of aiming
solely at the achievement of personal interests, a civis bonus pursues his interests only
insofar as they do not injure the interests of other individuals or the state.
171 Cic. Off. 3.27.101, 3.29.104-5.
172 Cic. Phil. 1.33-34.
173 Cic. Off. 2.22.79.
174 Cf. Dyck (1996) 620.
175 Cic. Off. 2.24.85.
176 Cf. Atkins (1990) 270-271 on the argument Cicero gives for valuing society.
177 Cic. Off. 3.27.101.
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In Cicero’s opinion, this effort to reconcile interests is the attribute of a great
statesman. As he says early in the work, the citizen who is serious, brave, and worthy
of ruling the state will renounce self-aggrandizement and instead uphold the state as a
whole by looking out for the interests of each individual.178 This theme is repeated in
2.23.83, when he praises statesmen of the past, saying that eaque est summa ratio et
sapientia boni civis, commoda civium non divellere atque omnes aequitate eadem
continere (and this is the highest reasoning and wisdom of a good citizen, not to sunder
the interests of the citizens but to hold them all together by means of justice).179 In
these statements, Cicero invokes a concept similar to one in his earlier treatises. When
describing the rector rei publicae in de Orator and de Republica, he is not referring to a
political office but is introducing the ideal of an individual who is capable of guiding
the state and devoted to her welfare.180
In de Officiis, however, it becomes even clearer that the concept of the civis
bonus is not necessarily tied to public office. The task of preserving the solidarity
between common and individual interests is just as relevant for a private citizen as for a
statesman. Cicero states this strongly in de Officiis 3.6.26, when he says that ergo unum
debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum
(therefore, it ought to be the single purpose for all, to make the interest of each
individual and of the whole together the same). Throughout the work, Cicero
emphasises that a man of noble character will chose a life of active service to the state;
nevertheless, although this choice will likely entail public office, it does not necessarily
dictate such an outcome. In so doing, he shifts the focus away from the pursuit of
power and position to the real aim that he wishes all good citizens to pursue: to apply
justice in all areas of one’s conduct and thus to promote the general welfare.
It would not be far wrong to say, therefore, that de Officiis is about the role of
honestum in tying together the entities of the individual and the community and in
making their interests coincide. Cicero’s ultimate aim is to demonstrate that fulfilling
the obligated officia toward others and the state is consistent with seeking one’s own
interests. In his eyes, the civis bonus is the individual who recognises the necessity of
this endeavour and seeks to realize it more fully. Implicit in this conception of the good
178 Ibid. 1.25.86.
179 The Teubner edition contains the one variation of “omnis”.
180 Fantham (2004) 317-318; Steel (2004) 70, 76; Ferrary (1995) 53.
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citizen, however, is the acknowledgement that conflicts of interest do occur. Although
his theory of the congruency between interests is theoretically reasonable, in practice it
raises significant difficulties. He spends a large part of de Officiis in attempting to
answer some of these questions, struggling because of his desire to maintain a
consistent philosophical framework while being forced to recognise that the tension
never can be completely resolved.
1.4.3. Irresolvable tension
In the third book of de Officiis, Cicero resumes the topic discontinued by Panaetius,
believing that the discussion will only be complete when the apparent irreconcilability
between honestum and utilitas has been explained. While other points of philosophical
and logical inconsistency could be noted in de Officiis, the tension that Cicero attempts
to resolve between self-interest and the interests of others has the most significant
bearing on his concept of the good citizen.
The first main area of conflict occurs between one individual’s interest and the
interest of another. Even if one accepts Cicero’s asserted premise that honestum and
utilitas do not conflict, that one’s self-interest is best maintained not by the protection of
life or the increase of wealth and influence but by adherence to moral duty, questions
still remain. Specifically, the issue arises as to why on a practical level the interest of
two individuals often appear to clash and as to how one should apply justice in the
different situations of life. In other words, when a conflict occurs between my tangible
interests and those of another, does officium indicate a course of action that not only
preserves my self-interest but also fulfils honestum? And how does one discover that
explicit rule of conduct (or as the courts phrase it, the bright line rule)? These are the
issues Cicero attempts to clarify.
As a result of this effort, he becomes more dogmatic in the final book and
despite his adherence to the New Academy lays down inflexible solutions to a series of
examples illustrating the conflict of interests. For instance, he addresses the extent to
which one can conceal faults in an item of sale without committing actual fraud and
concludes that an individual violates the principle of justice whenever he conceals a
matter that is in another’s interest to know.181 Cicero also praises Quintus Scaevola
181 Cic. Off. 3.13.57.
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because, believing the value of a house to be incorrectly appraised, he paid a much
greater price than that demanded by the seller.182 Many of the moral dilemmas on
which Cicero gives his opinion were raised by previous philosophers, such as the list
given by Hecaton of Rhodes, which examines questions like whether a drowning man
can morally seize the plank of another.183 Unsurprisingly and yet also disconcertingly,
the precise details of each scenario affect the outcome of Cicero’s conclusions.
Although the different situations relate primarily to Roman life, the tension of interests
for which he seeks a universal rule is a difficulty transcending time and culture.
The second main area of tension, which Cicero begins to deal with in the second
book, is that between the interests of an individual and those of the community as a
whole. A key illustration of this and one particularly relevant to the Roman political
situation is the conflict between the interests of the wealthy and powerful citizens and
the needs of the poor. On the one hand, as already mentioned, Cicero fiercely defends
the property interests of the elite members of society. He acknowledges, however, that
those governing the republic ought to consider how to ensure that the people have the
necessities of life.184 As he says in de Republica, the moderator of the state aims at the
happiness and material well-being of the people.185 Even further, officia demand such
behaviour not only from the statesman but also from the private citizen, who should
employ his artes (skills), operae (efforts), and facultates (resources) in order to unite
human societas.186
While Cicero’s philosophy focuses on preserving the common interests and the
various ties of societas, he veers wide of a more egalitarian distribution of property such
as that sought through the land and agrarian reforms. His focus on the individual
interests of the Roman elite, therefore, causes him to neglect apparent implications of
the principles he advocates. For instance, whether the personal interests of a member of
the elite could potentially clash with those of a slave or the common good of the plebes
is beyond the field of Cicero’s inquiries. On this point, classicists tend to critique
182 Ibid. 3.15.62.
183 Ibid. 3.23.89-90.
184 Ibid. 2.21.74.
185 Cic. Rep. 5.6.8.
186 Cic. Off. 1.7.22-23.
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Cicero’s model, noting that while his principle of communal interest is “breathtaking in
its implications”, he limits it to an extremely narrow application.187
Despite his support of private property, Cicero realises that measures opposed to
these interests are sometimes necessary. Even in his severe critique of property taxes,
he admits that at times they are necessary for the republic;188 similarly, he condemns the
Gracchi grain doles, but says the moderate one enacted by Marcus Octavius was rei
publicae tolerabilis et plebi necessaria (acceptable for the state and necessary for the
common people).189 Once again, therefore, the conflict of interests demands a clear line
for decision-making; yet, even the wise and learned who agree that officium should be
upheld may view necessity or common interests as dictating antithetical courses of
action.
Cicero attempts to explain the apparent dichotomy between the divergent
perceptions of what officium requires in these different situations by reverting to
Platonic notions of virtue. On the philosophical level, he believes that all viri boni will
agree that honestum and utilitas do not conflict, that true glory consists in rising above
the preferred advantages of life and wealth, and that certain officia rank higher than
others. Nonetheless, as his examples demonstrate, disagreement still occurs over how
to practically apply justice, with the philosophers arguing not that one should act
expediently in disregard of honestum but instead arguing over what morality demands
in a given circumstance.190 In his effort to solve this dilemma in both theory and
practice, Cicero delineates between the perfect wise man and the men that perform wise
acts, between true law and justice and the shadows of these principles that are
applicable to daily life. In the fundamental passage of de Officiis 3.17.69, he draws
attention to this distinction:
Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus,
umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur!
But in truth we retain no solid and distinct image of true law and justice, the shadow and
echoes of them are all that we enjoy. If only we would observe the very things!191
187 Dyck (1996) 530; cf. Long (2006) 329-330; Carter (1972) 34-36.
188 Cic. Off. 2.21.74.
189 Ibid. 2.21.72.
190 Ibid. 3.12.53.
191 Although the concept is most clearly expressed here, it persists from the beginning of the work: see
Cic. Off. 1.3.8, 1.15.46, 2.10.35, 3.4.16. On a comparison with the example of the cave given in Plato’s
Republic, cf. Tanner (1972) 111; MacKendrick (1989) 254.
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A semblance of justice, of honestum, and ultimately, therefore, of officia is all that
Cicero can offer. On the philosophical level he insists on an absolute standard of virtue,
but accepts that differing perceptions of truth will govern the practical sphere. In light
of this, people need not expect to attain to the ideal of the vir bonus, but instead to live
according to honestum insofar as they do perceive it.192
In this context, motivation and intent become central, with virtue alone
protecting the interests of the state. In a world of shifting circumstances where the exact
requirement of duty is not always clearly defined, the good citizen must still attempt to
uphold the principles of justice by harming no one and preserving the common interests.
Cicero’s legal knowledge and experience are clearly at work in this theory. From the
early de Inventione, when he explains how to make a case by manipulating arguments
based on either the letter of the law or on the spirit of the law,193 to his later judicial
speeches, Cicero well understood the difference between merely following the written
laws compared to following the lawgiver’s intent. Such arguments allowed him to
defend the act of law-breaking in his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy as he
sought to protect the state, which he considered his primary officium. In de Officiis, to
reconcile his claims that justice sometimes requires more than the written laws demand
but that a solid definition of such duties is not always attainable, Cicero reverts to the
argument of intent, based on the notion that above all an individual should seek to fulfil
the general principles of justice. In the end, officium depends less on following certain
rules than on one’s intent, with the proper intent being a desire to benefit others and to
distribute justice regardless of the consequences.
The good citizen of de Officiis, therefore, seeks congruence of interests.
Different dangers threaten each individual. In the examples provided by Cicero, the
statesman struggles against allowing the desire for popularity and power to guide his
decisions, while the individual selling a house wants to conceal defects in order to
increase the price. Regardless of the situation, Cicero emphasises that whether
statesman or private citizen, each must observe officia insofar as they perceive them, not
ignoring the tension and conflicts of interests that this effort entails, but seeking the best
resolution possible.
192 Cic. Off. 3.4.17.
193 Cic. Inv. 1.33.55-56, 1.38.69.
151
Cicero’s solution fails, however, to solve the conflict occurring in his conception
of the good citizen. On both a philosophical and a practical level, the individual still
faces a tension of interests that cannot be eased by the theory that the ideal of justice is
only dimly discernible.
The first main problem results from the foundational premise of de Officiis, that
virtue is the summum bonum, which Cicero rigidly asserts is beyond argument.
Interestingly, he approaches this premise from the perspective of the New Academy,
which cannot help but weaken his argument. By maintaining that all questions can only
be decided on the basis of probability,194 but that the only probable assertion is that
moral goodness is worth seeking only for its own sake,195 Cicero seeks to make his
position both probable and certain. This effort to place moral certainty on the
philosophical basis of mere probability only increases the difficulty in proving his
premise. Raising arguments with the viewpoint of virtue as the greatest good is outside
the scope of de Officiis, let alone of this chapter; however, the fact remains that even in
de Finibus this viewpoint is fiercely contested. Yet Cicero recognises that his model of
the good citizen can only stand if this presupposition is universally accepted—to the
point where one is not only intellectually convinced, but willing to act accordingly and
to sacrifice life, wealth, and temporary glory for the sake of honestum.
Even beyond the issues of whether such common agreement is possible and how
it is to be achieved, the motivation Cicero offers also raises questions. In de Officiis, he
acknowledges the pull of expediency and argues that it is not incompatible with
honestum. Aside from the blanket statement that honestum, in and of itself, is in one’s
best interest, one of the most compelling reasons Cicero gives for its pursuit is that of
vera gloria, which comes not through reputation but through actual deeds and which
lasts beyond one’s lifetime.196 However, is the pursuit of lasting glory enough to enable
people to view their officium as Cicero defines it and to risk their tangible and
temporary interests for the sake of long-term honour?
At this point in his own lifetime, Cicero appears willing to take that risk.
Concerned with how people viewed his political actions and career, Cicero seeks glory
as his lasting legacy. Gloria is an important theme in de Officiis, especially as it
194 Douglas (1965) 143.
195 Cic. Off. 3.7.33.
196 Ibid. 1.19.65, 2.12.43.
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reconciles Roman competitiveness with the interests of others. Cicero would not have
viewed his childhood motto from Homer “far to excel and to be above the rest”197 or his
lifelong political ambitions as incompatible with the principles he advocates in de
Officiis, since he considers gloria as inseparable from justice and as the proper result of
virtuous deeds.198
Long remarks that while Cicero demonstrates that a reputation for justice is a
precondition of true glory, his attempt to “connect acceptable glory with justice and
mass approval fails”.199 To an extent, such an assessment detracts from the subtlety of
Cicero’s approach. Two distinct elements of thought interact in Cicero’s theory of
gloria. First, he realises without doubt that the true gloria resulting from justice will not
always be appreciated or meet with popular approval, and this theme consistently
appears in his final treatises. In de Officiis 1.4.14, he says that honestum is
praiseworthy even if praised by none. Earlier, in de Republica 1.3.4-5, he addresses the
fickleness of public approval and the wrongs perpetrated against those who aided the
state, and in de Legibus 3.11.26 he portrays himself as willing to endure this public
scorn and to sacrifice praise in order to save the state. On the other hand, Cicero’s
broad interpretation of reason and virtue as natural and perceivable by all demands the
conclusion that eventually praiseworthiness will be praised and that gloria will in fact
be the reward of justice. Even if not in the here and now, the viri boni will inevitably
recognise and praise one’s honestas. Long’s statement that public recognition of true
glory cannot be guaranteed is undeniably correct. Many factors could destroy the
promise of eventual praise and lasting gloria; for instance, not all may share in the
belief of what constitutes a praiseworthy action, one’s actions or motives may be
misinterpreted, or historical bias may ruin a good reputation. Nevertheless, while
Cicero’s conclusion that history reveals true gloria is clearly debatable, it is still
consistent within his theoretical framework and can be reasonably inferred from his
arguments.
A greater difficulty occurs as a result of Cicero’s example of Gyges, which must
logically work two ways. The individual who would refrain from wrongdoing even if
no one perceived it must also be willing to perform just actions without outside
197 Cic. QFr. 3.5.4.
198 Cic. Off. 2.12.42-43, 2.20.71.
199 Long (2006) 323.
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recognition or approval. Therefore, according to Cicero’s argument, the good citizen
must be prepared to fulfil the demands of officium not only if it brings no praise but
even if it entails the loss of tangible advantages. In such a case, a great tension
inevitably exists between the dimly perceived moral self-interest and the obvious loss of
tangible self-interests. Even if ultimate gloria is certain, the question remains of
whether such a hope can motivate an individual to endure temporary suffering. Cicero
proves willing to accept it on a personal level, gambling his life in the hope of restoring
the republic and gaining lasting glory for his name. His perspective, however, is
coloured by Roman values and the culture of his time, which fostered reverence for its
past heroes and naturally assumed that history would consider them in the same light.
Cicero’s conception of the good citizen, therefore, requires a specific view of both
history and universal ethics to support it.
Another significant motivation Cicero offers readers in de Officiis is the
preservation of societas. As previously mentioned, a failure in justice also leads to the
severing of societas, which destroys the state and the advantages accruing to the
individual through its existence. As Atkins remarks, in order for Cicero’s argument to
have an effect, “we must both believe his claims about the binding role of justice, and
must also ourselves already care that society should survive”.200 While on a theoretical
level most would likely agree with Cicero’s connection between the interests of the
individual and those of societas, much ambiguity still exists on a personal and practical
level. The link, for instance, between selling a house for a higher price than its actual
value and the breakdown of the state is not immediately apparent. The question
remains, therefore, of whether the individual will be sufficiently motivated to refrain
from all harm and concealment in the securing of his own interests, particularly if his
primary motive in preserving the state is to protect his personal interests.
Two other main problems remain unresolved on the practical level. Firstly, the
different perceptions of truth leading to mutually exclusive applications will
inescapably produce confusion.201 In de Officiis, Cicero is not concerned with
legislating virtue; although the good citizen should follow the written laws of the state,
at times Cicero believes that officium requires more of an individual than even the laws
demand. In the absence, then, of defined rules, he says that living in accordance with
200 Atkins (1990) 271.
201 Dyck (1996) 128.
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honestum entails practice and experience, and he advises people to consult men of
wisdom and learning.202 However, having already admitted that even the learned
frequently disagree, Cicero once again leaves the reader without clear guidance.
The second main problem results from Cicero’s insistence that honestum is
naturally understood. Although virtue may be natural, Cicero admits that even when
people perceive the proper course of action, they frequently reject it. Few, he says, will
refrain from injuring another if they can do so impunitate et ignoratione omnium
(without fear of punishment and in secret).203 Immediately after a series of examples
where he condemns concealment in financial transactions, Cicero states that in truth,
there are very few times when simulatio et dissimulatio (deceit and dissimulation) do
not occur.204 A disconnect appears, therefore, between theory and actuality. As Dyck
remarks, this passage contains “an important admission that things are not really as
simple as they have so far been represented”.205 Annas attempts to explain this apparent
incongruity in Stoic philosophy by saying that “nature is a theoretical term in Stoic
ethics: the natural life is the life we would ideally live, and the fact that we do not live
that way merely shows that we have been corrupted”.206 However, while this
explanation demonstrates that a Stoic conception of nature does not demand universal
conformity to an ideal, it does not succeed in providing the state with the good citizens
it must have in order to endure.
The inability to change peoples’ intent, therefore, is the ultimate dilemma in
Cicero’s attempt to resolve the tension between diverging interests. While written law
and prescribed punishment may succeed in changing behaviour, Cicero desires to
change desires, values, and motivations, but he provides no compelling incentive.
Although he gives expedient arguments for honestum, he also acknowledges that an
individual must consider virtue his greatest self-interest in order to gain those
expediencies. Thus, he fails to empower individuals to become virtuous and to seek a
congruence of interests rather than their own self-interest. It is clearly unlikely that
individuals will risk tangible expediencies for the sake of another or of the state unless
they will gain some kind of visible advantage in the process.
202 Cic. Off. 1.18.60, 1.41.147.
203 Ibid. 3.17.72.
204 Ibid. 3.15.64.
205 Dyck (1996) 575.
206 Annas (1995) 273.
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Similar to his approach in de Legibus 3.3.10, when he dictates a law for the
senate that “the order shall be free from vice, and shall be a model for all the people”,
Cicero describes how the good citizen should behave and what he should value, but he
does not explain how to make this good behaviour a reality. Clearly, a governmental
measure would prove inadequate, since by definition, the good citizen is not compelled
by an outside force. In Cicero’s model, the good citizen is defined not by what the state
or others require of him but what he requires of himself; even if no one is watching he
will still uphold honestum.
Cicero himself still clings to the position that the good citizens who upheld these
political values made the Republic strong in the past and will enable it to continue in the
future. Unlike Polybius, whose cycle of constitutions emphasises the inevitable decline
of Rome,207 Cicero hopes that the virtue of the leading citizens will renew Roman
political culture and ultimately lead to the restoration of the Republic.208 Nevertheless,
the universal tension between self-interests and the interests of others is evident, as well
as the effect of this tension on the state. Rahe, in summarising the discussion of natural
law and justice in de Legibus 1.14.40-15.43, says that “as Cicero pointed out long, long
ago, the civility required for the maintenance of civil society can hardly be sustained on
a foundation of calculation alone”.209 While Cicero may be right in perceiving the
abyss, however, his solution does not succeed in bridging it.
Any political theory will have areas of unresolved tension and will face
difficulty in balancing the interests of the individual with those of the community. True
to his own political bent, Cicero views the good citizen as the one who recognises this
conflict and the inability to fully perceive the ideal but still embraces an active life of
service to the state and forges ahead despite these obstacles rather than pondering them
in retirement. Essential to the survival and the stability of the state are these individuals
who willingly choose to perform their officia and to seek congruence between their own
interests and those of their community. Because he viewed the breakdown of the
virtues on a practical and individual level as the very thing that tore apart the Republic
and threatened to prevent its rebuilding, as exemplified in the overweening ambitions of
207 Polyb. 6.9.12-13.
208 Cic. Rep. 3.29.41; cf. 1.45.69. Cf. Powell, J. G. F. (2001) 23-24 on a comparision between Polybius’s
and Cicero’s account of the cycle of constitutions.
209 Rahe (1994) 206.
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individuals like Caesar and Antony, Cicero seeks the reformation of Roman political
values as the only way to bring about the rebirth of the Republic. By renewing
dedication to the mos maiorum and to justice, as he has defined it, Cicero believes the
Roman state will be provided with the good citizens that will enable it to endure.
Although Cicero failed in his final endeavour, the legacy of de Officiis was accepted by
the American Founding Fathers. Although they sought different ways of attaining their
goal, they wholeheartedly endorsed his conclusion that the permanence and strength of
the republic are ensured by the virtue of the good citizen and his personal commitment
to justice. Wilson, in particular, adopted Cicero’s conception of the good citizen and
employed it in his own analysis of civic virtue.
2. Wilson’s conception of the good citizen
The necessary and corresponding side of Wilson’s doctrine of popular sovereignty is his
strong belief in the duty of citizens to obey the law. Just as they have the freedom to
choose the laws, so they must willingly and gladly submit themselves to them. In itself,
the very act of consent implies obedience. Once chosen, therefore, even human laws
carry with them this obligation.210 Although he believes citizens have the right to
choose their country as well as the laws governing them, Wilson also believes that
residing in a state carries with it a type of tacit consent.211 By entering into a civil
society, people voluntarily pledge themselves to abide by the will of the majority and to
be answerable to the community for their behaviour.212
The national character of the United States, as Wilson claims in his introductory
lecture, is “distinguished by the love of liberty, and the love of law”.213 Without this
dual foundation of respect and affection not only for liberty but also for the laws of the
state, Wilson believes neither liberty nor law can endure. In order for a state to succeed,
he warns that “the obedience of the citizens is of a necessity, absolute and supreme”.214
210 Wilson (1804) 1:99.
211 Ibid. 1:317. Cf. Hall (1997) 107 on how this concept of tacit consent lends political stability to a
nation governed by Wilson’s ideology of liberty.
212 Wilson (1804) 2:312; cf. 1:310.
213 Ibid. 1:5.
214 Ibid. 2:435.
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They can be free only by fulfilling their first and primary duty of submission to the laws
of their nation.215 In this context, it becomes clear why Wilson included the pro
Cluentio quotation at the beginning of his lectures and continually reiterates its assertion
that individuals serve the laws in order that they may be free. On this basis of freedom
and obedience, he constructs his system of legal and political thought.
The obligations of obedience, however, entail more than a simple adherence to
the law merely for the expediency of the state or in order to preserve individual rights.
The people’s obedience to the laws they have established is only part of a broader
system of duties binding them, which they follow from a sense of moral obligation.
Thus, throughout his lectures, Wilson constantly returns to the duty of citizens to submit
to certain laws, traditions, and moral imperatives.
Ultimately, Wilson endorses the theory of an overarching natural law that
enjoins virtue. In opposition to human laws, which cannot entail obligation, Wilson
outlines the notion of divine law: the only supreme law rightly dictated by a superior,216
the “principium essendi” or the “efficient cause of moral obligation”.217 Wilson’s
theory of natural law cannot be separated from its classical foundation. In maintaining
that the will of God is the “supreme law” universally binding all men, Wilson turns
directly to de Legibus 2.4.8: principem legem illam et ultimam, mentem esse dicebant,
omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis dei (they were declaring that first and ultimate
law to be the mind of god which by reason either compels or prohibits all things).218
Thus, while the people are sovereign and cannot be bound by any fellow human being,
they are not sovereign in regard to all law. Free from human laws unless they consent,
they are universally and perpetually bound by divine law. As he seeks to differentiate,
divine law consists both of revealed law as “promulgated by the holy scriptures” and of
natural law as “promulgated by reason and the moral sense”.219 Wilson employs the
well-known quotation from de Republica 3.22.33 in his insistence on the immutability
and universality of the law of nature.220 Natural law, for Wilson, acts as the ultimate
215 Ibid. 2:436.
216 Ibid. 1:66.
217 Ibid. 1:118.
218 Ibid. 1:118. See above, p. 56 for the context of this quotation.
219 Ibid. 1:104; cf. 1:64. Cf. 1:120, where Wilson states that we can discover the will of God “by our
conscience, by our reason, and by the Holy Scriptures”.
220 See above, pp. 56-57 for the whole of this quotation, Wilson’s translation of it, and the surrounding
context.
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sovereignty binding all men and dictating a specific standard of moral virtue that they
are obligated to obey.
Wilson does not rely solely on his classical training to provide him with such a
construction of natural law. Richard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity
(1666) and Jean Jacques Burlamaqui’s The Principles of Natural and Political Law
(1747) are two of his most cited works in the chapters on natural law. Nevertheless,
Cicero continues to be a primary source even here, and it is evident that Wilson wishes
to root his theory in the classical tradition just as fully as in more contemporary sources.
In fact, such an endeavour helps to establish one of his main arguments: that not merely
the Christian tradition but reason and an innate moral sense in humankind reveal the
principles of divine law.
Even in his chapter ‘The Nature and Philosophy of Evidence’, where he relies
almost exclusively on Thomas Reid’s doctrine of intuitive truths, Wilson clearly seeks
to base his ideology on a classical foundation. Reason and the moral sense, he asserts,
convey not only a universal standard of right and wrong or virtue and vice, but also an
understanding of truth and beauty.221 In support of this perspective he translates de
Oratore 3.50.195:
“Let no one”, says Cicero, in his excellent book de oratore, “be surprised that the most
uncultivated mind can mark and discern these things: since, in everything, the energy of
nature is great and incredible. Without education or information, every one, by a certain
tacit sense, is enabled to judge and decide concerning what is right or wrong in the arts.
If this observation is true with regard to pictures, statues, and other performances, in the
knowledge of which they have less assistance from nature; it becomes much more evident
and striking with regard to the judgements, which they form concerning words, harmony,
and pronunciation: for concerning these there is a common sense implanted in all, of
which Nature intended that no one should be entirely devoid.”222
Thus, Wilson depends on Cicero as well as Reid for his argument that nature or reason
communicates to humankind a proper sense of judgement and taste. Significantly, he
incorporates Reid’s philosophy into his translation of the passage, attempting to bridge a
connection between Cicero and the Scottish School of Common Sense and to
221 Wilson (1804) 1:136.
222 Ibid. 2:81. Wilson does not include the Latin text, which reads in the 1692 edition: Illud autem nequis
admiretur, quonam modo haec vulgus imperitorum in audiendo notet; cum in omni genere, tum in hoc
ipso magna quaedam est vis, incredibilisque naturae. Omnes enim tacito quodam sensu, sine ulla arte,
aut ratione, quae sint in artibus, ac rationibus recta ac prava, diiudicant: idque cum faciunt in picturis, et
in signis, et in aliis operibus, ad quorum intelligentiam a natura minus habent instrumenti; tum multo
ostendunt magis in verborum, numerorum, vocumque iudicio; quod ea sunt in communibus infixa
sensibus, neque earum rerum quemquam funditus natura voluit esse expertem. The minor variations in
the Teubner edition are found in the phrases: “volgus imperitorum”, “ad quorum intellegentiam”,
“sensibus nec”, “natura esse voluit expertem”.
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demonstrate that the contemporary ideas he espouses have a classical tradition. The
translations of both phrases tacito quodam sensu (by a certain silent perception) and
sunt in communibus infixa sensibus (they are fixed in the public sensibility), which
Wilson renders as “by a certain tacit sense” and “there is a common sense implanted in
all”, provide a clear reference to Reid’s statements on the existence of first principles of
human knowledge perceived by all.223 Indeed, Wilson draws directly from Reid at this
point, since Reid himself employs the quotation from de Oratore in his Essays on the
Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), although he does not provide a translation of it.224
Like Reid, Wilson believes that the values of society are held in common
precisely because of this universal moral judgement. Even in criticising those who
disagree with such sentiments, Wilson responds not merely to his more modern
contemporaries but also to the ancients. The moral sense, he says, while denied by
those like Lucretius and Hobbes, is proven by the feelings of “gratitude, or resentment,
or pride, or shame” which all experience.225 These compel a person to “acknowledge a
sense of something benevolent, of something unjust, of something, worthy, and of
something mean”; ultimately, they demonstrate the existence of the “honourable” and
the “dishonourable”.226
If such a moral perception exists, it must of logical necessity be universal in its
application; therefore, Wilson turns to Cicero’s de Natura Deorum 1.16.43 as offering
proof that humankind intuitively possesses knowledge of these moral truths.227 Once he
has shown that all humankind can perceive this divine law, whether revealed through
scripture or through nature and reason, Wilson links divine and human laws. The
statutory laws established and sanctioned by the people derive their obligatory authority
from divine law,228 and the people are bound to exercise their sovereign power
according to its principles.229
Unsurprisingly, Wilson does not clarify the precise connection between natural
law and human laws. McCloskey, for instance, draws attention to this dilemma in the
223 Reid (2002) 39-41, 452-453, 551-552. Cf. Haakonssen (1996) 185-186 on Reid’s first principles of
human knowledge and 193-195 on the similarity between Reid’s thought and Cicero’s understanding of
officia.
224 Reid (2002) 431, 452-453.
225 Wilson (1804) 1:121.
226 Ibid. 1.121.
227 See above, p. 54 for the complete quotation and its translation.
228 Wilson (1804) 1:104-105.
229 Ibid. 1:153.
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Law Lectures of attempting to reconcile the changes in customary law with the
immutable principles of natural or divine law.230 This tension, however, is not unique to
Wilson but is inherent in all natural law theories. Although he is not able to resolve the
difficulty, Wilson attempts to bridge it by pointing to the guidance of reason and the
moral sense. A legislator seeking to promote the ends of justice and duty will often find
the means to procure those ends a matter of doubt and “considerable difficulty,” but will
be aided by reason.231 Therefore, although Wilson asserts the existence of divine
principles, he also freely admits that they fail to elucidate “the origin, the nature, the
extent of the several rights and duties . . . nor do they specify in what instances one
right or duty is entitled to preference over another”.232 Those inquires are left to human
beings to decide by means of their rational powers.
In a manner similar to Cicero, Wilson focuses on how the moral virtues enjoined
by natural law apply to one’s relationships with other individuals and thereby support
the common good. The subject of public community and interest forms an important
part of Wilson’s discussion on obligations and provides stability for his doctrine of
popular sovereignty. Society, Wilson argues, materialises through a natural and
positive desire for assistance and affection.233 In his discussion of the relationship
between the individual and the community, Wilson makes the obvious point that by
serving the general good, an individual also protects his own self-interests. Believing
that nature enjoins an individual’s freedom to “pursue his happiness and perfection”,
Wilson also says that, “Whatever promotes the greatest happiness of the whole, is
congenial to the principles of utility and sociability.”234 Developing this idea further,
Wilson believes each citizen must be willing to sacrifice individual interest to the
interest of the general public whenever they come into an unavoidable and temporary
conflict.235 In practice, Wilson recognises that unless each individual protects the
general interest, society itself will crumble into factions and ultimately self-destruct. As
he states, “by the will and by the interest of the community, every private will and every
230 McCloskey (1967) 41.
231 Wilson (1804) 1:127. As he practically admits, those who look to revealed divine law for specific
instructions in each situation expect more than they will discover [1:139].
232 Ibid. 1:139.
233 Ibid. 1:296-297.
234 Ibid. 1:140; cf. 1:303 on the equating of self-love and the common interests.
235 Ibid. 2:438-439
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private interest must be bound and overruled. Unless this maxim is established and
observed; it is impossible that civil government could be formed or supported.”236
On one level, therefore, the higher law demands a type of public virtue,
embraced for the good of the state. In high-flowing rhetoric, Wilson describes how an
individual must be “inspired with ardent affection for the publick … his heart, his head,
his hands, his tongue, his pen, his fortune; all he is, and all he has, are devoted to his
country’s cause, and to his country’s call”.237 The preeminent duty of each citizen lies
in serving the state and its common good.
In the end, however, the obligatory force of these principles of mutual help and
common self-interest does not merely lie in arguments of expediency, which maintain
that human society will crumble if they are ignored. Humanity, generosity, and justice,
while necessary to the proper functioning of society, are all personal virtues that can
only be enjoined by appealing to a source superior to human authority.238 Although
fulfilling or neglecting the demands of virtue has a profound effect on the state and on
one’s community, Wilson still insists that “virtue and vice are ends; and are hateful or
desirable on their own account”.239 Nonetheless, when individuals fulfil these
obligations and pursue virtue, Wilson believes that legal and political stability will be
the certain result.
The same tension inherent in Cicero’s perspective of virtue, however, also exists
in Wilson’s philosophy. While all people are equal in their moral obligations and in
their ability to perceive them,240 Wilson acknowledges the difficulty of applying those
duties to specific situations. Although he looks to natural law and its prescription of
individual virtue to guide the decisions of legislators as well as the practical decisions of
daily life, Wilson believes the perception of what virtue demands in each situation has
not been given to humankind; instead, people must employ reason in order to apply the
higher law rightly.241
236 Ibid. 2:439; cf. 1:353.
237 Ibid. 1:423.
238 Ibid. 1:212-213.
239 Ibid. 1:136. Cf. Wilson (1804) 1:301; Leg. 1.18.48-49.
240 Wilson (1804) 1:118-119. Cf. 1:308 where Wilson broadly generalises and equates his understanding
of natural rights and duties with that of the ancients, saying that “With regard to all, there is an equality in
rights and in obligations; there is that ‘jus aequum’, that equal law, in which the Romans placed true
freedom. The natural rights and duties of man belong equally to all”; cf. 2:470 for a similar statement.
241 Ibid. 1:127.
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Beyond the issue of how people correctly apply an ultimate standard of virtue to
their individual circumstances is the greater conflict that occurs in the effort to reconcile
common and individual interests. While all would likely acknowledge the theoretical
necessity of prioritizing the general interest, an individual will likely protect his self-
interest when it appears to clash with the common good. The conviction that virtue
would serve as the bulwark of the republican form of government, a theory shared by
many of the founders, proved increasingly difficult to defend as a principle of actual
politics.242 Wilson, however, expresses no such doubt in his lectures. Much like
Cicero, he recognises the tension between his philosophy and its practical application
but does not abandon the view that the true safety of the state rests on the personal
virtue of each citizen.
3. Wilson’s slant on Cicero
Despite many variations in how virtue is defined and interpreted, the significance of
civic virtue in republican theories of political thought is widely noted.243 Indeed, it
would be difficult to address modern questions of civic identity, sovereignty, and
constitutionalism, or to trace their classical origins, without dealing with the issue of
virtue. For Wilson, as for many of the founders, virtue functioned as a check on the
unlimited power of the people, providing the defining line between the unbridled
tyranny of the mob and the right of the people to freely choose the laws which governed
them. Although Cicero did not formulate a theory of popular sovereignty by name, his
conception of individual virtue and the connection he drew between the stability of the
state and the adherence of its leaders to virtue and the mos maiorum became an essential
part of the foundation on which Wilson constructed his own version of popular
sovereignty, relying on Cicero’s theory of virtue as the surest means of its success.
For both Cicero and Wilson, virtue is ultimately prescribed by natural law. In
his analysis of the classical influence in early American political thought, Kirk defines
natural law as “a loosely-knit body of rules of action prescribed by an authority superior
242 Agresto (1977) 489-491. Cf. Skinner (1998) 32 n. 103 on republican self-government and the
inevitable tension between personal interests and the common good.
243 Burtt (1992) 64-65; Honohan (2002) 148-150, 166.
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to the political state” which are “presumed to be derived from divine commandment,
from the nature of man, or from the long experience of mankind in community”.244
Although broader than most, this definition is helpful both in encompassing various
interpretations of natural law that have existed in disparate ages and communities and
also in explaining the variance between competing ideologies of virtue. Within such a
context, virtue consists in obedience to obligations of justice, right, or duty, which may
or may not be reflected in the written laws and which derive their legitimacy from a
source outside the actual government of the state. Without digressing into an intricate
examination of arguments on natural law, it can nevertheless be seen that Kirk’s
explanation provides a framework for understanding how republican theorists have
viewed virtue as a source of stability within communities and as a limit in democracies
against the unrestrained authority of the people.245
Cicero’s designation of the state as a res populi and of the people as an
association based upon justice fits within this framework of natural law by providing an
outside source of law and justice that the people are obligated to obey. His definition
also eliminates the possibility of mob rule, since a legitimate form of popular rule can
exist only when there is a shared moral consensus among the people.246 On this point,
Wilson concurs with Cicero. Even as he supports the ultimate authority of the people as
expressed through the will of the majority, Wilson argues that the standard of natural
law and the obligations of virtue it places on individuals act as a protection against the
unrestrained power of the mob and maintain the balance between liberty and license.247
In his Law Lectures, Wilson only partially portrays Cicero’s thought, but he
recognises the important link between conformity to the public standards of virtue and
justice and the stability of a system guaranteeing some level of popular involvement in
political affairs. Thus, both classical thinking and modern political philosophy affirm
that the virtue of the individual citizen cannot be divorced from the state’s constitution
or form of government. While their interpretations of the precise virtues that define the
244 Kirk (2003) 109.
245 Cf. Bix (1996) 223; Hart (1961) 156; cf. Wild (1953) 64 on the definition of natural law as it relates to
ethics. Cf. Sellers (1997-1998) 15 on republicanism and its adherence to a Stoic conception of natural
law that distinguishes between liberty and license. On the history of natural law theory and different
definitions offered of natural law, cf. Rommen (1998) 3-96; Haakonssen (1996) 6-7. On the subject of
Cicero’s influence in the development of natural law theories, cf. Bix (1996) 223-228; D’Entrèves (1951)
20-23. For bibliography on Wilson and natural law, see above, p. 107 n. 157.
246 Schofield (1995) 71-72.
247 Wilson (1804) 1:9, 11, 108, 114.
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civis bonus differ in some respects, both Cicero and Wilson emphasise the personal
virtue of the citizen as an essential foundation for the particular type of government
advocated by each. As will be demonstrated, Wilson closely follows Cicero’s
conception of civic virtue in three essential ways: in his view of positive association, in
his equation of individual and common interests, and in his insistence that virtue must
be sought primarily for its own sake.
The first main point of similarity is Wilson’s dependence on Cicero’s
perspective of association. As seen earlier,248 Cicero centres his theory of individual
justice in nature and locates the origins of political society in the natural impulse
drawing people into association. In opposition to this perspective, political thinkers
who espouse a negative view of association assert that the primary cause of social
cohesion lies in the contradistinction between various groups and especially in the fear
of danger from external threats.249 Such, for instance, is the theory Hobbes posits when
he argues that civil society originated from fear of others:
It is true that the advantages of this life can be increased with other people’s help. But
this is much more effectively achieved by Dominion over others than by their help.
Hence no one should doubt that, in the absence of fear, men would be avidly attracted to
domination than to society. One must therefore lay it down that the origin of large and
lasting societies lay not in mutual human benevolence but men’s mutual fear.250
Contrasting with this perspective, Wilson aligns himself with Cicero’s approach
by basing his political philosophy on positive association and employing the Ciceronian
texts as justification for his belief that individual self-interest can be reconciled with the
common good. Using quotations from de Officiis and de Amicitia, Wilson argues that
society is a necessary requirement for human happiness, based on goodwill and
fellowship, and furthers the mutual advantages of all. Since Cicero was writing de
Amicitia around the same time as de Officiis, it is not surprising that he frequently
dwells on similar themes in the two works. Clearly recognising this connection, Wilson
references them together. The quotation from de Amicitia 23.87-88 best summarises
Wilson’s own view that association develops through a mutual desire for fellowship and
is necessary for the preservation of human life and happiness:
“If we could suppose ourselves,” says Cicero, who knew so well how to illustrate law by
philosophy—“if we could suppose ourselves transported by some divinity into a solitude,
replete with all the delicacies which the heart of man could desire, but excluded, at the
248 See above, pp. 135-136.
249 Evrigenis (2008) 1-4.
250 Hobbes, On the Citizen 1.2.
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same time, from every possible intercourse with our kind, there is not a person in the
world of so unsocial and savage a temper, as to be capable, in these forlorn
circumstances, of relishing any enjoyment.” “Nothing”, continues he, “is more true, than
what the philosopher Archytas is reported to have said: If a man were to be carried up
into heaven, and see the beauties of universal nature displayed before him, he would
receive but little pleasure from the wonderful scenes, unless there was some person, to
whom he could relate the glories, which he had viewed. Human nature is so constituted,
as to be incapable of solitary satisfactions. Man, like those plants which are formed to
embrace others, is led, by an instinctive impulse, to recline on those of his own kind.”251
In the case of this quotation, Wilson does not provide the Latin text. As can be
seen, he follows his own understanding of the text rather than providing a literal
word-for-word translation:
ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret
atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam,
hominis omnino adspiciendi potestatem eriperet—quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam
ferre posset ciuque non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo? Verum ergo illud
est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi
ab aliis senibus auditum: si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et
pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore, quae
iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem cui narraret habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat
semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum annititur, quod in amicissimo quoque
dulcissimum est.252
Suppose that some god should lift us away from this place frequented by men and should
place us somewhere in solitude, and there supplying us with an abundance and plenty of
all things that nature could desire, should snatch from us entirely the power of beholding
a fellow-being—who would be a man of such iron, who would be able to endure that life,
and from whom the enjoyment of all pleasure would not be snatched away by solitude?
True, therefore, is that saying that I have heard related by our old men, which they had
heard from other old men, that I believe was accustomed to be said by Archytas of
Tarentum: if anyone should ascend into heaven and should observe the nature of the
universe and the beauty of the constellations, that marvel would be unpleasant, which
would have been most delightful for him if he would have had someone to whom he
could relate it. Thus, nature loves nothing solitary and always strives as it were for some
support, which is sweetest when found in a very close friend.
Wilson’s slant on the passage is particularly evident in his inclusion of “there is not a
person in the world of so unsocial and savage a temper”, a description he actually takes
from the previous sentence of the text (not included here) that speaks of Timon of
Athens as a man of such a fierce and savage nature that he shunned and hated human
society.253 Wilson also makes the quotation less verbose by excluding the phrase
referring to the transmission of Archytas’s proverb, and leaves out the final clause of the
paragraph. Clearly, by this last omission, Wilson aimed at disregarding the specific
application Cicero makes to friendship and instead to end the quotation on its broader
251 Wilson (1804) 1:300.
252 The Teubner edition contains the two minor variations of “aspiciendi”and “adnititur”.
253 Cic. Amic. 23.87.
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application to the necessity of human society. Although he slants the text in order to
emphasis this point, Wilson believes he is being consistent with a general reading of
Cicero’s thought, as evidenced by the other quotation he employs from de Officiis
1.7.22, which contains the same themes on the natural inclination of humankind to join
together and the benefits resulting from this union:
“There is nothing more certain”, says Cicero, “than the excellent maxim of Plato—that
we are not intended solely for ourselves; but that our friends and our country claim a
portion of our birth. Since, according to the doctrine of the stoicks, the productions of the
earth are designed for men, and men are designed for the mutual aid of one another; we
should certainly pursue the design of Nature, and promote her benign intention, by
contributing our proportion to the general interest, by mutually performing and receiving
good offices, and by employing our care, our industry, and even our fortune, in order to
strengthen the love and friendship, which should always predominate in human
society.”254
In this quotation as well, Wilson only includes the translation given above without
the Latin text:
Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque
nostri partem patria vindicate, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris
gignuntur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse
generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem
sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando accipiundo,
tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem.255
But since, as has been very famously written by Plato, we are not born only for ourselves,
and our country claims a part of our birth, as do our friends; and, as is believed by the
Stoics, everything produced in the earth has been created for the use of humankind; men
are born for the sake of other men, so that they may mutually be able to benefit one
another, in this we ought to follow the guidance of nature, to contribute to the public
advantage in the community by an interchange of services, in giving and receiving, to
unite closely the fellowship among men by our skills, by our efforts, and by our
resources.
In this quotation, which he translates more literally than that from de Amicitia, Wilson
reinforces the theme of positive association and introduces the topic of obligation into
the discussion by supporting the ancient conviction that individuals have a duty to serve
not only their own interests, but also to serve their friends and their state.
This point leads to the second essential way in which Wilson’s conception of
virtue closely follows Cicero’s line of reasoning by emphasising the link between
common and individual interests. The commitment to individual liberty at the time of
the American Revolution should not lead to the view that the founders neglected the
254 Wilson (1804) 1:299.
255 The Teubner edition contains the two minor variations of “gignantur” and “accipiendo”.
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importance of social unity.256 In fact, the willingness to subordinate individual interests
to those of the larger community plays as important a role in Wilson’s model as it does
in Cicero’s. For Wilson, virtue manifests itself in devotion to the state, characterised by
an active participation in government and devotion to the common good. As has been
seen, in order to emphasize that a virtuous citizen seeks a convergence of interests
between his own desires and the needs of the community, he employs the argument of
de Officiis 1.7.22 that according to nature, humankind is meant to strengthen the bonds
of mutual help and fellowship. Such is the key denotation Wilson ascribes to the term
patriotism. When speaking of the need for citizens to be primarily devoted to the
interests of the entire United States and not merely a particular state, he says,
“Expanded patriotism is a cardinal virtue in the United States. This cardinal virtue—
this ‘passion for the commonweal,’ superiour to contracted motives or views, will
preserve inviolate the connexion of interest between the whole and all its parts”.257
Thus, the first consideration of the good citizen is the interests of the whole
community of which he forms a part, and only in promoting the common good can the
security of the state and the well-being of its citizens be preserved. In detailing
particular civic duties, Wilson mentions such tasks as voting, serving on juries, and
acquiring a thorough knowledge of the laws,258 but when, in language reminiscent of
Cicero, he refers to the general principle of civic duty, he says that an individual is
required “to fulfil the engagements, which he has made; and to do no injury”.259 The
strength of the state relies upon these types of individuals, who actively seek the good
of the whole community and refrain from pursuing self-interest to its detriment. Once
again, Wilson turns to the authority of de Officiis 3.6.28 to support this claim that the
unity and preservation of the state rest on the type of virtuous conduct that refrains from
injuring another, saying that self-interest at the expense of the common welfare will
“dissolve the union of the state”.260
In emphasising the necessity of virtue for the good of the state, however, Wilson
also makes an essential distinction that follows Cicero’s approach in a third main way.
256 Wood, G. S. (2003) 90 on the common emphasis in the republicanism of the American Revolution on
a “morality of social cohesion” and the necessity of seeking the common welfare of the state.
257 Wilson (1804) 1:357.
258 Ibid. 1:11-12.
259 Ibid. 2:495.
260 For the whole of the quotation and Wilson’s translation, see above, pp. 62-63.
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The strong connection Wilson makes between virtue and the common good may
initially appear to be an argument of mere expediency that views virtue as existing for
the good of the state and one’s community. For Wilson, however, patriotism is more
than a public virtue existing for the benefit and continued existence of the state. Thus,
in addition to holding similar views of association, Wilson and Cicero locate the good
of the state as resting in the personal virtue of the individual, but they explicitly
differentiate between virtue as a public necessity and as an individual obligation that
must be sought for its own sake. While closely related to civic duty, this theory of
virtue originates in justice and derives its source of obligation from outside the actual
state. Cicero’s depiction of the statesman or politician, imparting the new conception to
Roman political thought of the individual “constantly engaged in civilian activity for the
good of the state”,261 allows for a broader understanding of the individual citizen and
emphasises the importance of one whose actions are essential to the state’s well-
being.262 While one’s chief officia are owed to the state, however, the virtue that
promotes civic stability applies equally to personal moral character. As previously
stated, Cicero’s conception of the virtue of the good citizen is inseparably connected
with the principles of justice: to refrain from harming another and to preserve the
common interest. Cicero recognises that what virtue demands may at times clash with
one’s duty toward the state, and he insists that the obligations of moral duty come first,
saying that there are some actions so abominable and disgraceful that a wise man will
not commit them even to save his country.263 Hence, moral duty exists apart from the
state; an individual is required to fulfil the principles of justice even if such actions
should result in the state’s downfall.
In his own discussion of civic virtue, Wilson also feels the need to clarify his
position. Much like Cicero’s address to Marcus and the rising generation of Roman
political leaders, in his lectures to law students desiring positions of political and legal
prominence in the United States, Wilson focuses on the civic necessity and benefits of
virtue but is careful to note that virtue cannot be confined to a political context. While
he emphasises that the good of the individual is achieved only through seeking the well-
being of all and that such virtue is essential in maintaining the state, Wilson also argues
261 Steel (2004) 70; cf. Powell, J. G. F. (1994) 20.
262 Connolly (2007) 125; Earl (1961) 38-39; Zetzel (2001) 86.
263 Cic. Off. 1.45.159.
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that the virtue required of good citizens does not serve a purely civic purpose: it governs
not only behaviour in the public sphere but also private actions.
On this point, Wilson makes a conscious break with previous philosophers who
tied virtue inextricably to the purpose of supporting the state and civil society. Thus, he
excludes the Machiavellian interpretation of virtue, which is not based upon justice and
which serves a primarily civic purpose.264 Machiavelli’s conception of virtù divorces
the moral and cardinal virtues from the behaviour required of a statesman and allows for
decisions made on the basis of expediency.265 Although Wilson never deals specifically
with Machiavelli’s work, he views Montesquieu as endorsing a similar position and
believes he presented virtue as something to be sought for the state rather than for its
own sake. Despite essential differences between the political thought of Montesquieu
and Machiavelli, by arguing that, “Ce n’est point une vertu morale, ni une vertu
chrétienne, c’est la vertu politique” characterised by “l’amour de la république”,266
Montesquieu followed Machiavelli’s conception of virtue as “an equality of subjection
to the republic’s laws and of devotion to her good”.267
At a time when Montesquieu’s definition of republican virtue provided a
philosophical framework and source of inspiration for many of the founding fathers,268
Wilson departs from this trend and attempts to discredit the tradition of virtue as
promulgated by Montesquieu by reverting instead to a Ciceronian perspective. Instead
of citing Montesquieu as an example to be followed, Wilson believes that his
conception of virtue actually threatens the security of the new republic.
In his Law Lectures, Wilson contends that in the Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu
abandons justice, reason, and truth since he does not seek them for their own sake.
When honour and truth cease to be sought as ends in themselves, Wilson believes that
these virtues must inevitably cease to exist. In arguing for a theory of virtue derived
from the ultimate standard of natural law, Wilson commends the classical discernment
which made the temple of honour “accessible only through the temple of virtue”.269
Justice must be required in personal matters as well as in a civic context, and individual
264 Burtt (1992) 65-66.
265 Skinner (2000) 42-45, especially note the contrast Skinner draws between Machiavelli’s view and that
of Cicero; cf. Skinner (1978) 1:136.
266 Montesquieu (1950) 9, 94; citations are taken from the forward to the work and section 1.5.2.
267 Pocock (1975) 491, 463.
268 Reinhold (1984) 98, 145.
269 Wilson (1804) 2:471.
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virtue must exist not only for the good of the state but also for the good of the
individual; otherwise, society will embrace a standard such as Montesquieu’s theory of
honour, which “fashions the virtues just as it pleases, and extends or limits our duties by
its own whimsical taste”.270 A republican government, Wilson maintains, will not
desire to obtain a mere appearance of honour which is “vicious in its practice, and, even
when right in its practice, vicious in its principle”.271 Thus, virtue, as Wilson
understands it, functions as the same set of duties binding both the individual and the
citizen. While it may have different applications regarding the specific political duties
required of the individual, it equally applies to personal duties.
Following Cicero’s argument in de Officiis, Wilson believes a virtuous citizen
must seek virtue for its own sake or he ceases to be a truly good citizen. It is on this
type of virtue that the security of the state rests. In Wilson’s model, therefore, if virtue
is sought for the good of the state alone, rather than for its own sake, the collapse of
virtue itself and consequently that of the state is imminent. In this way, Wilson situates
himself within a Ciceronian context, employing the same test of virtue against
Montesquieu as Cicero used against his own contemporaries.
While Wilson appeals to Cicero’s authority for an ideal of virtue to be sought for
its own sake, he also recognises the practical advantages resulting from such virtue.
Security of one’s person and property, the ability to pursue happiness in the ways best
suited to that aim, and the attainment of deserved fame are all proper benefits that attend
a virtuous people and a well-ordered state.272 As he reminds his young law students, the
United States is becoming free and prosperous under the new constitution, and as they
establish high aims for themselves, they can expect to gain from these advantages.273
Additionally, Wilson well understood the complexities of law and politics and
the frequent difficulty in applying the ideals of justice and virtue to the daily affairs of
life.274 On these points as well, Cicero’s philosophy offered the practical approach to
ethics that Wilson found so consonant with his own theories. Following Panaetius’
perspective of Stoicism, Cicero emphasised not the impossible model of the perfect
270 Ibid. 2:471.
271 Ibid. 2:471.
272 Ibid. 1:160, 164-165; cf. 2:466.
273 Ibid. 1:42.
274 Ibid. 1:127-128.
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wise man, but an attainable standard.275 This approach, described by Dyck in his
commentary as “idealism tempered with realism”,276 encapsulated a practical theory of
virtue enabling Wilson to support his view of American citizenship.
Despite the similarity between their theories of virtue, however, Wilson makes a
significant departure from Cicero by imparting a highly optimistic colouring to his
conception of the good citizen—a view resulting from Wilson’s enlightenment
philosophy with its impregnable trust in the future advancement of human virtue and
liberty. Although he disagreed with the theory that states must inevitably decline and
believed that a res publica could indefinitely continue if the citizens upheld the
institutions and customs handed down to them, Cicero never promulgated a theory of
universal peace achievable throughout the world. Nevertheless, Wilson draws on
Cicero’s doctrine of the cosmic community shared by humankind and the gods to
support his own belief in the good fellowship that will be advanced not only in the
United States, but also in interactions with foreign states as their mutual striving for the
common interests of all eventually leads to the end of strife and the progress of
liberty.277 Society, as Wilson views it, “is in a progressive state, moving on towards
perfection” and to the ultimate cessation of “discord, devastation, and war”.278 On this
point, Wilson’s perspective stands in contrast with those of other founders like
Madison, who argued in Federalist Paper Number 10 that self-love and the competing
interests of humankind were more likely to lead to enmity than to cooperation, with
decisions made on the basis of self-aggrandizement rather than “with a sole regard to
justice and the public good”.279 Nonetheless, although Wilson is aware that he is
drawing new conclusions from the idea of mutual cooperation propounded by the
ancients, Wilson says that the advancement of political science has led to new
discoveries and the perfecting of human progress,280 and he sees himself as defending
the classical concept of the common society of humankind and advancing it to its
logical end.
275 Powell, J. G. F. (1995) 24.
276 Dyck (1996) 43.
277 Wilson (1804) 1:170-174.
278 Ibid. 1:30, 381.
279 Willis (1982) 44-45.
280 Wilson (1804) 1:416-417.
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A less significant point of difference occurs in Wilson’s democratic application
of Cicero’s thought. While Cicero acknowledges the need for all citizens to be virtuous,
he essentially writes to the educated and experienced elite in de Officiis, looking to them
to lead the Republic in political leadership and virtue; conversely, Wilson wants the
entire populace to become the type of virtuous statesmen recommended by Cicero.
Nonetheless, Wilson’s theoretical framework is made possible by the broad
understanding of virtue articulated by Cicero in de Officiis, which centres on a virtue
perceivable by all, on an inevitable correspondence between the good man and the good
citizen, and on the idea of a statesman who even as a citizen actively works for the good
of the state.281 Wilson remains true to the spirit of Cicero’s work, which reiterates the
importance of an individual achieving political leadership if possible.282 Whether an
individual succeeds in political leadership is incidental to Wilson’s argument, since in
observing duties like voting, acquiring a comprehensive knowledge of the law, and
maintaining justice in his private behaviour toward others, a citizen fulfils the role of a
statesman even if he has not obtained political office. Wilson’s more democratic
position was undoubtedly bolstered by a more widely educated populace and greater
opportunities for individual advancement in the colonies than had existed in Rome;
however, Cicero’s theory of virtue allowed Wilson to take the notion of the statesman-
citizen a step further. While his democratic emphasis overlooks some of the more elitist
themes in Cicero’s work, he remains true to the sentiment expressed in de Republica
2.69, when Scipio speaks of a statesman as one who splendore animi et vitae suae sicut
speculum praebeat civibus (by the splendour of his mind and life would present himself
as a mirror to his fellow citizens). For Wilson, all citizens act as leaders of the state
even in their individual capacities, and the virtue of each should act as a mirror to the
rest. Thus, despite some slight divergences, Wilson advocates the type of virtue set
forth by Cicero and looks to the virtuous citizen of the pattern of de Officiis to protect
the stability and well-being of the Republic.
281 Cf. Wilson (1804) 1:120-121 on the natural ability of all to perceive virtue and justice. The language
of this section is also reminiscent of Off. 1.4.11-14.
282 This point was furthered by a conversation with Malcolm Schofield at the Classical Association
Conference 4 April 2009.
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Chapter 5: Justified disobedience to written law
Il n’y a ni guerre étrangère, ni guerre civile; il n’y a que la guerre injuste et la guerre
juste … Chasser le tyran ou chasser l’ Anglais, c’est, dans les deux cas, reprendre son
territoire. Il vient une heure où protester ne suffit plus; après la philosophie il faut
l’action; la vive force achève ce que l’idée a ébauché.
Victor Hugo, Les Misérables
This chapter focuses on civil disobedience, specifically on the way Wilson and Cicero
use their theories to legitimize action. In exploring the concept of resistance to
government, it is possible to see how the philosophies formulated by these men were
shaped by the political circumstances in which they found themselves. In particular, the
concepts of popular sovereignty and civic virtue explored in the last two chapters served
for these men as a legal justification for resistance to written law and thus for the
practical decisions they made as statesmen, with Cicero stressing the duties of a good
citizen and Wilson emphasizing the importance of consent. Although each defended
civil disobedience in a unique way, they both resorted to a political viewpoint that
offered a broader interpretation of law as encompassing not only written word but also
an unwritten higher law and tradition.
This final chapter, therefore, examines the practical application of Cicero’s and
Wilson’s thought and demonstrates that they employed their distinctive versions of
popular sovereignty and civic virtue to justify civil disobedience and support their
personal and political agendas. As will be seen, although Cicero acknowledges the
necessity of popular consent, he does not use a lack of consent as a basis for resistance;
rather, he derives his doctrine of civil disobedience from the necessity of preserving the
state, arguing that an ultimate standard of justice may compel an individual to resist
written law. Wilson, who believes the absence of consent in itself justifies the removal
of laws or forms of governments, views the Ciceronian texts as a confirmation of his
theory, but his ideas actually rely on a more democratic foundation. Despite these
differences, however, both Cicero and Wilson turn to customary law and the stability of
tradition as an essential means of knowing and applying natural law in a way that allows
resistance to occur while still preserving an ordered state and a common respect for law.
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1. Cicero and resistance
Throughout his lifetime, Cicero consistently used his writings as a means of defending
his political decisions and associating himself with the image of statesmanship
portrayed in them.1 This is not to say, however, that he lacked concern for the problems
and uncertainties of his time. In his works he genuinely endeavoured to identify and
avert the crises threatening the Republic.2 Both his public image and his effort to
preserve the Republic increasingly became centred on the issue of resistance to written
law.
As an advocate, Cicero employed various definitions of law and custom as
rhetorical strategies tailored to particular situations; in some cases he appealed to law
only as it applied to written statutes, and in others he provided a broader definition of
law that encompassed an unwritten and higher tradition. As the unknown author of the
Rhetorica ad Herennium notes, in the performance of arguing against the letter of the
law, one can appeal to intent and demonstrate that disobedience to the written law is
justified by another law or even by principles of mos, natura, or what is aequus et
bonus.3 The same tactic appears in Cicero’s de Inventione, when he explains how
arguments of justice and equity may be employed in setting aside written statute.4
After his condemnation of the Catilinarian conspirators without a trial, Cicero
first faced the necessity of justifying his own actions in legal terms. He appeals not to
expediency alone in his suspension of the laws of due process, but also to the safety of
the res publica, which he represents as the suprema lex to which a statesman is bound.5
His later treatises bear witness to his endeavour to portray his violation of written law as
consistent with the highest law of statesmanship.6 His own exile, which Clodius legally
engineered, forced Cicero to consider the issue of law from another angle. In this case,
he views the law as wrongly employed to suspend his own civil rights, and therefore
regards Clodius as attacking the state by making unjust laws of exile. The situation of
the Catilinarian conspirators and his own exile provided Cicero with the need to offer a
1 Fox (2000) 269; Steel (2005) 7, 15, 54, 61.
2 Rawson (1975) 159.
3 Rhetorica ad Herennium 2.10.14.
4 See above, p. 109.
5 Cic. Leg. 3.3.8.
6 Cic. De Or. 1.1.3; Cic. Rep. 1.4.7; Cic. Off. 1.22.77.
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specific interpretation of law, and thus, in his later treatises, he offers a perspective
justifying his actions both to himself and to others.
In allowing for the option of resistance, Cicero broke with previous political
philosophy. For example, although it is only a thought experiment, one may consider
how Plato would have reacted to the issues facing Cicero. In the Crito, Plato addresses
the question of how to respond to unjust laws. While acknowledging that the laws have
wrongly condemned him, Socrates even rejects the idea of passively resisting the laws
by departing from Athens and escaping from their power. Whether the laws have
rightly accused him or not, he believes he must submit to their authority, and argues that
a private individual has no excuse to oppose a law, even if its application conflicts with
justice.7 Indeed, in his personification of the state, Socrates says that if you cannot
persuade her of the rightness of your cause, then you must be prepared ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν 
κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα (to do whatever she
commands, and to suffer, whatever she bids you to suffer, keeping silent).8 Instead of
accepting this premise that disobedience to the laws brings about their destruction as
well as that of the state, Cicero argues that disobedience is sometimes necessary to
protect the people and the state. Hence, Cicero makes a distinction between higher law
and written law that permits resistance.9
Cicero’s approach focuses on the safety of the state as upheld by citizens who
fulfil the principles of justice. The themes of motivation and intent in de Officiis are
essential to this perspective, since in guarding the interests of the state and its citizens,
discretion at times may call a good statesman to neglect performance of a written law,
even as an individual may fail to keep a promise lest it rebound to the hurt of another.
This fits with Cicero’s depiction of the citizen-statesman: tradetque se totum rei
publicae neque opes aut potentiam consectabitur totamque eam sic tuebitur ut omnibus
consulat (and he will surrender his whole self to the republic, and he will pursue neither
resources nor political power for himself, and will so watch out for the entire state that
he may consult the interests of all).10 He emphasises the same principle in de
Republica, asserting that the ultimate end of the statesman is to guarantee the happy
7 Pl. Cri. 50a-b.
8 Ibid. 51b.
9 Harries (2006) 57; cf. McIlwain (1958) 35-36.
10 Cic. Off. 1.25.86.
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lives of the citizens—lives secure in wealth, rich in resources, great in glory, and
respected in virtue.11 Therefore, just as the officia of an individual alter according to the
situation and just as he must follow the principles of justice as he can best perceive
them in a given instance, even so the statesman must be guided by his primary duty of
protecting the safety of the state and the well-being of its citizens. While following the
written laws is normally part of this officia, as Tanner remarks, the argument of de
Officiis is that “the conscience of a Wise Man as a good citizen of any society must lead
him to prefer and follow the largest good for the largest number as he sees it, whether in
so doing he uphold or defy the statutes of his country as then enforced”.12 This theory
enabled Cicero to justify the murder of Caesar: although virtue forbids slaying a fellow
man, it is honourable to kill a tyrant in defence of the state.13 Thus, Cicero’s final
writings establish the theory that the virtue of the good citizen may occasionally dictate
civil disobedience.
In addition to interpreting the duties of a statesman in this way, de Officiis can
also be read as affirming the right of the people to possess this type of leader, who will
actively seek their good and ensure that justice is upheld. Cicero says in 2.12.41-42 that
the people first chose leaders and appointed laws in order that they might have justice
(iustitia) and equal rights (ius aequabile). He adds that before the tyranny of Caesar,
the state was governed by those quibus se ipsa commiserat (to whom she had entrusted
herself).14 Power, therefore, is assigned to the leaders and to the laws in order to fulfil
the specific purpose of ensuring the people’s welfare.15
Although Cicero employs these conclusions to justify the murder of a tyrant, he
does not carry the application to the point of legitimising revolution. Nonetheless, the
idea subtly underlies his argument that if the interests of the res publica are not met and
justice is overturned, then individuals may reestablish their leaders and laws on a
rightful basis, just as when Lucius Brutus as a privatus (private citizen) freed the early
Romans from the tyrants.16 Influenced by more personal motives, Cicero’s defence of
Sestius follows the same line of reasoning. Portraying Clodius in pro Sestio 7.15 as oti
11 Cic. Rep. 5.6.8; cf. 2.29.51.
12 Tanner (1972) 112.
13 Cic. Off. 3.4.19.
14 Ibid. 2.1.2.
15 For a similar reading of de Republica, see Schofield (1995) 74-76 on the people’s authority in
entrusting powers to the state and on their right to have their interests protected.
16 Cic. Rep. 2.25.46.
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et communis salutis inimici (an enemy of tranquillity and the public safety), Cicero
argues that his edicts were contrary to law and to the liberty of the citizens and that
Sestius’ use of force was a justified defence of the res publica.17
In his arguments supporting disobedience to written law, therefore, Cicero
makes a connection between justice and civil disobedience, arguing that the higher
standard of justice not only permits one to engage in an unlawful action but even makes
such an action honorable and virtuous. This legitimisation of resistance contrasts with
Wilson’s approach, which associates popular sovereignty and civil disobedience.
Cicero never argues that the removal of popular consent entails resistance. Although he
never makes the argument as such, his discussion in de Republica appears to imply that
no matter what type of government exists, so long as it upholds the interests of the state
and rightly dispenses justice, the people should be satisfied.
2. Wilson and resistance
The circumstances of his own time placed a similar burden on Wilson to legitimise the
American Revolution and his own part in it. Indeed, one of the main characteristics of
the American writers was their thoughtful approach to the issue of revolution and their
hesitancy to take action against the mother country unless they could vindicate
themselves in legal and political terms.18 For Wilson, the issue of popular sovereignty
and its connection with civil disobedience becomes the guiding theme throughout his
lectures on law, and his disagreement or alignment with previous political thinkers is
largely based on whether their interpretation of law grants the people the right of
resistance. At the heart of his theory of popular sovereignty is the premise that any
institution or law made without the people’s consent cannot constitute a legitimate
authority. Such was the doctrine that provided the American states with the willingness
to rebel.19 While Wilson applied the theory of resistance much more broadly than
Cicero by developing it to the point of revolution, he imitated Cicero in framing the
17 Cic. Sest. 13.30, 38.83; cf. Fantham (2004) 308.
18 Bailyn (1967) 18, 142.
19 McLaughlin (1932) 117; Wood, G. S. (1969) 45.
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debate in terms of law and justice. Also like Cicero, he found himself compelled on a
personal level to construct a theory of higher law that justified civil disobedience.
Central to Wilson’s declaration of popular consent is the right of the people to
throw off those laws not established by their consent and contrary to the principles of
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”.20 He realises that his theory of consent has
serious implications for the stability of laws and governmental forms. Once it is granted
that the only moral or obligatory force a government or a system of laws possesses is
that which has been granted to it by the people, then a corresponding right of resistance
also arises: if the people have not consented, the government is not legitimate and its
laws are only bonds of tyranny.21 When power is opposed to right, it is stripped of
every claim to obedience.22
Wilson’s distinction between right and power rests in turn on a distinction
between human law and divine law. Any law created by an individual or a group is still
only a law of human creation. Not surprisingly, Wilson rejects the concept of the divine
right of kings, and argues on the basis of equality that no man can lawfully compel the
obedience of his fellow men. While one is under a moral obligation to obey divine
laws, the same does not hold true of laws created by an equal.23 Throughout history,
Wilson observes, two justifications have been given for maintaining authority over
others: that people must obey either those who are superior to them in strength or those
who are superior in excellence.24 However, while brute force may for a time compel
obedience, it does not entail any legal obligation of obedience. Nor does superior
excellence, while it may be esteemed, entitle its possessor to dominate others. Instead,
the only way a people can be bound by a human authority and be obligated to obey its
decrees is when they have first bound themselves through consent.25
Wilson does not hesitate to take the theory of popular sovereignty to its practical
and logical conclusion. At the start of his lectures, he even introduces popular
soveriegnty as the principle of revolution, which means that the people “always retain
the right of abolishing, altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time, and in
20 Declaration of Independence, paragraph 2.
21 Wilson (1804) 1:220.
22 Ibid. 1:458.
23 Ibid. 1:111.
24 Ibid. 1:108-109.
25 Ibid. 1:221; cf. 1:200, 212.
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whatever manner, they shall deem it expedient”.26 On this point, Wilson’s arguments
sharply but subtly conflict with Blackstone and other contemporaries of his.
The Declaration of Independence illustrates the way in which Wilson took the
theory of popular sovereignty to its logical conclusion. Many political theorists would
accept the beginning of the oft-quoted paragraph of the Declaration of Independence
regarding the rights of citizens: “to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”; however the
second clause provokes more disagreement:
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. 27
While the first premise is reminiscent of Cicero’s insistence on popular consent and the
duty of statesmen to ensure the happiness and well-being of the people,28 the second
premise advances beyond Cicero’s argument by asserting the people’s ultimate right to
change their government. Exploring the case of Blackstone demonstrates the
divergence among philosophers on this point. Blackstone happily accepted the initial
statement but departed from the American perspective of resistance expressed in the
paragraph’s conclusion. For this reason, Wilson strongly criticises Blackstone, who
admits the right of the people to change their legislature but considers it a purely
theoretical notion impossible to implement in practice.29 By contrast, Wilson argues
26 Ibid. 1:17.
27 Declaration of Independence, paragraph 2.
28 For Cicero’s view on the duty of statesmen, see above p. 148. To a great extent, Cicero’s statements
on this point contradict Benjamin Constant’s widely-accepted depiction of Roman liberty as guaranteeing
political involvement in government but denying individual rights: “Toutes les actions privées sont
soumise à une surveillance sévère. Rien n'est accordé à l'indépendance individuelle, ni sous le rapport des
opinions, ni sous celui de l'industrie, ni surtout sous le rapport de la religion” [Constant (1819)]. Cf.
Brunt (1988) 298-300 on Constant’s inaccurate perspective of the liberties of the individual citizen during
the late Roman Republic.
29 Wilson (1804) 1:181. The position of English law on this topic is itself a matter of complexity. James
Otis and other American colonial leaders appealed to Bonham’s Case (1610) in their attempt to justify
their actions to their English counterparts. In this case, Sir Edward Coke made the statement that “it
appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul acts of parliament, and
sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of parliament is against common right and
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such
act to be void” (8 Co. Rep. 107a, 114a C.P. 1610). Due to its implications for judicial review, this
judgement produced a flurry of controversy and has been the subject of a number of differing
interpretations. In 1614, Chief Justice Hobart made a similar comment that “even an Act of Parliament,
made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in itself, for jura naturae sunt
immutabilia, and they are leges legum”, but others like Lord Ellesmere argued that such judgements could
not be made by the courts [Berger (1969) 532, 540]. The meaning of Coke’s declaration continues to be
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that those possessing the right to originally establish laws and government must also
possess the right to alter them.30
Although Wilson constantly examines the underlying principles of his theories
and attempts to address them both philosophically and practically, he, unlike other
political thinkers, does not focus on whether a tyrannical law ceases by definition to be
law at all. At one point, he does quote Richard Hooker to say that laws cannot exist
without public approval.31 For Wilson, though, the primary issue is not whether such
laws exist in fact or theory, but whether they can compel obedience. In his opinion,
since the people always possess the sovereign right of changing or abolishing their
government, they also possess the right and even the duty of resisting tyranny. If force
is used to compel their obedience and they are not able to resist, then their right is not
destroyed but only postponed until an opportune and feasible time.32
Clearly, Wilson has the War for Independence in his mind when he outlines his
philosophical principles, often drawing connections between his theory of consent and
an object of discussion. Bailyn, for instance, argues the Coke merely meant that the courts must interpret
statutes in accordance with general principles of reason and justice [(1967) 177]. While he accepts that
such an understanding is more consistent with English case law, Holdsworth distinguishes between the
sovereign power of Parliament to pass general laws and their right to pass laws contravening “those
fundamental moral rules which seemed to be a part of that law of nature which natural reason teaches all
mankind”; furthermore, he recognises that the underlying issue of sovereignty in the state still remained
unresolved after the Revolution of 1688 [(1923) 2:442-444; 6:258]. Regardless of how Coke’s statement
ought to be understood, the American interpretation of Bonham’s Case identified this fundamental
tension in English law regarding sovereignty. For if, as in English law, the right of revolution against a
king who acted contrary to certain set and accepted principles was clearly recognised from the beginning
[Pollock and Maitland (1968) 181-183], then surely the same principles must equally bind acts of
Parliament. Wilson pinpoints this discrepancy, referencing the statements of both Sir Edward Coke and
Sir Henry Hobart in his condemnation of Blackstone’s unwillingness to allow the courts to judge acts of
Parliament void if inconsonant with natural or divine law [(1804) 1:456-457]. As previously mentioned,
the Ciceronian texts hold a prominent position in Coke’s writings (see above, p. 21), and this classical
influence appears to be at work in Bonham’s Case as well as in the later opinions of those like Hobart. In
his analysis of these higher principles and obligations, Wilson also turns directly to Cicero.
30 Wilson (1804) 1:418-419. In his Second Treatise of Government, Locke argues for a viewpoint similar
to Wilson’s, and his statements closely resemble the wording of the Declaration of Independence when he
speaks of the natural freedoms of humankind (7.87.1-10), of the necessary consent they give the
government (8.106.4-8), and of the supreme power the people possess to alter their government
(13.149.5-17). Although Wilson clearly concurs with this view and is familiar with Locke’s writings, his
citations of Locke do not focus on Locke’s exploration of the people’s right to change their government.
Instead, Wilson explores the ways in which Locke’s arguments for the existence of ideas led to scepticism
and Locke’s relation to the thought of Berkely, Hume, Hartley, and Priestley [Wilson (1804) 1:67, 258,
265-272]. Possibly, Wilson may have accepted Blackstone’s reading of Locke, which viewed him as
providing a merely theoretical argument for resistance not intended for practical application [cf. Wilson
(1804) 1:18]; in any case, when building his own case for resistance, Wilson turns to other authors and
frequently to the Ciceronian texts. Cf. Pangle (1988) 126 on the influence of Locke’s theory of revolution
on the founding fathers and on Wilson; in contrast to this view, cf. Conkin (1974) 22-23.
31 Wilson (1804) 1:102.
32 Ibid. 1:110.
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its applicability to the American colonies. Indeed, he views the competing
interpretations of law as the very reason for the war. He argues that the “despotick
claims” of Great Britain were founded on the notion that law is the power of a superior
against an inferior,33 while a proper idea of law based on consent was what justified the
colonies in their resistance. Carefully, Wilson lays out the argument that as citizens of
Great Britain, the colonists should have enjoyed the right of consenting to acts of
parliament as well as the duty of obeying them; because they had no representation in
that legislative body, they had no consent and no corresponding duty of obedience.34
In effect, Wilson accepted the doctrine of sovereignty espoused by many in
Great Britain that the king could be held accountable if he refused to yield to higher
obligations, but he developed this argument further by applying this principle to
Parliament. Such a philosophical step, however, introduced additional complexities and
could not conclusively resolve the tangled issue of sovereignty. Two main areas of
tension appear in Wilson’s attempt to construct a constitutional system that in its
practical workings protects the principle of popular sovereignty
The first area involves the judicial branch and the absence of limits set on its
authority to interprete the Constitution. For Wilson, the separate court system and its
ability to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional and void acted as a guard against
legislative infringement of authority. In practical terms, he looked to the courts to
uphold the principle of popular consent by striking down unconstitutional laws of the
legislature.35 While many of the Anti-Federalists vigorously opposed such a powerful
supreme court and declared that its authority would degenerate into judicial tyranny,36
Wilson’s strong reliance on the doctrine of popular consent prevented him from
endorsing such fears. In fact, his concern that the legislature might usurp the liberty of
the people and his belief that it must be guided by universal principles of reason and
justice even led him to consider granting greater authority to the courts. Thus, in the
Constitutional Convention, he hinted at the idea, which his colleagues promptly
rejected, that the judiciary power should not only be able to declare laws void if they
were deemed to be unconstitutional, but also if they were contrary to natural justice:
33 Ibid. 1:82.
34 Ibid. 2:57.
35 Ibid. 1:462.
36 Cf. Ketcham (1986) 293-298 on the anti-federalist perspective presented by the anonymous author
‘Brutus’.
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“Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive, and yet
not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect.”37
While Wilson’s suggestion was not accepted, it demonstrates his deep-rooted allegiance
to a higher law or standard of equity that must bind political leaders as well as citizens.
Nevertheless, the power of the Supreme Court to broadly interprete the Constitution and
thereby overrule legislative decisions still remains a point of complexity and a source of
political strife.
The second main area of tension occurs in the practical provision allowing for
majority rule. Notably, Wilson views the divine law that provides the people with the
justification to overturn human laws as a restraining force on their actions. An
untrammelled democracy is far from what Wilson has in mind. Although the people
possess absolute sovereignty in regard to human government, they are not free to act
however they choose or to pass any law that suits their fancy. As previously noted, he
emphasises that when power is opposed to morality, it ceases to compel obedience. The
same is true of the laws passed by a tyrannous majority. Having quarrelled with
Blackstone over whether the legislature can compel a law contrary to reason and justice,
Wilson cannot deny that the same governing principle must also apply to laws enacted
by the people with their full consent.
In terms of practical consent, Wilson equates the will of the people with the
majority and recognises that the minority must consent to the original agreement.38
This assertion, however, does not mean Wilson always believed the majority to be right
or that he did not perceive the danger of it tyrannising the minority. An individual or a
minority is not swallowed up in the general will: they still possess rights that should be
protected. As he clearly states, “on one side, indeed, there stands a single individual: on
the other side, perhaps, there stand millions: but right is weighed by principle; it is not
estimated by numbers”.39 Ever a child of the Enlightenment, however, Wilson’s
optimism in human progress gave him the hope that these obligations would be fulfilled
by future generations of Americans. As the majority fulfilled their moral obligations
and upheld justice, the popular right to change and overturn law would be reconciled
with the need for legal and political stability.
37 Farrand (1966) 2:73.
38 Wilson (1804) 1:310.
39 Ibid. 2:439.
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While Wilson does not give instructions for the proper manner of conducting a
revolution, he clearly views the example of the American colonies as a positive one.40
Furthermore, because his lectures centre on the issues and events of his time, he does
not address the details of individual resistance to a tyrannical law. The notion of a
single citizen resisting oppression does not naturally enter the scope of his discussion.
Nonetheless, Wilson still admits that a private citizen has the right to decide whether to
resist a particular law and may indeed be “justified in refusing to obey an
unconstitutional act of the legislature”; however, the citizen who disobeys the law must
also “abide by the consequences of a wrong judgement”.41 In the end, therefore, the
conscience of each citizen must decide whether a higher standard of justice conflicts
with written law.
For Wilson, this question of individual consent to the law is an important one,
which he tries to reconcile with his perspective of majority rule. Although democratic
institutions cannot demand universal acceptance of every law, the consent of each
citizen must still be obtained. If the minority finds that the original compact or its
intention has changed, and they no longer desire to live under such a government and
laws, they must be free to leave with their effects.42 While he says that in some
circumstances emigration may be restricted, he favours a system of open emigration so
that citizens withholding their consent to the nation’s laws and institutions may depart.43
As evidence for the just and practical application of this right, Wilson notes the example
of the Digesta of Roman law, which allowed individuals the freedom to choose the state
of their citizenship.44 In support of the strong connection between free emigration and
his conceptions of liberty and consent, Wilson also quotes from the pro Balbo 13.31,
which upholds the “power of retaining and of renouncing our rights of citizenship”.45
What Wilson appears to overlook is that his view of majority rule exposes him
to the same criticism he brought against Blackstone, who argued that while the people
theoretically have the right to change or abolish their legislature, in actual practice the
authority of Parliament is supreme. Similarly, Wilson argues that an individual or a
40 Cf. Wilson (1804) 1:21 on the example of the United States as proof that the principle of consent is not
dangerous, despite its revolutionary nature.
41 Ibid. 1:211.
42 Ibid. 1:418.
43 Ibid. 1:317.
44 Ibid. 1:315.
45 See above, p. 66 for the whole of this quotation and Wilson’s translation.
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minority has the right to disobey an unjust or unconstitutional law, but he provides no
practical way for such a law to be overthrown. Thus, while his theory asserts that the
majority are bound by abstract principles of justice and duty, the only remedy he
provides for a persecuted minority is to depart. In this case, Wilson’s doctrine appears
to reflect Plato’s perspective in the Crito, that those who disagree with the laws and
government of a country should depart and that if they remain they give their tacit
consent to abide by its decisions.46
On the general issue of reconciling popular sovereignty with civil liberties, Read
criticises Wilson, saying that his idealism prompted him to ignore the actual tensions in
political affairs, consequently leading him to reject practical safeguards such as the Bill
of Rights.47 Such an interpretation, however, minimises Wilson’s political perspicacity.
While undeniably optimistic in his views of human progress, Wilson does not claim to
have resolved the complexities of popular sovereignty. Instead, he accepts the reality
that if sovereign power is possessed by the people and exercised by the majority, there
can be no ultimate check to that authority. Neither governmental institution nor
political leader can long prevent the majority from carrying out their will. The first and
central question for Wilson is “are men capable of governing themselves?” and second,
“are they qualified—and are they disposed to obey themselves?”.48 If assent is obtained
to those questions, there is no other place to turn if the people should act unjustly or
unwisely. As Wilson soberly acknowledges before the Pennsylvania Convention, for a
people unwilling to govern themselves, “there is no remedy: from their power … there
is no appeal: to their errour, there is no superiour principle of correction”.49 Thus,
Wilson comprehends the danger of majority rule and acknowledges that there is no
human law or governmental protection that can infallibly prevent the majority from
abusing its power, but his commitment to popular sovereignty enables him to accept the
tension that exists in its practical workings.
46 Pl. Cri. 51d.
47 Read (2000) 113-114.
48 Wilson (1804) 2:435.
49 Ibid. 3:293. In his reply to William Findley on 1 December 1787, Wilson makes a similar comment,
saying that, “I have no idea, that a safe system of power, in the government, sufficient to manage the
general interest of the United States, could be drawn from any other source, or rested in any other
authority than that of the people at large, and I consider this authority as the rock on which this structure
will stand.—If this principle is unfounded, the system must fall” [Bailyn (1993) 1:821]. Cf. Wilson
(1804) 1:404.
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The question still remains of whether the people, as the whole body of free
citizens in the state, will be a responsible repository of sovereignty. Wilson’s optimism
may be as ephemeral as the confidence expressed in de Clementia for Nero’s regard of
the duties of kingship. In Wilson’s opinion, however, history has proven that individual
liberty and the wisdom of customary law are best preserved by popular authority.
Sovereignty, as an indivisible principle, by right belongs to the people and must be
granted to them despite possible consequences. Where else can it safely be placed?
3. The stability of tradition and customary law
Although they allowed for resistance to written law, neither Cicero nor Wilson can be
regarded as true democrats. Since Wilson leaned more fully on the doctrine of popular
consent in justifying resistance, he faced a greater challenge than Cicero in reconciling
the tension between popular consent and adherence to higher law. Like the other
founders, Wilson was loath to equate the will of the people with the highest law;
instead, he circumscribed his doctrine of popular sovereignty by the limits of virtue and
justice.50 He sought to describe this doctrine not so much as a revolutionary principle,
but as a devotion to traditional principles of government that proscribed the current
system and left them no option but to renounce it. Cicero also appealed to the ancient
traditions as a source of stability for his claim that the unwritten laws carried authority
and could be used to justify disobedience to written statutes. Both Cicero and Wilson
look to principles of right, duty, and justice that do not originate from the written laws
but come from an outside source.51 Confirmed by a tradition of time and usage, these
standards not only bind the citizens themselves, but also in a few critical circumstances
give them the right to act contrary to the written laws. In this way, stability and
accountability coincide to allow the possibility of resistance.
Customary law is Wilson’s instrument for resolving the conflict between
popular consent and higher law. Trusting in the wisdom and reasoning ability of the
50 Wood, G. S. (1969) 67. Conkin, in designating natural law and popular sovereignty as the “two main
sources of American constitutionalism”, recognises that natural law prevents the will of the people from
being the “sole criterion of legitimacy” [(1974) 3, 119-120].
51 Kirk (2003) 111-113; cf. Conkin (1974) x.
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people, he believes that majority rule combined with customary law provides the best
practical answer to the question of how one perceives and applies these universal
standards.52 In a sense, Wilson’s view of customary law could be described as natural
law in its practical workings.
The importance and stability of tradition cannot be overemphasised as a
counterpart to Wilson’s theory of revolution. Despite his whole-hearted acceptance and
defence of the revolutionary principle, Wilson does not desire frequent changes in laws
or government. He claims that it is “not a principle of discord, rancour, or war: it is a
principle of melioration, contentment, and peace”.53 While he admits some eras may
see greater changes in the legal system and in custom itself,54 Wilson believes that a
nation relying on customary law will experience only seldom and slow alterations. By
definition, his understanding of customary law implies stability, since it is slowly
developed over time, and since its wisdom is proven by time and experience.
The United States Constitution is a necessary accompaniment to Wilson’s
system of customary law. He believes that this overall framework and form of
government will protect the principles of liberty and popular sovereignty and will
remain the same even as changing situations require some specific provisions to remain
and others to fall away through disuse.55 Furthermore, Wilson points to the vis inertiae
that prevents fundamental changes in governments unless warranted by some great
necessity, and argues that when the people understand that they may alter the laws, they
are less likely to act impulsively or with reckless abandon.56
Thus, Wilson does not anticipate any great changes in the United States
Constitution or in its system of government. When amendments occur, they will likely
be minor and will take place gradually under a constitution and form of government that
safeguards the right of the people to make those changes when necessary. A system of
customary law both epitomises and attests to those principles most protective of the
people’s liberty, most in conformance to their will, and most closely aligned with
natural law. Ultimately, customary law will continue to operate regardless of
interference so long as the principle of consent is held sacrosanct. Even though
52 Cf. Hall (1997) 122, 143-144; McCloskey (1967) 39.
53 Wilson (1804) 1:21.
54 Ibid. 2:40.
55 Ibid. 2:38; cf. 1:417.
56 Ibid. 1:420-421.
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temporary errors or the passions of humankind may periodically disrupt the peace of the
state, Wilson is confident that a constitution resting on the basis of customary law will
in time restore the state to its natural peace and order.57
Ultimately, for such a system to function and for both liberty and stability in law
to continue, the people themselves must defend the traditions they have received. In
focusing on the perfections, knowledge, and reasonableness of customary law and on
the necessity for the people to accept and uphold its provisions, Wilson turns again to
the ancients. In the high rhetoric reminiscent of classical authors, Wilson explores how
the system of laws slowly collected, refined, and established by “our predecessors and
ancestors” is not only progressive, just, and strong, but is “our dearest birthright and
richest inheritance”.58 Cicero, Wilson assumes, was referring to just such a system of
customary law in the pro Caecina 26.74-75:
Mihi credite: maior haereditas venit, unicuique vestrum, a iure et a legibus, quam ab iis,
a quibus bona relicta sunt. Nam, ut perveniat ad me fundus, testamento alicuius fieri
potest: ut retineam quod meum factum sit, sine iure civili non potest. [Fundus a patre
relinqui potest, at usucapio fundi, hoc est finis sollicitudinis ac periculi litium, non a
patre relinquitur, sed a legibus. Aquaeductus, haustus, iter, actus a patre: sed rata
auctoritas harum rerum omnium a iure civili sumitur.] Quapropter non minus diligenter
ea, quae a maioribus accepistis, publica patrimonia iuris, quam privatae rei vestrae,
retinere debetis; non solum quod haec iure civili septa sunt; sed etiam quod patrimonium
unius incommodo demittitur; ius amitti non potest sine magno incommodo civitatis.59
Believe me: a greater inheritance comes, to each one of you, from justice and the laws,
than from those who may leave you wealth. For, a farm may come to me, by the will of
anyone this is able to happen: but in order for me to hold fast what is my own, this cannot
be without the civil law. [A farm is able to be bequeathed by one’s father, but the
acquisition of ownership of the farm, that is, the freedom from anxiety and the danger of
a lawsuit, these are not bequeathed by one’s father, but by the laws. The drawing of
water or the passage of an aqueduct, this right is obtained from one’s father, but the
established title to all of these things is obtained from the civil law.] Wherefore you
ought to hold fast the public inheritance of the law which you received from your
ancestors no less carefully than the inheritance of your private property; not only because
this property is protected by the civil law, but also because while it is disadvantageous to
an individual to lose his inheritance, the law is not able to be lost without great
disadvantage to the state.
As seen from the bracketed sections of the quotation, Wilson’s translation makes the
point more succinct by leaving out the examples Cicero provides:
57 Ibid. 2:42.
58 Ibid. 1:206.
59 Wilson renders the first phrase differently than both the Teubner and 1692 editions. The Teubner
edition reads: “maior hereditas uni ciuque nostrum venit in isdem bonis a iure et a legibus quam ab iis a
quibus illa ipsa bona nobis relicta sunt”; while the 1692 reads: “maior hereditas venit, unicuique vestrum
in iisdem bonis, a iure, et a legibus, quam ab iis, a quibus illa ipsa bona relicta sunt”. Wilson is
consistent with the 1692 edition for the rest of the quotation, although Teubner renders the phrases: “civili
fieri non potest”, “saepta sunt”, “verum etiam quod”, and “incommode dimittetur”.
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Believe me, a more inestimable inheritance descends to you from the law, than from
those who have left, or may leave you fortunes. A farm may be transmitted to me by the
will of any one: but it is by the law alone that I can peacefully hold what is already my
own. You ought, therefore, to retain the publick patrimony of the law, which you have
received from your ancestors, with no less assiduity than you retain your private estates;
not only because these are fenced and protected by the law; but for this further reason,
because the loss of a private fortune affects only an individual, whereas the loss of the
law would be deeply detrimental to the whole commonwealth.60
Wilson’s selection of this passage is carefully chosen. In context, Wilson is speaking of
customary law and its heritage, but he employs a Ciceronian quotation that not only
references customary law, but also clearly refers to the written laws safeguarding
property rights. Although he was clearly capable of analysing the various legal terms
employed by Cicero such as ius, leges, and ius civile, all of which carried different
meanings for their Roman audience, Wilson deliberately translates them all as “law”.
This conforms to his own overriding practice in this chapter ‘On the Common Law’,
where he attempts to demonstrate the connection between customary law and its written
expressions. For Wilson, the two form part of a united legacy of law and liberty. In his
view, customary law, founded on experience and on natural justice and reason, forms
and interprets written statutes as well as the overall system of law. In this translation,
therefore, he may be choosing not to distinguish between the different types of law in
order to focus on how they coincide and are jointly maintained.
Wilson also uses this Ciceronian passage to instil and reinforce his conception of
individual rights. Similar to Wilson’s oft-repeated quotation from the pro Cluentio, this
quotation conveys the idea that if the people desire to maintain their freedom, they must
obey and preserve the law as their common inheritance (publica patrimonia). Indeed,
the function of the law is to protect rights already existing separately from the law and
possessed by the people: “it is by the law alone that I can peacefully hold what is
already my own”.61
This passage from the pro Caecina also supports Wilson’s perspective of the
relationship between individuals and the community or state as a whole. Although he
believes that the law exists to protect the liberties of individuals—in this case their
property rights—he also emphasises the need for individuals to submit themselves to
the general law of the community and even to willingly sacrifice their personal interest
when necessary to protect its well-being. Ultimately, the stability and liberty of any
60 Wilson (1804) 2:46-47.
61 Ibid. 2:47.
189
nation depends not only on popular consent in framing law but also in the people’s
willingness to protect and defend it as a public legacy.
Wilson’s application of the quotation from the pro Caecina is consistent with
Cicero’s own use of the argument within its historical context. In admitting that
Aebutius’ wrongful ejection of Aulus Caecina from his estate was not necessarily
condemned by the wording of a statute, Cicero also argues that the act was contrary to
the intention of the law and undermined true equity and justice.62 In the passage cited
by Wilson, Cicero skilfully appeals to the whole system of Roman law, as evident in his
use of the phrase ius et leges. The written statues, the interpretations of the jurists, and
the unwritten legal principles and customs together formed the interconnected tradition
of law that Cicero employs in Caecina’s defence.63 The long-standing nature of these
laws and customs serve as a basis for Cicero’s appeal to their authority. In a manner
similar to Wilson’s later account of the legal history in the United States, Cicero praises
the lawgivers of Rome for imparting a tradition of laws and institutions throughout the
ages that could not have resulted from the wisdom of one leader.64 Like Wilson’s belief
that the United States possessed the best existing constitution, Cicero believes that
Rome’s ancient customs have enabled her to achieve the optimum statum civitatis (the
best form of state).65
Even as Wilson trusts in the reliability of customary law, so also Cicero looks to
the legal principles of the ius civile and to the mos maiorum as a means of determining
the higher principles of law. On a practical level, despite Cicero’s focus on the
philosophical origins and the nature of governments and laws, his conservative position
leads him to emphasise the necessity of following tradition rather than to explore the
radical possibilities of his theories. Although de Legibus was never completed, the
concluding statement serves as an appropriate reminder of this need to rely on the
authority of the ancients. Here, Cicero upholds the usefulness of examining the origins
of the ius naturae, but adds that with regard to the law of the Roman people we must
follow that which has been bequeathed and handed down to us.66 Even Cotta’s remark
62 Cic. Caecin. 17.49, 18.51-52, 19.55, 25.70.
63 Harries (2002) 66, 68; cf. Usher (2008) 38-39.
64 Cic. Rep. 2.1.2.
65 Ibid. 1.20.33; cf. 1.22.35, 1.46.70, 2.16.30.
66 Cic. Leg. 3.20.49. Dyck notes that due to the corrupt transmission of this sentence it is impossible to
affirm that the discussion would have continued solely along the lines of accepting all previous tradition
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at the end of the discussion on the existence of the gods in de Natura Deorum is
consistent with this position; for, whatever conclusions may be drawn from the debate,
he will still be guided by the ancient customs and no oratio aut docti aut indocti
(eloquence of either the learned or ignorant) will cause him to depart from the religion
imparted by ancestral tradition.67 Thus, although the Ciceronian texts can be read as
affirming the power of the people and supporting a theory of resistance, ultimately
Cicero still regards the people as bound by the sovereign authority of customary law.68
In conclusion, therefore, it has been seen that together with Cicero, Wilson
sought to unite the community in sharing a conception of justice and virtue, which both
men asserted is principally known and accepted through the medium of custom and
tradition. This point, I believe, acts as a necessary complement to the viewpoint of
Republican politics put forward by Fergus Millar, to whom I am indebted for his
discussions of political power and democratic processes in the Roman Republic. His
insightful work, The Roman Republic in Political Thought, focuses on significant
elements of popular sovereignty and traces this theme through classical and
contemporary perspectives of the Roman Republic; nevertheless, by focusing on the
Roman system as one “untrammeled by constitutional safeguards” where “the people,
and not the law, is the final sovereign”, Millar neglects to mention the important role of
custom and how it limited the people’s perception of their power and the exercise of
it.69 The Roman constitution allowed for innovation and new interpretations of custom,
which the people, as represented by the juries, could constantly reinterpret; however, the
unwritten laws of custom, tradition, and equity operated as a meaningful check upon the
exercise of unrestrained power. Although Cicero is referring specifically to written law
in the pro Cluentio, he recognises that the permanence of the state and the ability to
claim the title of a free people exist only through adherence to these popular norms. As
he reminds the judges, in sanctioning the laws they also place themselves under them;
for, quoniam omnia commoda nostra, iura, libertatem, salutem denique legibus
obtinemus, a legibus non recedamus (since we obtain all our advantages, rights, liberty,
[(2004) 554]; nonetheless, the overall sense of the sentence still affirms the authority and stability of
Roman law
67 Cic. Nat. D. 3.2.5.
68 Harries (2006) 148.
69 Millar (2002) 8, 176.
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and finally our safety through the laws, let us not diverge from the laws).70 Supporting
this interpretation of the Roman Republic, Zetzel, calls attention to its nature as “a
profoundly traditional society, resting on the mos maiorum and unwritten law” and
compares Cicero’s philosophy with English theorists like Burke who in direct contrast
to Locke based the legitimacy of government not upon popular consent but upon
“history, precedent, or tradition”.71 Even in recognising the important role of the
populus in the late Republic, therefore, the authority of custom must also be noted.
Wilson, carefully taking account of the philosophical strands of thought
preceding him, proceeded to bind them into a political theory based on the Ciceronian
principles of popular consent and the authority of custom and tradition. As this chapter
has demonstrated, although Wilson takes his conclusions further than Cicero by
employing his own doctrine of popular sovereignty in support of revolution, he attempts
to modify his democratic perspective with a Ciceronian emphasis on the stability of
custom, to which even a sovereign people must give heed. In the process of
legitimising their political actions through recourse to legal philosophy, both Cicero and
Wilson constructed theories that allowed for civil disobedience while still maintaining
strong and abiding institutions and a due respect for law and tradition.
70 Cic. Clu. 57.155.
71 Zetzel (2001) 86.
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Conclusion
This thesis has sought to fill an evident gap neglected by previous scholarship: namely,
the centrality of the classics and specifically Cicero, in Wilson’s writings. The first
chapter of this thesis demonstrated that as a result of an education based on the classical
texts and his own aptitude and strong inclination toward study, Wilson acquired a
thorough knowledge of classical works as well as of the writings of his contemporaries.
In examining the quotations he employed from Cicero, the second chapter established
his direct reliance on the texts. Wilson’s translations, the comparisons he makes
between different works, and his disagreement with alternative readings of the texts,
attest to his understanding not only of the works themselves but also of their context in
the wider field of Ciceronian thought.
Chapters three and four analysed the topics of popular sovereignty and civic
virtue within the framework of Cicero’s and Wilson’s political thought, and revealed the
primary role of Cicero’s texts in the development of Wilson’s philosophy. In his effort
to utilise Cicero’s authority in support of his arguments, Wilson read the quotations
within the context of his own time, often broadening their application and drawing
conclusions that are not present in the texts. Nevertheless, Wilson’s conception of
popular sovereignty and its accompanying theory of civic virtue, two key theories on
which he constructs the philosophy of his law lectures, reveal a striking correspondence
to Cicero’s thought. Additionally, while Wilson’s interpretations of Cicero’s works
were influenced by the intermediary authors he also studied, reading Cicero through the
filter of their diverse perspectives, his viewpoints of their writings were shaped in turn
by his classical readings. He frequently based his commendation or criticism of
contemporary authors on their alignment with classical perspectives.
After establishing the relation between Cicero’s and Wilson’s thought, chapter
five looked at the ways in which they applied their philosophy to the events of their
respective times and to the decisions they made as statesmen. As he formulated his
justification of the American Revolution, Wilson turned to the classics for a conception
of law and history that legitimized his position. His very attempt to apply Cicero’s texts
to the issues he faced as a lawyer and statesman is a final tribute to Wilson’s
appreciation of Cicero’s approach. Practically-minded as a politician, yet also desirous
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to achieve congruence between his philosophy and policy choices, Wilson follows
Cicero in constructing a specific version of history and tradition to justify his political
actions.1 For Wilson and the other founders, who read the classics as imparting
universal principles with application to daily life, the classical past served as an
authoritative and motivating source for guidance in the questions that confronted them
as individuals and politicians.2
Like Cicero, Wilson not only looked to the past for direction, but also pictured
himself as a source of advice for future generations. Viewing their texts as a legacy,
Cicero and Wilson believed that their perspectives of law and government were
essential not only to the lasting stability of their respective states but also to the benefit
of other nations. Cicero, for instance, believed that the laws and constitution of Rome
would apply to other states as well, saying that non enim populo Romano, sed omnibus
bonis firmisque populis leges damus (for we are shaping laws not only for the Roman
people, but for all good and stable nations).3 Similarly, Wilson and the other founders
were convinced that the laws, institutions, and principles of the American founding
would serve as a guiding light to the rest of humankind, an idea still underlining the
commonly-held conviction of American politicians that the democratic ideals of the
United States should be sold to the rest of the world.4
Thus, despite his personal slant, Wilson provides valuable readings of Cicero on
issues nearly related to our own time as well as to current topics of Ciceronian
scholarship. Since Wilson has exerted a profound but largely unrecognised impact on
the political direction and mindset of the United States, his works warrant further
scholarship. In particular, it would be valuable to analyse Wilson’s understanding of
natural law and its relation to foreign and domestic policies, his influence on the
writings of his contemporaries and on the specific provisions of the Constitution, and
his application of the theories of the Scottish Enlightenment and of the English common
law tradition to the colonial experience. Such efforts would provide a more
comprehensive picture of early American thought and would shed light on the historical
context in which questions of modern politics are still decided and discussed. The
1 Oakeshott (2004) 37 on the contrast between those who read history for practical instruction and those
who read it merely for factual knowledge.
2 Burns (1954) 142-144; Richard (2008) 179-180; Pangle (1988) 29.
3 Cic. Leg. 2.14.35.
4 Burns (1954) 149; Mansfield (1991) 131.
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recent publication of a new edition of Wilson’s writings points to the growing
recognition of his prominent place among the other founders and may evoke new
studies of his work and a renewed interest in his political thought.5
Although modern political science must confront issues unknown to the
founders, the importance of comprehending the ideas that shaped the formation of the
United States remains undiminished. By reading history as a means of gaining practical
knowledge, both Cicero and Wilson constructed the past in such a way as to justify their
own conduct and to provide stability in a time of social and political upheaval. At the
same time as they sought a philosophical rationale for their actions, the theories they
developed also imparted an impetus and resolve to their later decisions. This interplay
between action and thought in their writings, along with their theories of civic virtue
and popular sovereignty, are helpful in understanding modern viewpoints, since many
of these ideas still play an underlying and often unnoticed role in the foreign and
domestic policies of the United States, theories of democracy and civic identity, and the
implementation of constitutions.
5 Hall and Hall (2007).
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Appendix A: 1692 text of de Republica
This appendix contains the text of de Republica, taken from the chapter entitled ‘Marci
Tullii Ciceronis Scriptorum Fragmenta, in quibus & Somnium Scipionis’ in Volume X
of the Gruter, Wilhelm, and Gronovius edition (1692).1 As can be seen, it is divided
into two main sections. The first section from pages 196-201 contains the fragments of
the six books as were then extant, and the second section from pages 202-206 contains
the Somnium Scipionis.
1 See above, p. 16 for the background of this text and its place in the thesis.
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Appendix B: Contents of the 1692 edition
This appendix lists the contents of the eleven-volume set of the Ciceronian texts, edited
by Gruter, Wilhelm, and Gronovius (1692). Aside from emendations, the texts
accessible to Wilson were essentially the same as the texts as they are currently extant.
As already indicated in Appendix A, there is one main exception to this rule, which is
the text of de Republica.
Volume I:
 M. Tullii Ciceronis Historia, per Consules descripta, & in annos LXIV distincta per Franc.
Fabricium Marcoduranum.
 Rhetoricorum ad C. Herennium libri IV
 De Inventione Rhetorica libri II
Volume II:
 De Oratore ad Q. Fratrem libri III
 De Claris Oratoribus liber, qui dicitur Brutus
 Orator ad Brutum
 Topica ad C. Trebatium
 Partitiones Oratoriae
 De optimo genere Oratorum
Volume III:
 Pro P. Quinctio
 Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino
 Pro Q. Roscio Comoedo
 In C. Verrem septem
 Pro M. Fonteio
 Pro A. Caecina
Volume IV:
 Pro lege Manilia
 Pro A. Cluentio Avito
 Pro C. Cornelio, Maiestatis reo
 In Toga Candida, contra competitores
 Agrariae in P. Servilium Rullum tres
 Pro C. Rabirio perduellionis reo, ad Quirites
 In L. Catilinam quatuor
 Pro L. Murena
 Pro L. Flacco
 Pro P. Sulla
 Pro A. Licinio Archia Poeta
 Ad Quirites post reditum suum
 Post reditum in Senatu
 Pro domo sua ad Pontifices
 De Haruspicum responsis in Senatu
 Pro Cn. Plancio
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Volume V:
 Pro P. Sextio
 In Vatinium
 Pro M. Caelio
 De Provinciis Consularibus
 Pro L. Cornelio Balbo
 Pro M. Scauro
 In L. Calpurnium Pisonem
 Pro T. Annio Milone
 Pro C. Rabirio Postumo
 Pro M. Marcello
 Pro Q. Ligario
 Pro rege Deiotaro
 In M. Antonium Philippicae XIV
 Declamationes duae: una C. Sallustii in Ciceronem: altera Ciceronis, illius criminationi
respondentis
 Ad Populum & Equites Romanos, antequam iret exilium, Ciceroni falso, ut putatur, adscripta
Volume VI:
 Epistolarum libri XVI, quae vulgo dicuntur ad Familiares
Volume VII:
 Epistolarum ad T. Pomponium Atticum libri XVI
 Epistolarum ad Brutum liber singularis
 Epistolae ad Brutum, non ita pridem a Germanis repertae, & editae
 T. Pomponii Attici Vita, per Cornelium Nepotem
Volume VIII:
 Academicarum Quaestionum libri II
 De Finibus Bonorum & Malorum libri V
 Tusculanarum Quaestionum libri V
Volume IX:
 De natura Deorum libri III
 De Divinatione libri II
 De Fato liber singularis
 De Legibus libri III
Volume X:
 De Officiis libri III
 Cato Maior, seu de Senectute
 Laelius, vel de Amicitia
 Paradoxa Stoicorum sex
 Q. Cicero de petitione consulatus, ad M. Tullium Fratrem
 Marci Tullii Ciceronis Scriptorum Fragmenta, in quibus &
 Somnium Scipionis
 Timaeus, seu De Universo
 Consolatio M. T. Ciceroni adscripta
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Volume XI:
 Index Graeco-Latinus, continens Graecas dictiones passim occurrentes, & earum
interpretationes
 Index Rerum & Verborum
 Index Eorum ad quos scribit Cicero, & qui ad Ciceronem scribunt aut ad alios in libris
epistolarum XVI
 Index Eorum, quae occurrunt in notis Gronovii
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